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Personal and Professional Development 
 
Discuss the role of the therapeutic relationship in effecting change with clients. Compare 
and contrast at least two different theoretical orientations.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After approximately a half century of psychotherapy research, one of the most consistent 
findings is that the quality of the therapeutic alliance is the most robust predictor of treatment 
success  
(Safran & Muran, 2000, p. 1). 
 
One route to answering the question lies in concentrating on the therapeutic relationship as a 
predictor of successful outcome in psychotherapy, rather than a focus on the effectiveness of 
specific techniques of a therapeutic model.  In order to do this, I will address and attempt to define 
the role of the relationship within three theoretical orientations, how it is conceptualized through 
theory, and how it functions to implement change in outcome research.  I have chosen to explore 
the therapeutic relationship as a predictor of change in cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), family 
therapy and existential psychotherapy.  The reason for choosing these approaches was that they 
each reflect the different levels at which therapy operates; the individual  (CBT), a systems level 
(family therapy) and the world level (existential).  Using these therapeutic methods, I will aim to 
illustrate my belief that the relationship is the key component in effecting change for clients and not 
the model used. 
 
The therapeutic relationship refers to a bond formed between client and therapist during 
psychotherapy (Orlinksy & Howard, 1986).  It is now recognized across theoretic orientations as 
being one of the core conditions for facilitating therapy and implementing clinical change (Hazler & 
Barwick, 2001; Safran & Segal, 1990).  The interest in the therapeutic relationship may be, in part, 
an attempt to understand the shared, non-specific conditions that all therapists use to promote 
change (Hazler & Barwick, 2001).  This has been spurred on by meta-analytic studies indicating 
 6 
that no one therapy has been shown to be more effective than another (Bergin & Garfield, 1994; 
Gaston, 1990; Hunt, 1993; Horvath & Symonds, 1991; Orlinsky & Howard, 1994).  The growing 
body of evidence seems to suggest that it is the quality of the relationship that is more important for 
positive outcome and therapeutic efficacy, than the therapeutic techniques employed.  If the 
relationship is lacking, the therapy is less likely to be of benefit regardless of the therapeutic 
approach (The Department of Health, 2001; Horvath & Symonds, 1991; Martin, Gaske, & Davies, 
2000; Roth & Fonagy, 1996; Safran & Muran, 2000; Safran & Segal, 1990). 
 
A conceptualization of the therapeutic relationship 
 
Many commentators have stressed the importance of a solid therapeutic relationship as a 
prerequisite for change, regardless of the model used.  It has been suggested that there are core 
dimensions that can be applied transtheoretically (Bordin, 1979; Gaston, 1990; Luborsky, 1994; 
Orlinksy, Grawe & Parks, 1994,).  Bordin‟s (1979) theory of a working therapeutic alliance provides 
a comprehensive conceptualisation that is widely cited (Horvath & Greenberg, 1994; Johnson & 
Wright, 2002; Safran & Muran, 2000; Safran & Segal, 1990).  The theory presupposes that all 
psychotherapies need a strong alliance to be effective.  The type of alliance and the demands 
placed on the therapist and client will vary across therapies.  The strength of the alliance will be 
determined by the compatibility of client and therapist with these demands (Johnson & Wright, 
2002).  
 
According to Bordin (1979), the alliance is based upon interdependent components; the strength of 
agreement between client and therapist about the tasks and goals of therapy and on the quality of 
the interpersonal bond between them.  Tasks refer to the specific skills of a therapy and the degree 
of concordance with these and the client‟s expectations of therapy.  There must be mutual 
agreement on the goals set and the client must feel that the therapist is invested in helping them.  
The affective bond signifies the „human relationship‟ (Bordin, 1979, p. 254) between therapist and 
client, which will be influenced by life experience and use of self on the part of both, as well as the 
therapeutic model chosen.  The strength of task and goal agreement will have an ongoing influence 
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on, and be influenced by, the quality of the affective bond between the therapist and the client 
(Safran & Muran, 2000).  
 
Bordin (1979) provides a framework for viewing the alliance as a construct that can operate 
similarly across treatment modalities.  The theory acknowledges that the alliance may shift to 
accommodate different tasks and goals.  Each therapy may therefore require different types of 
alliance and be at risk of inducing characteristic breaches in the alliance (Horvath & Greenberg, 
1994).  Bordin‟s (1979) conceptualisation of the alliance goes a long way to emphasising its 
complex and changing nature.  The work stresses that regardless of therapeutic orientation, the 
relationship is likely to have the most influence on therapeutic change, as it is a prerequisite for 
therapeutic technique.  Bordin (1979) seems to suggest that theoretic orientation is simply a further 
aspect of the relationship, as the therapist will use it to inform their behaviour when performing the 
therapist role.  Adherence to a treatment model will, to a great extent, be a part of the therapists 
self and beliefs (Orlinsky et al, 1994). 
 
The importance of a good therapeutic alliance has been demonstrated and attempts have been 
made to theorise it.  It remains unclear quite what makes the relationship work effectively.  There 
has been a proliferation of measures, notably Horvath & Greenberg‟s (1987, 1994), produced to 
attempt to quantify the alliance and to demonstrate the validity of the concept in promoting positive 
therapeutic outcome.  Most of the work has been directed at client characteristics in the relationship 
and little attention has been paid to therapist factors, although this is changing (Roth & Fonagy, 
1996).  There remains a great deal of disagreement about the factors that constitute an effective 
therapeutic relationship (Bohart & Greenberg 1997; Hausner, 2000; Orlinksy & Howard, 1994; 
Stricker & Fisher, 1990).  There seems to be two main hypotheses; that the relationship is the main 
agent of change, or that it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for therapy success (Burns & 
Auerbach, 1996).  The remainder of this essay will be devoted to exploring how the therapeutic 
relationship is conceptualised in three diverse treatment models, exploring whether it is seen as an 
important component for change and if so, how it is seen as bringing about this change.   
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THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP IN COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY 
 
Any cognitive or behavioural technique not embedded in the context of a trusting 
therapeutic relationship will probably fail. 
(Burns & Auerbach, 1996, p. 150). 
 
The belief that therapeutic relationship, or working alliance, is secondary to technique in cognitive 
therapy is one that CBT commentators are increasing keen to dispel (Burns & Auerbach, 1996).  
However, the place and importance of the relationship in CBT remains in hot debate.  CBT requires 
a therapeutic environment, with an emphasis on collaboration.  What requires clarification is what 
collaboration consists of, and how much it contributes to an effective therapeutic relationship.  The 
concept of collaborative empiricism (Beck, 1979) is central to a cognitive approach.  The therapist 
and client work together on the mutually identified problem-focused goals, the ultimate aim being to 
instruct the client in monitoring thought processes and testing them out.  In this way the client‟s 
thoughts and beliefs are viewed as hypothesis to be tested (Moorey, 1996).   
 
The thread of collaboration runs through the intervention.   The rationale being that the client knows 
the most about their problem, so a collaborative stance gives the client an active role in the 
therapeutic process.  This is thought to reduce conflict, encourage self-efficacy and facilitate the 
learning of cognitive techniques (Moorey, 1996).  CBT fits well into Bordin‟s (1979) 
conceptualisation of the alliance.  Collaboration is one of the core conditions, that make CBT 
effective and the therapist uses it, as a skill to direct the therapeutic relationship (Hazler, 2001).  
The collaborative dynamics will change as the therapy progresses.  At first the therapist will be 
more directive in socialising the client to the model and its techniques and later the dynamics will 
shift as the client takes on the techniques and becomes more independent in testing out their 
hypotheses (Hazler, 2001, Moorey, 1996).   
 
There does seem to be a power imbalance inherent within the collaborative nature of the working 
alliance in CBT.  Proctor (2003) draws attention to the very powerful position of the CBT therapist in 
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respect to the client and highlights the dangers in taking on the stance of an objective and neutral 
scientist.  It is assumed that the therapist possesses the knowledge about adaptive thoughts and 
behaviours and imparts that knowledge, through cognitive restructuring, onto the patient (Proctor, 
2003).  It is suggested that the client only actually contributes to an existing treatment agenda, 
already drawn up by the therapist, under the guise of a collaborative relationship; „the whole 
approach of one way of thinking being the answer for everyone is directly in contradiction to 
respecting the autonomy of each individual client‟ (Proctor, 2003, p. 15).  This underlines the 
importance of establishing an effective therapeutic relationship prior to using CBT techniques.  
Indeed, the use of CBT techniques seems, in particular, to require a solid working relationship to be 
effective, otherwise methods like cognitive restructuring, have the potential to be viewed as 
threatening by the client (Safran & Muran, 2000).   
 
 
The relationship in CBT 
 
The variables that make up the therapeutic relationship have not received much attention in CBT 
research.  Considering the wealth of work on the efficacy of the therapy itself and its techniques, 
this gives the appearance that the relationship is not as valued in CBT, as it may be in other 
approaches.  Hazler (2001) points out that in CBT the relationship is enmeshed with technique and 
not easily separated out.  He states that while most of the focus of the literature is on technique, 
what most CBT therapists are actually concerned with are factors within the relationship (Hazler, 
2001).   
 
Hazler (2001) offers some discussion around the core conditions, which enable CBT techniques to 
be implemented.  These include many factors of the relationship such positive reinforcement of 
clients‟ progress, reflecting enthusiasm to clients while attending to the non-verbal behaviours that 
convey empathic listening.  Burns & Auerbach (1996) also make the point that the behaviours that 
may be called therapeutic technique in CBT, are actually the same types of action that convey 
empathy; listening, observing and accurately reflecting.  In this way, there seems to be nothing 
discretely different about CBT therapists than in any other approach.  The generic counselling 
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qualities of warmth, genuineness and accurate empathy, identified by those such as Rogers (1957) 
and Egan (1994) are considered to be essential for effective CBT (Burns & Auerbach, 1996; Hazler, 
2001; Moorey, 1996) as they are in many other therapeutic approaches.  Moorey (1996) suggests 
that the fundamental difference for CBT therapists is the acceptance and integration of the 
cognitive model into the therapists self.  Therapists who appear genuine are thought to increase 
motivation and confidence in the client (Hazler, 2001) and this perhaps ties in with the acceptance 
and belief in the model. 
 
 
The relationship as a tool for change in CBT 
 
The view does seem to be that a collaborative therapeutic relationship is necessary to enhance the 
efficacy of cognitive techniques but the relationship in itself is not the main agent of change (Beck, 
1979).  The lack of a research into these non-specific relationship variables has been discussed 
above.  Despite this, however, there has been some key research pointing to the association of the 
therapeutic alliance with positive therapeutic outcome (Burns & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1992; Gaston, 
Thompson, Gallagher, Cournoyer & Gagnon, 1998; Persons & Burns, 1985; Safran & Segal, 1990; 
Waddington, 2002) but to date the role of the relationship in effecting change in CBT remains 
unclear. 
 
THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP IN FAMILY THERAPY 
 
According to Pinsof (1995), the therapeutic alliance in family therapy can be seen as, 
 
„consisting of those aspects of the relationship between and within the therapist and patient 
systems that pertains to their capacity to mutually invest in and collaborate on the goals of 
therapy‟ (Pinsof, 1994, p. 61).   
 
Despite this, the field seems to be without a unifying conceptual framework of the relationship and 
its efficacy (Flaskas, 1997).  The relationship, as opposed to the techniques, would seem to be of 
 11 
ultimate importance in family therapy with the potential for complex therapeutic relationships with 
multiple members (Rait, 2000).  It would seem that the family therapist would need to possess 
particular skills and have considerable knowledge of how involvement in the family system can 
influence therapist, family and outcome.  An fuller understanding of the relationship in family 
therapy, in particular the position of the therapist in relation to the family, can be gained from an 
understanding of how it is viewed within the two opposing schools.  The reader should bear in mind 
that it is considered important by all schools to establish and maintain a positive therapeutic 
relationship within the family (Rait, 2000).   
 
Within the structural approach to family therapy Minuchin (1974, 1996), the therapist may choose to 
work from two alternate positions, the restrained or transferential position of outsider looking in, or 
the interventionist, existential position of working inside the family (Minuchin, 1996).  From an 
interventionist standpoint, the therapist is seen as personally committed and active in the 
therapeutic process.  They attempt to join the family and in turn, the family must accept the 
therapist (Harari, 1996).  In this personal commitment, the therapist seems to act as the agent of 
change and uses their own self in forming alliances with family members.  The interventionist family 
therapist may deliberately attempt „rock the boat‟ of the family system by supporting one individual, 
or subsystem, at the expense of another (Rait, 2000).  They may temporarily choose a co-therapist 
from among family members when it is felt important to do so and will change co-therapist during 
and across sessions, as necessary (Minuchin, 1996).  The concept of a co-therapist is integral in 
the therapist endeavor to develop new hypotheses and situations for the family to consider.  A 
focus on the interactions of the therapist and their use of self as the agent of change in family 
therapy, stresses the point that it is the relationship, as this will influence the delivery of any 
therapeutic technique, that is likely to be the essence of change.   
 
Within the systemic school (Palazzoli, 1980), considered a restrained approach by Minuchin (1996), 
the concern is not to impose the therapists self onto the family, in case this is overwhelming.  The 
neutrality of the therapist is given weight and as such it has something in common with CBT.  There 
are two methods of action in which therapist neutrality may operate; by remaining unresponsive to 
the emotional needs of all family members or by aligning oneself equally to all (Harari, 1996).  
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Systemic therapists are now more keen to state that adopting a neutral position does not imply 
indifference or disinterest in the family, rather the therapist uses their curiosity and their empathy to 
remain sufficiently detached in order to provide useful hypotheses for the family‟s difficulties 
(Cecchin, 1987).  The therapist must carefully attend to their role within the family as it will shift 
across the therapeutic problems within the family and it‟s members (Harari, 1996).  This is 
acknowledged as being a very difficult task and is perhaps why intensive supervision, in many 
forms, is key in family therapy (Flaskas, 1997, Minuchin, 1996).  One of the functions of the 
reflecting team in the systemic approach is to monitor the therapists‟ relationship within the family 
and provide useful feedback, which may generate further hypotheses for the family (Harari, 1996).   
 
In the family therapy field, the model of working the therapist adopts is crucial in understanding the 
position they take up within the family (Rowan & Jacobs, 2002) but it is perhaps not helpful, in 
thinking about the therapeutic relationship, to see family therapists in terms of this split between 
schools.  A way of viewing the different stances as interventionist/restrained (Minuchin, 1996) or 
direct/indirect (Rait, 2000) is perhaps more beneficial as there are shared issues and 
commonalities.  The emotional vulnerability of the therapist to the influence of the family system 
has long been acknowledged (Rait, 2000; Flaskas, 1997).  All therapists use their selves when 
forming the relationship (Rowan & Jacobs, 2002).  Their skills and therapeutic preferences are 
closely allied to „the therapist‟s personal characteristics, level of comfort, and theoretical 
commitments, as well as his or her match with the particular family‟ (Rait, 2000, p. 215).  As 
Bordin‟s model (1979) would emphasise, this can result in unique impasses and difficulties in the 
relationship.  The relationship can be threatened when the family react to the therapists‟ presence 
in a way designed to maintain the habitual way of functioning that the family finds most comfortable.  
The therapist then,  
 
„subsequently finds him or herself in the paradoxical position of trying to perform the 
impossible task of helping the couple or family to change their situation while 
simultaneously operating under the same rules of interaction that have preserved the 
problematic situation.‟ (Rait, 2000, p. 215 ).   
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It was in attempt to counteract this „pull‟ into the family that the team approach was introduced into 
systemic family therapy (Tomm, 1984 in Rait, 2000) to enable the therapist to remain neutral and in 
control.  Johnson and Wright (2002) have illustrated the utility of Bordin‟s (1979) conceptualization 
with family therapy but point out that it may need to be extended, as it does not adequately account 
for the differences between individual and family therapies. 
 
The relationship as a tool for change in family therapy 
 
Family therapists acknowledge that research into the therapeutic relationship in family therapy is 
still in its infancy and as such the effect is not well understood (Flaskas, 1997; Flaskas & Perlesz, 
1996; Rait, 2000).  The literature often seems to ignore the therapist as the instrument of change in 
its focus on technique.  Minuchin (1996) considers this a by-product of family therapists‟ desire to 
distance the theory from psychoanalytical models.  The important theoretical and research work 
into the relationship has suffered as a result.   
 
Family therapy does seem to acknowledge and use the relationship itself as a therapeutic 
technique and there seems to be growing recognition that, despite the different treatments of the 
alliance, it is this relationship that is the key factor in producing change (Flaskas & Perlesz, 1996; 
Minuchin, 1996; Rait, 2000).  Its neglect in the research is beginning to be acknowledged (Flaskas, 
1997).  There have been steps taken to develop and use theoretically based instruments that 
measure aspects of the relationship, most notably the Family Therapy Alliance scale based on 
Bordin‟s (1979) model (Pinsof, 1994).   
 
Taken as a whole, these findings seem to confirm the importance of the relationship within family 
therapy.  However the research, although promising, is not without it‟s problems.  Horvath & 
Symonds (1991) made the point that the most accurate reports of the relationship in predicting 
outcome are those rated by the client.  Much of the literature in the field so far is based upon 
therapist ratings of the alliance.  The measurements in themselves often involve combining each 
member of the family‟s ratings of the alliance to obtain one single alliance score (Johnson & Wright, 
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2000; Pinsof, 1994).  This is problematic as it is realistic to believe that not all family members will 
have the same views of the therapy relationship.   
 
The acknowledgement of the importance of the therapy relationship in family therapy theory, is 
somewhat overshadowed by the neglect in the research.  Important aspects, such as the emotional 
involvement of the therapist, their use of self, the different qualities of relationship that may develop 
between a family and their therapist over time and the therapist factors that may influence its 
development are all worthy of consideration.  More work into this area in future seems likely to 
stress the importance of the therapeutic relationship, over family technique, in engendering change.  
 
 
THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
„Therapists must convey to the patient that their paramount task is to build a relationship 
together that will itself become the agent of change‟  
(Yalom, 2001, p. 34) 
 
I have some distinct reasons for including existential thought in this discussion of the therapeutic 
relationship.  The consideration of the relationship from an existential perspective is important, as 
existential ideas can be usefully incorporated into other therapeutic orientations.  Ideally, existential 
psychotherapy is not considered to be a separate orientation or school.  As Yalom puts it, „therapy 
should not be theory driven but relationship driven‟ (2001, p. xviii) and an awareness of existential 
issues will influence the therapeutic endeavour across orientations.  I will refer primarily to Yalom‟s 
(1980, 1989, 2001) work in this section, although other existential psychotherapists have offered 
their own considerations of the alliance.  It seems that the existential approach gives the most 
therapeutic weight to and prioritises the relationship more than any other (Spinelli, 2002, Yalom, 
2001).  From this stance, it has a lot to offer other forms of therapy that may favour a focus on 
technique over maintenance and fostering of the relationship. 
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According to Yalom (1980) „existential psychotherapy is a dynamic therapeutic approach that 
focuses on concerns rooted in human existence‟ (p. 3).  Those concerns are isolation, death, 
meaning in life and freedom, and the integral struggle with the person‟s way of being against these 
harsh facts of life (Spinelli, 1997, 2001, Yalom, 1980, 1989, 2001).  Further expansion of these 
themes is not possible within the scope of this essay, so I will concentrate on the existential view of 
the centrality of the relationship and it‟s function as an agent of change. 
 
The essential idea in existential work is that most patients seeking therapy do so as a result of 
difficulties in relationships and with intimacy (Yalom, 1980).  As a result of this viewpoint, it makes 
sense that therapy would be primarily about the relationship.  The therapist is not seen as expert 
but is an active participant in the therapeutic process, open and willing to share in the patient‟s 
world-view and experience.   The relationship is conceptualised as one where both are „fellow 
travellers‟ (Yalom, 2001, pg. 8).  The client is ultimately responsible for progress and change.  The 
therapist is there to help the client explore their relationships, through the here-and-now of the 
therapeutic encounter (May, 1953, 1961), or as Yalom puts it, the „inbetweenness‟ (2001, p. 46) of 
the relationship.  It is this human connection that is viewed as the essential element of change 
(Hazler, 2001).   
 
Like other psychodynamic and analytic approaches, existential psychotherapy views the 
therapeutic relationship as a reflection of the client‟s wider relationship issues in miniature, 
therefore, interpersonal difficulties will manifest in therapy (Yalom, 1989, 2001).  Yalom (2001) 
advises therapist‟s to use their own feelings as a source of data highlighting the reactions the client 
is likely to evoke in others.  He stresses that it is important to know how much of the feelings belong 
to you and how much are being evoked by the client.  According to Yalom, (1989, 2001) this 
indicates the need for therapists to have extensive therapy themselves.  This idea seems as if it 
may be someone out of favour in the current therapeutic climate.  As a trainee, it feels important to 
understand how my own beliefs and potential reactions to clients may facilitate or hinder the 
therapeutic relationship.   
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The relationship as a tool for change in existential psychotherapy 
 
There is an absence of outcome research in demonstrating either the effectiveness of the 
approach, or exploring how working with the relationship in this way effects change.  With the 
relationship and therapy being tailored so individually in existential psychotherapy, the problems 
with measuring the effectiveness of the relationship as a therapeutic agent of change are not 
difficult to imagine.  It would be problematic to attempt to standardise a therapeutic relationship that 
will vary enormously through being uniquely tailored to the individual.  There are well written and 
engaging, case studies (Yalom, 1989, 1999, Randall, 2001), which, seem to have positive 
outcomes.  Lantz and Gregoire (2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b) have produced extensive, long-term 
studies, which have indicated significant clinical improvement using existential psychotherapy 
across a variety of client groups and presenting problems.   
 
Yalom (2001) assents that for the most part his practice of existential psychotherapy is for long-
term; he has some strong views on the ethics and legitimacy of short-term therapy, fee-paying 
clients whose problems are not debilitating.  However, Spinelli (2001) has recently produced work, 
which may support increasingly wider applications of existential ideas, as he proposes the use of 
an existential approach with psychosis.   
 
The existential approach does fit with Bordin‟s (1979) conceptualisation of the relationship.  It 
stresses the importance of the relationship as a tool for change, over technique, at all times.  The 
approach has tasks and goals, unique to itself, but may provide ideas that could be incorporated 
into other models of working.  A task characteristic of existential psychotherapy would be the 
moment-to-moment, here and now tracking of the clients and therapists experience of the 
relationship.  The goals of existential therapy are high, not only to alleviate symptoms but to 
facilitate personal growth and character change (Yalom, 2001).  It is perhaps important to use the 
concepts of this approach to guide the therapeutic process of relationship building that can be 
carried forward into different models of working with clients.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
„That‟s what a therapist has to do…to create a feeling that you can trust them and that 
they can help you.‟  
(„Anne‟s story‟ in Greenberg, 1999, p.16). 
 
Dependent on theoretical standpoint, the therapeutic relationship has been seen as either a 
necessary and sufficient vehicle for change or an integral component of therapy but one which is 
not adequate for change on it‟s own.  Existential psychotherapy places great importance on the 
relationship, seeing it as the core of therapy and the essential condition for therapeutic change.  
Within family therapy, the two schools view the relationship differently but use it as a vehicle for 
affecting change, secondary to the „therapy‟ itself.  Within a CBT framework, the relationship is 
viewed as a vital part of getting to the „true‟ work of the therapy, monitoring and countering 
maladaptive cognitions.   
 
In reality, the efficacy of the therapeutic relationship in producing a positive outcome for the client 
probably falls somewhere between the two viewpoints; it is a vital ingredient of the therapy backed 
up by therapeutic tasks.  What does appear to be the case, according to the research thus far is 
that it is the relationship or alliance that is more important than the therapeutic model implemented 
in effecting change with clients.  The research cited here clearly points to the importance of a 
facilitative environment for therapy to take place but in numerous meta-analyses no one therapy 
has been shown to be any more effective than another (Hovath & Greenberg, 1991; Safran & 
Muran, 2000).  This seems to be related to certain core conditions and non-specific factors 
common to all therapeutic approaches (Hazler & Barwick, 2001).   
 
Until further research is produced and more is known both about the function of the relationship 
across and between different approaches, it would seem practical for clinical psychologists to utilise 
a transtheoretical conceptualisation of some of the key components of the therapeutic relationship 
to inform their way of developing alliances with clients.  Bordin‟s (1979) model seems ideal for use 
 18 
here and has been adopted recently by commentators from opposing orientations as a useful way 
of conceptualising the alliance (Johnson & Wright, 2002; Safran & Muran, 2000).  Measures based 
upon the model also exist to facilitate research (Pinsof, 1994).   
 
The mixed picture of the research illustrating the importance of the therapeutic relationship has 
some implications for current practice.  While the usefulness of a good working alliance is no doubt 
widely accepted by therapists, there appears to be variability in how the relationship is formed and 
used across approaches.  Regardless of orientation, building a therapeutic relationship should be 
the first major task of therapy, which needs work to maintain it throughout treatment (Bergin & 
Garfield, 1994).  While this skill of forming and building effective relationships with clients may 
develop naturally with experience, it seems to be a skill that would benefit from formal teaching.  
Burns and Auerbach (1996) claim that training is important to help therapists to learn when to leave 
technique aside and focus on the relationship, and learn how to deal with ruptures and impasses 
that occur in the relationship.  Transtheoretical training, perhaps using Bordin‟s (1979) 
conceptualisation would be of value. 
 
With the drive within the NHS for brief and cost effective treatments for symptom relief, it seems like 
the importance of the relationship in psychotherapy is overlooked in a focus on effective 
techniques.  Longer treatments that focus on relationships, like an existential approach, may not be 
favoured, despite their being little to differentiate therapy effectiveness (Horvath & Symonds, 1991).  
It may be important to develop alliances more quickly.  Techniques that directly focus on the 
positive aspects of therapy, which may not be appropriate in longer-term therapy, may need to be 
adopted, such as demonstrating confidence and enthusiasm for change (Orlinksy & Howard, 1994).   
 
Finally, if we as therapists use a model like Bordin‟s (1979) to inform our thinking in developing 
relationships with clients, it is likely we will be able to create an environment that makes our clients 
feel like Anne does in the quote above.  Without further research on the therapist and client 
variables of what makes an effective therapeutic relationship, this may be a good enough start. 
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Child & Adolescent Mental Health 
 
Discuss the construction of ‘psychopathology’ in children and adolescents: AD-HD & 
Conduct Disorder 
 
“Fancy thinking the beast was something you could hunt and kill” 
(„The Lord of the Flies‟ William Golding) 
 
William Golding‟s novel „The Lord of the Flies‟ illustrates the difficulties inherent in naming the 
darker side of our nature.  As such the novel captures many of the salient issues involved in 
classifying, quantifying and pathologising the more problematic behaviours of childhood.  The 
young male protagonists of the novel have to survive alone, without adults, after being stranded on 
a remote desert island.  The „beast‟ referred to is a mythical creature, a manifestation in the boys 
minds of something dangerous within them that must be controlled, and they represent this as an 
animal lurking on the island.  The „Beast‟ mocks the boy‟s fear of what they do not understand and 
what they cannot track, hunt and put an end to; the „savage‟ parts of themselves.  „The Beast‟ 
considered in this essay will be what we term Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (AD-HD) and 
Conduct Disorder (CD).  These are the darker aspects of childhood behaviour that we seek to 
make sense of and once clinicians put a name to them, we attempt to call forth into existence.   
 
“We‟ve got to have rules and obey them. After all we‟re not savages.” 
AD-HD & Conduct Disorder – diseases for our time? 
 
The trainee‟s interest in the debate surrounding AD-HD was generated during the core child 
placement.  A frequent point of debate within the CAMHS service that the trainee worked within 
was the way in which to manage referrals and cases presenting with AD-HD symptoms, including 
associated conduct problems.  The volume of referrals within the service framed in terms of difficult 
behaviour, home or classroom-based problems was also noticeable by comparison with referrals 
for other disorders.  It was interesting to debate within the team and in supervision the possible 
explanations for the frequency of the referrals; could it be that the „disorder‟ of AD-HD is on the rise 
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or might a cultural change in the way we think about childhood behaviour account for some of the 
prevalence.  In other words, might AD-HD and CD be culturally constructed phenomena? 
 
The debate surrounding AD-HD is very topical at the moment, there is much coverage within the 
press and NICE draft guidelines (2005) are currently in preparation, but the debate is not a new 
one.  Perhaps in the face of a lack of concrete evidence for a definite biological basis and perhaps 
due to the fact AD-HD largely concerns a population with a limited voice of its own, it wages on and 
tends to attract heated attention.  From reviewing the literature it also appears to generate polarised 
views; a purely biological explanation or a critical psychiatry viewpoint.  This in itself limits the 
options available for understanding the phenomenon and is perhaps counter-productive in 
constructing a balanced and informed debate to present to healthcare professionals, parents and 
children.   
 
This essay will attempt to review a more balanced, bio-psycho-social model of AD-HD and CD that 
attempts a dialogue between a medical model and a psychological understanding of hyperkinetic 
and anti-social child behaviour.  The diagnostic criteria for the disorders will not be discussed in 
detail, and AD-HD and CD will often be referred to together.  This is because the wider arguments 
about the disorders are similar and the disorders share more features than not.  An outline of the 
how the disorders are defined will be presented below, followed by a discussion of why and how 
they have come to be categorised in this way. 
 
Definitions and the extent of the ‘problem’ 
 
In terms of DSM IV and ICD-10, AD-HD or Hyperkinetic Disorder is characterised by clusters of 
symptoms around three core areas of hyperactivity, impulsivity and inattention.  AD-HD has been 
sub-typed according to: 
 the pervasiveness of clinical features across settings (i.e. symptoms will be present both at 
home and school),  
 the presence of both inattention and hyperactivity 
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 and the presence of CD (Barkley, 2003).   
 
Severe hyperactivity is felt to be a strong predictor of poor psychosocial adjustment (Schachar & 
Tannock, 2002).  Severely hyperactive children show the clearest changes on executive function 
tests and are felt to respond best to stimulant medication (Barkley, 2003).  
 
Co-morbidity between AD-HD and CD indicates greater severity.  Children with this presentation 
are felt to be less responsive to treatment and to have a much poorer prognosis (Taylor et al, 
1996).  CD is defined as a “repetitive and persistent pattern of behaviour in which the basic rights of 
others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). 
Three or more symptoms from a list of fifteen behaviours classed as aggressive, disruptive or anti-
social have to be present for a year in order for a diagnosis to be made.  Both disorders are more 
common in boys, with AD-HD being frequently found pre-adolescence.  With CD, there are thought 
to be two presentations, life-course persistence and an adolescence-limited subtype (Moffitt, 1993 
in Richters & Cichetti, 1993).   
 
The prevalence of AD-HD varies widely dependent on the stringency of the diagnostic criteria 
applied.  The literature documents rates from one to twenty six percent (Timimi & Taylor, 2004).  A 
review by Hinshaw et al (1998 in Timimi, 2002) based upon UK criteria, which demands the cross-
situational stability of symptoms, found prevalence to be one percent.  With the prevalence for CD, 
the range is still wide, between one and ten percent (Hinshaw & Lee, 2003).  Prevalence rates for 
these disorders are confounded by the fast rate of change in their definition.  The definition of AD-
HD has changed twice since 1980 with each revision producing a higher prevalence rate, which 
makes comparison amongst studies difficult (Timimi, 2002).  For CD, recent definitions are much 
more stringent (Hinshaw & Lee, 2003).  Developmental progressions across the disorders may also 
account for some of the variation (Lahey & Waldman, 2003). 
 
More definite statistics exist for Ritalin, the psycho-stimulant drug of the methylphenidate (MPH) 
class prescribed for AD-HD.  In the USA, the estimates make worrying reading with some 
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suggesting up to six million children are diagnosed with ADHD and on medication (Timimi, 2005).  
MPH prescription rates are on the rise in the UK also, with the figure being recently put at over 
420,000 per year (NICE draft scope guideline, 2005; Boseley, 2006).  AD-HD has been linked in 
the UK press with the benefit system so figures such as these create moral panics.  Likewise, this 
is the case for reports concerning the Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBO‟s), linked to children with 
CD (Grisso, 2004).   
 
AD-HD and CD: more similarities than differences? 
 
Despite being diagnostically classed as separate disorders, AD-HD and CD have much in common.  
It is widely acknowledged that up to three quarters of children diagnosed with AD-HD also meet the 
criteria for another disorder, most notably that of CD (NICE, 2005; Timimi & Radcliffe, 2005; 
Richters & Cichetti, 1993).  This has led some commentators to go so far as to argue that they are 
not discreet disorders at all (Timimi, 2002; Timimi & Radcliffe, 2005).  It is easy to see the reasons 
for this, in shared deficits of functioning in the areas of sustained attention, poor impulse control 
and lack of foresight (Hinshaw et al, 1998 in Timimi, 2002).  Children with a co-morbid diagnosis of 
CD and AD-HD demonstrate significantly greater deficits in functioning in all the relevant domains 
(Biederman, 1991; Hinshaw, 2001).   
 
An association between AD-HD and offending has also been demonstrated.  In studies conducted 
within prisons in the USA, Sweden, and Norway there are reports of between twenty two and sixty 
seven percent of inmates having been diagnosed with AD-HD in childhood and further reports of up 
to thirty percent remaining symptomatic as adults (Grisso, 2004).  In 2002 in the R. vs Blackender 
trial of a sixteen year old accused of murder the judge accepted a charge of manslaughter on the 
basis of diminished responsibility due to the boy‟s ADHD diagnosis.  There are numerous reports 
on parent and anti-psychiatry websites convincing linking school shootings in the USA with the 
prescription of drugs of the MPH type (see http://www.adhdfraud.org). 
 
While working within a CAMHS service the trainee was party to team discussions regarding the 
increasing pressure from the justice system to prescribe MPH type drugs for adolescents with a 
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history of offending.  The trainee observed the implications for the way in which CAMHS services 
may potentially have to operate, as medicating „treatment‟ services rather than multi-disciplinary 
assessment and intervention services.  These demands can neglect the often complex family and 
difficult social circumstances existing for these children. 
 
 
Are AD-HD and CD under-recognised neurological disorders? 
 
Eight years ago the National Institute of Health claimed that „there are no data to indicate that 
ADHD is caused by a brain malfunction‟ (NIH, 1998 cited in Timimi & Radcliffe, 2005).  The 
evidence produced since then has done little to clarify this (James, 2006).  The neurobiological 
evidence estimates the heritability in twin studies at between sixty-five and ninety percent (in 
Barkley, 2003).  The risk has been suggested to increase by three to five times in first degree 
relatives of people with ADHD and it is assumed that much of the familial association is due to 
genetic inheritance (Taylor et al, 1996).  However, some argue that the heritability findings are so 
tenuous and the symptoms so ubiquitous that a likely conclusion might be that all children 
potentially fit the diagnosis, particularly if they are male (Timimi, 2002). 
 
Neuro-imaging studies have indicated some functional brain changes associated with hyperactivity 
(Barkley, 2003; Taylor et al, 1996) but there are flaws in these findings.  The neuro-imaging 
research has been conducted on children already on MPH medication and to date, age matched 
control groups have not been used (Leo & Cohen, 2003).  The studies have small sample sizes and 
inconsistent results.  In this way the rigour of research is open to question and interpretation 
(Joseph, 2000; Timimi, 2002; James, 2006).  Timimi (Timimi & Taylor, 2004) goes as far as to liken 
likens the search for neurobiological evidence for AD-HD to phrenology.  Timimi insists that the 
high levels of co-morbidity throw doubt on the specificity of the diagnosis, as this suggests shared 
genetics between AD-HD and CD and other externalizing behaviours, not specific to AD-HD.   
 
However, despite the polarisation of the current debate, it is important for clinicians not to 
underestimate the implications for severe hyperactivity and impulsivity.  There is evidence strongly 
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predicting negative outcomes for these children, across a range of dimensions.  Taylor (Timimi & 
Taylor, 2004) argues that while the over-treatment of AD-HD may occur in the US, in the UK under-
treatment is more likely.  This highlights a problem in identifying, referring and treating children with 
severe hyperactivity and impacts on the prevention of some of the associated long-term outcomes.  
Taylor again makes the point that differences in brain structure and function have been 
demonstrated in children with high levels of hyperactivity.  However, it is important to understand 
how these observed changes in structure and function predispose the child to develop ADHD and 
how these factors interact with the environment. 
 
CD raises its own issues and debate.  The diagnosis of CD using DSM throws light on the flaws 
inherent in psychiatric diagnostic systems.  In the same way as the boys in „The Lord of the Flies‟ 
give a name to the Beast, assigning a diagnostic label automatically assumes the category exists, 
is valid and suggests the behaviours associated can be explained (Richters & Cichetti, 1993).  To 
obtain a diagnosis of CD a child need only have three symptoms from a list of fifteen.  This results 
in children with the same diagnosis, yet with very different presentations, as they may not share a 
single symptom (Richters & Cichetti, 1993).  Clinically, this would seem to render the diagnostic 
label of CD relatively meaningless.  CD might well be an example of a „medicalised social problem‟ 
(Timimi, 2002). 
 
 
“Which is better, law and rescue or hunting and breaking things up?” 
Problems and limitations of pathologising childhood behaviour 
 
Assigning diagnostic labels to children presents ethical dilemmas and can have potential harmful 
effects.  Kutchins and Kirk (1997) point out that we tend to make negative statements about those 
who have less power.  DSM-IV is a classification system designed with adult disorders in mind.  It 
does not lend itself to behaviours that may be predominantly defined by others as opposed to those 
that are self-reported or directly observable.  Attention and conduct problems are of the few child-
centric disorders within DSM-IV and these rely heavily on evaluation by others.  The question has 
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to be asked that if children had equal power would we be diagnosing these behaviours at all 
(Timimi & Radcliffe, 2005). 
 
The problem with medicating AD-HD 
 
As mentioned previously, prescription rates for MPH type drugs have soared in recent years in the 
UK.  Treating childhood behaviour in this way is extremely profitable for the pharmaceuticals 
industry.  Ritalin has made headlines recently and there are numerous concerns about the use of 
MPH in children.  It is widely acknowledged as a drug of dependency, comparable to amphetamine 
substances like cocaine.  The recently reported deaths (Boseley, 2006) have lead to a call in the 
USA for a “black box” warning to be put on MPH drugs (Tanne, 2006).  Parent and lobby groups 
have had longstanding concerns regarding the widespread prescription of Ritalin for children. (see 
http://www.ritalindeath.com).   
 
The NICE guideline (2000) recommends prescribing MPH only for severe ADHD.  The guideline 
states that the drug should only be given to those aged over six, as part of a comprehensive 
treatment programme that involves support for parents and teachers.  They advise that treatment 
be discontinued on improvement of symptoms.  However, they also advise that lack of therapeutic 
resources or adequate support should not preclude a child from receiving medication if this is felt to 
be appropriate.  It is argued that this gives the green light for prescription alone and certainly as a 
first step, at the expense of psych-social interventions (James, 2006).  The Scottish Health 
Executive were so concerned about the escalation of rates of Ritalin prescription (a tenfold increase 
in Ritalin prescribing over eight years), that in January 2005 they launched an inquiry into ADHD & 
Ritalin, the findings of which are yet to be made available (www.psychminded.co.uk).   
 
A Recent meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials for the effectiveness of MPH showed that 
the trials were of poor quality, with evidence of publication bias.  The demonstrated largely 
inconsistent findings regarding the short term effects of the drug and very weak evidence to show 
longer term effects beyond four weeks (Schachter et al, 2001, cited in Timimi, 2002).  However, 
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some short term efficacy has been demonstrated, using global ratings of children‟s behaviour by 
parents and teachers (in James, 2006).   
 
The weakness within the evidence base does suggest that in deciding treatment for AD-HD, 
clinicians may all too readily decide upon medication in the first instance.  This was the trainee‟s 
observation when reviewing referrals within the CAMHS service; medication appeared to be the 
first choice of intervention.  Some argue that the function of Ritalin is largely one of social control 
(Baldwin, 2000), prescribed to bring about change in the short term and not to reduce any 
identifiable hazard to health.  Reports state that MPH shows similar mechanisms of action in 
healthy children and adults, lending further support to the criticism of AD-HD as a discreet entity 
with underlying neuro-biological deficits (Breggin, 2002).  Furthermore, research indicates drugs 
like Ritalin suppress spontaneous and social behaviours while promoting more ritualistic behaviours 
which may make children more manageable in structured sits (Breggin, 2002).   
 
There remains an argument for prescribing MPH in some instances.  Given that severe 
hyperactivity is such a strong predictor of poor psychosocial adjustment (Timimi & Taylor, 2004); 
withholding the drug is felt to have long-term repercussions.  It is argued that those not diagnosed 
and medicated are more prone to accidents, conduct disorder, psychiatric problems in 
adolescence, educational and occupational failure, and a lack of constructive occupations or 
satisfactory relationships (Barkley, 2003).  However, a review of non-pharmacological approaches 
Hinshaw et al (1998; in Timimi, 2002) would suggest that there are effective alternatives to 
medication and that these should be more widely available and be given more attention in 
research. 
 
Is the medical model too simplistic?  
 
Timimi (2002; 2005) suggests that the way we make meaning and respond to the biological fact of 
children‟s immaturity is highly culture specific and there are many cultural factors that can adversely 
affect mental health.  Within a purely medical framework, the AD-HD diagnosis is a simplistic 
misrepresentation of the problem as it ignores the complex interrelationship between the child‟s 
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psychological and physical world, their parents and the wider community.  Timimi and others argue 
that labelling AD-HD as a disease shuts out consideration of the broader context and allows 
disengagement from our social responsibility to raise well-behaved children.  It reduces medical 
practitioners to agents of social control, and disempowers parents by creating unnecessary 
dependence on doctors.  Ultimately this may stigmatise children, leading to social isolation and may 
reinforce parental attribution of the child‟s difficulties to a medical problem rather than highlight 
family factors that may need attention (Timimi & Taylor, 2004).  
 
A bio-psycho-social model of viewing disorders such as AD-HD and CD has been proposed as it 
offers a dynamic view of childhood, which moves away from the search for signs and symptoms 
towards a fuller understanding of the difficulties a child may present with (Carr, 1999).  The 
research indicates that biological influences are a factor in the disorder but on their own add little to 
the understanding of how neurology, the within-person and contextual factors interact to influence 
the presentation and severity of symptoms we label AD-HD and CD.   
 
A systemic and cultural perspective: what is ‘normal’ childhood behaviour? 
 
The contribution and associations of wider systems factors to our understanding of AD-HD and CD 
cannot be ignored.  In data recently published by the Office of National Statistics (2003) the 
persistence of conduct disorders was found to be associated with the child having special 
educational needs, having step-children in the family, being frequently shouted at and poor 
maternal mental health.  In terms of family and household characteristics, the rates of persistence 
of conduct disorder were also associated with having widowed, divorced or separated parents, 
living in rented accommodation and having a gross family income of less than three hundred 
pounds a week.  Discord within the family had significant associations with the persistence of CD, 
as did the poor psychological well-being of mothers.  There is growing evidence that exposure to 
trauma and abuse has significant associations with the development of the symptoms of 
hyperactivity and inattention and conduct problems (Ford et al, 1999; 2000). 
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In the Mental Health of Young People in GB report (2005) parental employment was found to be 
linked to hyperactivity and attention problems; the proportion of children with hyperkinetic disorders 
living in households where both parents were unemployed was twice that amongst children with no 
disorder.  Children with hyperkinetic disorders were more likely than other children to live in a 
household in which someone received a disability benefit  
 
It is difficult to ignore strong social factors such as these, but how might they impact on the 
presentation of attention and conduct problems in the child?  It is argued that ordinary child activity 
when coupled with frustration can look like hyperactivity; boredom and loneliness in the child can 
look like inattention (Timimi, 2005).  If children live in poverty, on family incomes of below three 
hundred pounds per week, many will not be able to afford pleasurable outings or holidays.  Within 
education, the current system places increasing pressure on children to succeed academically, with 
exams and testing as early as age four.  This may set the child up for an early pattern of failure, 
with league tables serving to reject children rather than support them.  When we place labels such 
as AD-HD or CD on a child, these social problems seem to fade into the background, seemingly 
becoming less important in the way clinicians view children‟s lives.   
Cultural expectations of children can play a large part in those we see presenting at clinic and can 
impact their subsequent diagnosis and treatment.  Children are dependent on the views and 
observations of others to determine their „caseness‟ (Taylor & Timimi, 2004; Timimi, 2005).  It has 
been found that cultures vary widely in their tolerance of children‟s behaviour.  In a study using the 
Connors rating scale, it was found that Chinese and Indonesian clinicians gave consistently higher 
hyperactivity ratings than did their Japanese and American colleagues when shown standardised 
videotaped vignettes of children participating in both group and individual activities (Mann et al, 
1992).  Hackett and Hackett (1993) found that Gujarati speaking parents had more rigorous and 
clearly defined expectations of child behaviour and tolerated fewer behavioural difficulties.  As a 
result their children exhibited fewer behavioural problems.  The same behaviour is viewed 
differently when seen within different cultural contexts. 
 
Differences in rates of hyperkinetic and conduct problems are also found within more micro-
systems.  Schools and families within a cultural group can vary enormously in terms of tolerance 
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and expectation.  To illustrate this, Reid et al (1993 cited in Timimi, 2005) cite several studies which 
report that specialist teachers in schools for emotional and behaviour problems tend to be more 
tolerant of misbehaviour.  They also judge their student‟s behaviour as less deviant than their 
mainstream class teachers.   
 
What constitutes a sign or symptom depends on cultural and sub-cultural values.  With government 
initiatives such as anti-social behaviour orders, it is clear that our society has limited tolerance for 
what we would term „deviant‟ behaviour.  As well as differences cross-culturally, intergenerational 
factors exist.  Differing attitudes of parents, grandparents and clinicians to acceptable behaviour will 
inevitably influence diagnosis.  As there is no specific cognitive or medical tests for AD-HD and CD 
all of these factors will ultimately influence prevalence.  This has been corroborated by reports of a 
twenty fold difference in diagnostic rate reported between the USA and UK (Taylor & 
Sandberg,1984 in Timimi, 2002). 
 
There can be little doubt that family and cultural factors play an important role in both the structure 
of the child‟s environment and in the perception, manifestation and treatment of childhood 
psychopathology (Dwivedi & Banhatti, 2005; Richters & Cichetti, 1993).  The cultural interaction 
between the child‟s world and the adult world may sometimes be in conflict.  For example, a less 
able child in a family whose parents attach particular importance to academic success, or a child 
who is expected to understand and cope with the complexities of adult relationship break up.  This 
is where thorough and multi-modal assessment and formulation is needed and clinical 
psychologists have much to contribute to the debate and to the teams they work within. 
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“Maybe there is a beast…What I mean is…maybe it‟s only us.” 
Do we pathologise hyperactivity, attention and conduct problems or try to understand them 
in context? 
 
In Golding‟s „The Lord of the Flies‟, some of the children recognise the „Beast‟ as something within 
themselves that must be withheld.  One of the ways in which they attempt do this is to lay down 
rules and attempt to organise their micro-society.  Diagnostic criteria and the medical model can be 
seen as a way to attempt to tame the untameable; to create global, simplistic and precise 
definitions to attempt to understand concepts of childhood behaviour which are hugely complex, 
varied and culture-specific.  AD-HD and CD are both examples of where the limits of the diagnostic 
system are evident and can be usefully discussed.  It is disappointing that recently, with the 
consensus statement on AD-HD (Barkley et al, 2002) commentators have attempted to prematurely 
close down the debate regarding the merits of diagnosis and drug treatment of AD-HD. 
 
The medicalisation of attention, hyperactivity and conduct problems has its drawbacks and its 
limits.  It shifts the responsibility and locus of control for a child‟s behaviour from within themselves 
to outside agencies and „pills‟ (Baughman, 1993).  It sets up a stigmatised belief that child is 
physically abnormal in some way and can serve to displace family difficulties onto the child, without 
looking at the interrelationships within the family and the systems.  Diagnoses of AD-HD and CD 
can limit professional responsibility and can push teachers, clinicians and medical practitioners into 
self-doubt about their capacity to teach and care for the children they look after (Timimi, 2002; 
2005).   
 
However, there is evidence to hypothesise that a proportion of children displaying hyperkinetic and 
conduct problems do suffer from an underlying dysfunction.  It may be that potential dysfunctions 
with neuro-biological origins play an important role in predisposing some children towards chronic 
hyperactivity problems or anti-social behaviour and may play a role in maintaining the symptoms.  
There are plausible theoretical and empirical reasons to assume that there are other social and 
environmental pathways to these behaviours as well.  Neuro-biological theories, such as those 
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highlighting the impact of trauma and abuse on the developing brain (Terr, 2002, van der Kolk, 
1994 in Dwiverdi & Banhatti, 2005), can be used to support the development of non-
pharmacological interventions that the Hinshaw et al (1998 in Timimi, 2002) review recommends.  
Neuro-biology can also help to challenge wider cultural beliefs that difficult or deviant behaviour in 
children is always their own fault or a product of poor, neglectful parenting. 
 
Psycho-social interventions are demonstrating good results.  Projects such as the Family Well-
being Project in Birmingham and the Parent Adviser Scheme in Tower Hamlets (Harris, 2005; 
Buchan et al, 1998) have been set up.  These projects support families whose children have 
behaviour problems, and have included employing and training Gujarati speaking workers.  To date 
the results have been positive, with a reduction in the children‟s behavioural difficulties reported by 
parents, and improvements in the children‟s language development.  The projects have also 
demonstrated global improvements in parental coping factors, including enabling parents to 
communicate more effectively with the clinicians involved in their child‟s care and giving them 
access to information to the services available to them (Bandak, 2005; James, 2006).   
 
There is a lack of services like this and a paucity of research on contextual factors which needs to 
be addressed, in conjunction with continuing research into the neuro-biology of these disorders.  
This will help to move away from a polarized debate which limits a fuller understanding.  It is 
evident that systemic, cultural and environmental factors are as important to the debate and 
contribute to the conceptualization of AD-HD and CD as well as helping to guide interventions with 
these children. 
 
„The Lord of the Flies‟ highlights many of the dilemmas inherent in the way we have come to 
construct and pathologise children‟s behaviour, Golding only gives the boys stranded on the island 
two options of how to be; saints or savages.  By constructing childhood behaviour in the way of 
medical classification systems such as DSM-IV, we too restrict and constrain the options available 
to children; they can be „normal‟ or they can be pathologised or criminalised.  In this way, childhood 
behaviour is not seen on a continuum and individual and external influences are not taken into 
account.  Worse still, acquiring these labels is not a transient process, as AD-HD and CD are not 
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framed as disorders one grows out of but have poor prognoses for adulthood.  It is important to 
deconstruct our way of viewing childhood behaviours, in order to understand the implications for the 
way we „treat‟ children.  A more individualised conceptualisation of childhood behaviours like AD-
HD and CD, which takes into account environmental, contextual and systems factors, is needed in 
order to guide interventions with these children and their families. 
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Abstract 
 
In this audit, a six-week psycho-educational group for the carers of people with a diagnosis of 
dementia was evaluated.  Measures of depression, anxiety, strain, self-efficacy and knowledge of 
dementia were used to this end and were administered prior to and just after the six-week group.  
Feedback questionnaires were also administered after the group to obtain qualitative information on 
the carers‟ experiences.   
 
Five participants completed the intervention, all of whom were close relatives of people with 
dementia and had identified themselves within the caring role.  Mean levels of anxiety and 
depression decreased post-group and mean scores of self-efficacy and dementia knowledge 
improved.  Measures of perceived strain showed a slight increase after the group.  The individual 
participants‟ scores are discussed.  Qualitative feedback was positive and encouraging, indicating 
that the group was well received by the carers. 
 
The findings are discussed in terms of offering the group as part of a standard service for carers, 
improving access to the group in order to offer the service as soon as possible following diagnosis. 
 
Introduction 
 
The following audit took place within an Older Adult CMHT within the south east of England.  It is a 
preliminary study of a psycho-educational group, the “Great Minds Think Differently” group, 
targeted at carers and close relatives of people with dementia.  Dementia is a syndrome 
characterized by progressive decline in memory, communication, reasoning and learning abilities.  
It usually manifests itself in behaviour change and loss of functional ability.  In the later stages 
dementia is associated with physical features such as incontinence and weight loss (Thompson et 
al, 2003).   
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Informal caregivers can be defined as people who look after family, partners or friends that need 
assistance or are incapacitated due to illness or disability. The care they provide is unpaid and 
often requires the performance of tasks that may be physically, emotionally, socially and financially 
demanding (Carers UK, 2005).  
 
The picture of caring in the UK 
 
The 2001 Census shows that 5.2 million people provided informal care in the UK, with just over 1 
million providing over 50 hours of care per week.  Government figures estimate that there are 3.3 
million women and 2.4 million men providing informal care in this country.  Most carers are between 
the ages of 45 and 64 almost all of whom care for a close relative.  It is estimated that nearly half of 
all carers will look after someone over the age of 75 (DOH, 2005, Maher & Green, 2002).   
 
It is clear that a large number of people provide significant levels of informal care, which is 
proposed to play a vital role in delaying hospitalisation and keeping people with dementia in their 
homes and communities.  The level of input that carers provide has begun to be acknowledged.  
Recent legislation and guidelines seek to recognise and support the work done by carers and 
introduce initiatives that will support them in their role (DOH, 2004, 2005).  Under the Carers (Equal 
Opportunities) Act 2004, statutory services have a duty to offer carers a separate assessment of 
their needs and are obliged to inform carers of this right.  The carers‟ wishes for employment, 
leisure and training opportunities should be considered and social services now have power to 
make use of other bodies in the provision for carers.  Carer led support and pressure groups 
support the move to provide increased resources for carers, however they argue that this support is 
inconsistently applied and can vary across geographical area (Carers UK website). 
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The emotional costs of caring 
 
It is widely accepted that many carers suffer inequalities in mental and emotional health as a result 
of their role (Depp et al, 2003; Charlesworth, 2001; Wood et al, 2003).  Caring for an older relative 
with dementia typically involves dealing with challenging issues, such as behavioural disturbance 
and increased responsibility for physical needs, such as administering medications.  These are 
factors in addition to the psychological consequences of adjustment to the relationship changes 
dementia may bring.  Many carers need to cope with issues of grief and loss inherent within a 
progressive condition (Charlesworth, 2001).  Carers are twice as likely than non-carers to report 
high levels of psychological distress, which can include anxiety, depression, and loss of confidence 
and self-esteem (Carers UK).  Carers are also at risk of significant social exclusion due to the 
demands and burdens of caring.  Most carers report the additional pressures of having to invest 
considerable time and money in support of their role.  Those providing substantial amounts of care 
are statistically more likely to be either out of work or working reduced hours (Depp et al, 2003).  
 
With appropriate support, carers are less likely to become marginalized while they care for 
someone and will be more able to return to work when their caring role ceases.  The organisation 
Carers UK make the point that carers in good health are more willing and able to provide and cope 
with the demands of care giving.  These are some of the issues that national policy documents are 
attempting to address and the health and social services are attempting to make provision for. 
 
Research on interventions for carers of people with dementia 
 
Interventions targeted at carers and their needs have varied in mode of delivery; group or 
individual, and in the content of the interventions, such as social support or cognitive strategies.  
Two key systematic reviews have been conducted (Cooke et al, 2001; Pusey & Richards, 2001).  
Pusey and Richards (2001) found that interventions that included problem solving, behaviour 
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management and educational components were more effective than those relying on emotional 
support alone.  However, they found much methodological weakness within the research and 
concluded that there was limited evidence to support any of the interventions in terms of the mode 
of delivery.   
 
The review by Cooke et al (2001) focused predominantly on the content of the intervention and 
indicated that interventions for carers are most effective if they contain a social element or a 
combination of social and cognitive components, such as problem solving.  Recommendations 
based on these reviews suggest that interventions should be more individually tailored to needs of 
the carer in order to maximize effectiveness.  This is thought to be specifically important in terms of 
gender (Toseland & Rossiter, 1989), the type of dementia and the relationship of the carer to the 
person with dementia (Knight et al, 1993).  
 
In terms of what carers want to enable them to continue to care, the indicators are that having 
access to respite services, increased social support, being in receipt of satisfactory services and 
information and a recognition of their role are identified by carers as being helpful to them (Twigg, 
1992). 
 
The efficacy of psycho-educational groups for carers of people with dementia 
 
Psycho-educational groups are the most common mode of delivery for interventions targeted at 
carers of people with dementia (Cooke et al, 2001; Pusey & Richards, 2001).  Psycho-educational 
interventions are typically structured and time-limited, based upon CBT approaches.  Groups of this 
nature have clear aims and objectives, usually focused upon skill acquisition (Coon, Rider, 
Gallagher-Thompson, & Thompson, 1999; Depp et al, 2003). The typical focus of these 
interventions is to provide information about dementia, strategies for self-care and stress 
management techniques (Depp et al, 2003).  Depression and anxiety in the carer can also be the 
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focus of some interventions (Aranda & Knight, 1997; Gallagher-Thompson et al, 2000).  Some 
psycho-educational groups focus on increasing the skills of care giving in order to enhance the 
quality of life for the person with dementia and facilitate caring (Charlesworth, 2001).   
 
There has been empirical support within the literature for the effectiveness of psycho-educational 
groups over support-based groups (Depp et al, 2003; Knight et al, 1993).  Findings have indicated 
that psycho-education is more effective in reducing carer depression, increasing knowledge and 
self-esteem than support groups alone (Sorensen, Pinquart, and Duberstein, 2002).  Some studies 
have also shown that psycho-educational groups can have the added effect of delaying 
hospitalisation for the people cared for and can affect the cost of care giving, in terms of increasing 
knowledge regarding access to benefits and assistance available (Mittleman, 1993).  Important 
qualitative findings have also been noted in psycho-educational groups for carers; specifically 
carers report that attending groups decreases their sense of isolation and increases confidence 
(Thompson & Briggs, 2000).  However, it remains to be demonstrated whether psycho-educational 
group interventions are more effective than individual interventions (Pusey and Richards, 2001; 
Thompson et al, 2003).   
 
The clinical setting – history & aims of the „Great Minds Think Differently‟ group 
 
The six-week group was developed in order to provide a time-limited, psycho-educational service to 
carers of people who had recently received a diagnosis of dementia within the catchment area of 
the Older Adult CMHT.  No such service is currently provided in this area of the country.  This 
would appear to be at odds with what has been recommended by key government policy (NSF 
Older People, 2001).  Recognition of the lack of local information provision and services for people 
diagnosed with dementia and their carers culminated in the Older Adult CMHT and the local branch 
of the Alzheimer‟s Society (AS) to work jointly on developing this service. 
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The aims of the group were to provide information and support for the caregivers following a 
diagnosis of dementia and to encourage mutual support between group participants.  The aims for 
the service were to learn more about the specific problems and needs of carers of people with 
dementia by the evaluation of the intervention using quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
The objectives of the audit were two-fold: 
 
1. To measure the effectiveness of the group upon factors associated with psychological 
adjustment in carers of people with dementia including: anxiety, depression, strain, self-
efficacy and knowledge of dementia. 
2. To establish whether participants‟ valued the psycho-educational group as indicated by 
their general satisfaction with the service received. 
 
Methodology 
 
Design 
 
A pre-test – post-test design was employed measuring participants‟ anxiety, depression, strain, 
self-efficacy, knowledge of dementia, and general satisfaction across the six-week psycho-
educational group. 
 
Following consultation with the relevant Trust‟s Research & Development Committee, this study 
was considered an evaluation of routine clinical practice and classified as audit.  For this reason, 
ethical approval was not considered necessary for the project.  The Clinical Audit & Effectiveness 
Group approved the submitted project proposal in January 2005.  The study fulfils the criteria for 
audit as outlined in Wade (2005). 
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Format & content of the group 
 
This was a closed group, for carers of people with a recent diagnosis of dementia.  The course took 
place over six weeks in January - February 2005.  The format was broadly as follows: 
 
Session Topic Discussion 
1 Hello and welcome 
Introduction 
Introduction to the group  
Signs & symptoms of dementia 
2 Questions and concerns about 
memory problems 
Facts about Dementia: different types of 
dementia, how memory works, different types of 
memory, external memory strategies  
3 Challenges of dementia Coping with stressful & difficult to understand 
behaviours 
4 Coping with stress  How to recognise stress.  Relaxation 
5 How has your life changed? - 
Adjusting to new situations 
Changes since the diagnosis of dementia, & 
ways of managing these changes 
6 How services & different 
professionals can help 
Talks from relevant local professionals and 
services. Closing the group – feedback. 
 
Participants were provided with information sheets and handouts during the sessions and were 
asked to carry out some activities between sessions. 
 
Participants 
 
Potential participants were identified by the Clinical Psychologist in the CMHT for Older Adults or by 
the local AS.  All had a partner or first-degree relative attending a memory clinic or a day centre, or 
they were attending a carer support group.  All participants (n = 6) were close relatives of people 
 52 
who had recently received a diagnosis of Alzheimer‟s disease or vascular dementia.  All 
participants committed to attend all or the majority of the six sessions of the group. 
 
Procedure 
 
Potential participants for the group were invited to attend by the Clinical Psychologist or the AS Co-
ordinator. They had the opportunity to ask questions about the group and were given a two-week 
period in which to opt-in.  They were given a leaflet summarising the content of the course and 
were assured their decision would not affect any current or future services they would receive.   
 
Once participants had opted-in, via telephone contact with the Clinical Psychologist or AS Co-
ordinator, they were contacted by the Trainee Clinical Psychologist to complete the pre-group 
evaluation.  They were informed that completion of the questionnaires was anticipated to take 45 
minutes. During the meeting, the Trainee Clinical Psychologist reminded participants that a 
decision not to attend or to withdraw from the group would not affect any current or future services 
they received.  The Trainee was available to answer questions concerning the group.  Participants 
were asked to sign a consent form before completing the questionnaires for the pre-course 
evaluation.   
 
In the final session of the group, participants completed the qualitative satisfaction questionnaire.  
Then, in the week following the final session of the group, the Trainee met with the participants in 
order for them to complete the post-group evaluation.   
 
All the information gathered was kept confidential, anonymous and securely protected in a locked 
filing cabinet held within the Clinical Psychology department.  All questionnaire data was recorded 
on a database.  A coding system was used and the names of participants were coded once 
consent to participate in the group was obtained.   
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Measures 
 
The service evaluation involved the completion of a questionnaire package by the carer of the 
person with dementia.  All measures were routinely used with people for clinical and research 
purposes and are not known to cause discomfort or distress.  They were as follows: - 
 
▪ Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Snaith & Zigmond, 1983).   
▪ The Machin Strain Scale- Modified Version (Gilleard, 1987).   
▪ Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1993).   
▪ The Dementia Quiz (DQ; Gilleard & Groom, 1994). 
▪ General satisfaction questionnaire (constructed for the purpose of this audit) 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
It was proposed that participants identified as needing extra input as a result of material generated 
in the sessions or following the end of the group would be offered an appointment with the Clinical 
Psychologist for the Older Adult CMHT. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to answer the audit questions, the qualitative information will be 
summarised. 
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Results 
 
In the sample of carers of people with dementia, the majority were over 65 (n = 5), 2 of the carers 
were husbands caring for their wives, 3 were wives caring for their husbands and one carer was a 
daughter, aged 47, who cared for her mother. 
 
One participant had to make the decision to move their spouse into care towards the end of the 
group, and the husband of one participant died before the group was completed, and they 
subsequently disengaged from the study.  
 
The carers mean scores on the questionnaires are shown in the table below: 
 
Questionnaire Pre group 
mean 
Pre group 
range 
Post group 
mean 
Post group 
range 
HADS Anxiety 8.5 4-14 7.8 3-12 
Depression 7.5 
 
0-12 6.4 1-11 
Strain Scale 
 
12.3 7-16 14.00 7-17 
Self-efficacy 
 
27.8 18-36 32.2 28-35 
Dementia Quiz Biomedical 
 
2.8 2-4 3.8 2-5 
Coping 
 
4.5 2-6 5.4 2-7 
Services 
 
3.5 0-6 5.2 3-6 
 
 55 
Mean levels of anxiety and depression were below clinical cut-offs for caseness and decreased 
following the group.  There was a wide spread of scores across the range for anxiety and 
depression.  Mean strain levels were high at baseline and increased following the group, however 
the range of scores remained consistent.  Self-efficacy was generally low but increased following 
the group.  There seemed to be a low degree of knowledge as measured by the Dementia Quiz, 
prior to the participants commencing the group, which seemed to be improved post-group. 
The individual participant‟s pre and post scores on the measures will be considered in more detail 
below. 
 
Graph 1: Did the group have an effect of the carer’s anxiety scores? 
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It is generally considered in the literature that a score above a cut off of 9.1 on the HADS Anxiety 
Scale is indicative of caseness for anxiety, which warrants further investigation.  Graph 1 shows 
that for three of the participants anxiety levels on the HADS were indicative of clinical levels prior to 
the group.  In the case of participants 3 and 5 this reduced following the group, although participant 
5 remained in the clinical range.  It seems that for two of the participants, anxiety levels rose 
following the carer‟s group, however, these remained at or below the cut off of 9.1. 
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Graph 2: Did the group have an effect on the Carer’s depression scores? 
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A cut off score of above 7 on the HADS Depression scale indicates depression, which falls just 
outside the normal range.  The majority of participants were at this level, or above prior to 
beginning the group.  For three of the participants there was a reduction in reported depression 
scores, although this was only a difference of a point in the case of participant 2.  Participant 1 
experienced an increase in depression score of 4 points following the group. 
 
Graph 3: Was there a reduction in the carer’s reported Strain following the group? 
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Strain scores for four of the carer‟s were at or above the cut off score of 14.6 at the pre-group 
assessment stage.  In all cases, participants reported increased or similar levels of strain upon 
completion of the group.  Although individual strain scores increased, the range of scores remained 
virtually the same.   
 
Graph 4: Did the group help to improve the carer’s self-efficacy? 
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For some participants, self-efficacy scores increased quite significantly following the group and 
typically, these were the participants with lower self-efficacy scores prior to the group.  Two of the 
participants experienced a slight decrease in self-efficacy score following the group but this was a 
drop of no more than 3 points on the scale.  
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Graph 5: Did the group improve the carer’s knowledge of Dementia? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Participant
0
5
10
15
20
D
em
en
ti
a 
Q
u
iz
 T
o
ta
l
Total-pre
Total-post
Graph of individual Dementia Quiz Scores (Total) Pre & 
Post
 
All of the participants demonstrated an increase in scores on the DQ overall, indicating an increase 
in their general level of knowledge about dementia.  For most participants, this increase was 
relatively dramatic; an increase of 5 points or more.  This was less so for participant 2 whose total 
score can be explained by their decrease in scores on biomedical knowledge (see DQ-Biomedical 
graph below).  All participants demonstrated an increase in scores on most of the individual 
components of the DQ, the Biomedical, Coping and knowledge about services (see graphs below). 
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Qualitative questionnaire feedback: 
 
The carers reported that they found the support received from the other participants valuable and 
found the information provision and behavioural management strategies particularly helpful. 
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Discussion 
 
Summary & discussion of the findings 
 
The findings of this audit indicate that being involved in the group was a positive experience for all 
of the carers, who commented that they had found the contact and support from the other 
participants invaluable.  This is consistent with the research outlined in the introduction that 
suggests that emotional support is an essential component of any group psycho-educational 
intervention, and that sharing experiences in a supportive setting is powerful and helpful for many 
carers (Depp et al, 2003; Knight et al, 1993; Thompson et al, 2003).  
 
In general, mean anxiety and depression scores decreased following the group.  This may be a 
result of the group enabling participants to voice their concerns, reduce isolation and learn more 
effective ways to manage stress.  However, this was not the case for some of the carers, whose 
scores increased following the group.  This may be related to the stage of the person with 
dementia‟s illness or other factors present in the carer‟s lives, which the group was unable to 
address or that were difficult to capture via self-report measures.   
 
It seems that the carers experienced an increase in measured strain following the group.  This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the progressive nature of dementia and the individual challenges faced 
by the carers over the course of the group.  One participant‟s spouse had a significant decline in 
health to the extent that respite care was arranged and two of the other carers‟ spouses 
experienced decline across the span of the group.  These factors may also explain individual 
increases in anxiety and depression.  Research indicates that strain and satisfaction for the 
caregiver can become reduced as the person with dementia‟s intellectual capacity decreases 
(Depp et al, 2003).  It is worth bearing in mind that although the group was targeted at carers of 
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those in the early stages of the illness, the participants were varied in terms of their relative‟s type 
of dementia and stage of decline.   
It is worth noting that this study did not attempt to measure the positive aspects of caring.  
Research of this nature indicates that for caregivers, strain, stress and satisfaction can co-exist and 
vary over time.  A high proportion of carers express satisfaction, irrespective of their scores of care 
giving burden and the impact on their physical or emotional health (Andren & Elmstahl, 2005). 
 
It is positive that scores on the self-efficacy scale increased following the group, indicating that the 
participants felt more confident in their ability to cope with the demands of care giving.  It may be 
that by having contact and gaining support from others in a similar position reinforced a sense of 
confidence for them.  It has been reported that carers often learn by a prolonged process of trial 
and error (Perry, 2002) and perhaps part of being involved in the group helped to facilitate this 
process and thus increase confidence. 
 
Looking at the DQ scores, it seems that the group was effective at increasing the carers knowledge 
of dementia in each of the related areas of biomedical, coping and service-related knowledge.  The 
participants expressed in their feedback that they had found the guidance on communication and 
managing difficult behaviours particularly helpful.   
 
Methodological issues 
 
Psycho-educational groups for close relatives of people with dementia have traditionally been 
evaluated using measures of anxiety, depression and strain, all of which are usually elevated in this 
population.  Within the research there is a trend for carers of people with dementia to show a 
reduction in symptoms of depression and strain, but an increase in levels of anxiety following 
interventions (Cooke et al, 2001; Pusey & Richards, 2001).  This has been shown to be dependent 
on a number of factors such as the individual‟s resources, their age, their gender and the level of 
 62 
disability or stage of decline of the person with dementia (Toseland & Rossiter, 1989; Depp et al, 
2003).  As a result of factors such as these, there is a general agreement that using self-report 
measures of anxiety, depression and strain to evaluate a time-limited group is not ideal (Perry, 
2002).   
 
The measures used in this study were well-validated tools, however there may have been issues 
that rendered them less effective at capturing change in this population.  It could be argued that the 
emotional processes likely to be involved in caring for a loved one with a progressive illness are 
likely to be much broader than a brief measure like the HADS would be able to capture.  Issues 
such as loss, grief and adjustment would not be encompassed by this measure.  Also, when 
measuring mood state in older people it may be worthwhile using a scale such as the Geriatric 
Depression Scale (GDS) which factors out physical limitations in the measurement of mood. 
 
There are many psychological, physical and systems factors that may be involved in the process of 
care giving (Charlesworth, 2001), all of which would not be possible to evaluate over the course of 
a short-term intervention.  Aspects such as the effect of increasing insight into the progressive 
nature of dementia, the carers‟ level of social support or isolation, perceived quality of life, coping 
style, self-esteem, physical health and financial burden are all likely to have an impact on the 
carers‟ emotional well-being and perceived ability to provide care.  It would have been worthwhile 
measuring these factors.  
 
Limitations & improvements 
 
The time limitations inherent in setting up, offering and attempting to evaluate this group meant that 
only carers could be involved in the group.  This group would have ideally operated in a parallel 
format, for both the carers and the persons with dementia.  The group was only offered to the 
carers in this instance due to organisational constraints.  Due to the clinician‟s knowledge of the 
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variation in the stage of dementia of the participants close relatives, it was not considered 
appropriate for them to form a group.   
 
In future interventions, it may also be worth considering matching the group members.  This may 
involve paying more attention to who is the carer, as in this case, all were spouses or close 
relatives and the group was mixed in terms of gender.  It remains to be seen as to whether there is 
benefit in having gender or relationship specific groups for carers, as some findings have indicated 
(Toseland & Rossiter, 1989; Depp et al, 2003).  The participants involved in the group were those 
who defined themselves in the caring role, and indeed the majority did live with the person with 
dementia and were the sole care provider.  It may be more appropriate for the person with 
dementia to nominate their carer (Charlesworth, 2001). 
 
During the evaluation of the group, the facilitators and participants felt that a slightly longer group 
would be more beneficial, perhaps for eight to ten weeks.  It was felt that this would allow the 
material to be covered in greater depth as well as providing the participants with more informal 
space to share their experiences with each other.  This is also more in line with treatment manuals 
and protocols available for groups of this type (Gallagher-Thompson et al, 2000; Coon et al, 1999).  
Another useful consideration is to provide modular interventions that give carers the option to 
attend the topics that are relevant to them and their situation.   
 
The Trainee would have valued more involvement in running the group, however due to time 
constraints this was not possible.  Being able to meet with the participants before and after the 
group and hearing the positive comments made was a valuable experience for the Trainee.  
Reading some of the qualitative literature regarding caring (Aarons, 2003; Perry, 2002) and 
discussion in supervision helped to increase the Trainee‟s insight into the experience of carers and 
the processes involved in group work of this nature.  Involvement in this study helped to foster an 
appreciation of the limits and realistic outcomes for a time-limited intervention.  
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Service implications & future research 
 
The group was well received by the carers and positive outcomes were indicated.  It would be 
beneficial to extend this audit to evaluate to efficacy of this group intervention for carers, allowing 
for statistical evaluation looking at clinically significant change for the participants.  Following on 
from this, it would be appropriate to offer this service as standard.   
 
It may be worth considering some of the changes mentioned above, such as increasing the length 
of the group and also taking into account the carers‟ feedback by providing the group at the initial 
stage of diagnosis.  Developing a standard treatment manual, which can accommodate individual 
gaps in knowledge and participant need, taking account of the participants‟ scores on the intake 
questionnaires, may also be considered.  This type of individual, needs-led approach has been 
recommended by other commentators (Depp et al, 2003; Gallagher-Thompson et al, 2000) 
 
Following this study, it was decided to provide the group in parallel format once more and extend 
the group to eight weeks.  There was also recognition by the group facilitators that a more 
systematic recruitment process would need to be implemented, with improved matching of the 
participants involved.  It was decided to programme the group at regular intervals throughout the 
year so that a systematic referral process could be set up. 
 
Longer-term improvements were highlighted based upon the qualitative feedback from participants.  
This included the importance of liaising with referrers in order to improve „early enough‟ detection of 
participants who may wish to attend the group.  Asking people whether they might be interested in 
accessing a group, should a diagnosis of dementia be received, and contacting them at various 
stages may be a useful first step to providing support to people following diagnosis.  By being 
proactive in this way, the hope would be to be able to provide more timely and effective support to 
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people with dementia and their close relatives who may otherwise feel isolated.  It was intended 
that in the longer term, the group would be extended across the regional area, with an aim to 
provide all carers, close relatives and people receiving a dementia diagnosis via the district memory 
clinic the opportunity to attend the group programme. 
 
In order to provide appropriate care, statutory services have a responsibility to monitor and assist 
those informally giving care to persons with dementia.  The government initiatives and service 
frameworks (DOH, 2001) indicate the key role of informal carers in providing adequate services for 
people with dementia.  Early identification would be key to detecting carers at risk of high levels of 
strain and poor physical and emotional health.  This would be most usefully carried out during the 
carer‟s assessment as referral links into the group could be set up to aid a more timely delivery of 
the intervention.   
 
This group was based upon research evidence and guided by government recommendations and 
seemed to provide the appropriate ingredients to enable carers to cope more effectively and reduce 
the negative effects of caring on their lives.  The long-term benefits of group interventions such as 
this remain to be seen.  It may be that small reductions in aspects such as strain, improvement in 
dementia related knowledge and increases in self-efficacy may be of benefit to carers by improving 
quality of life and ability to care.  Effective, developed systems for supporting carers are still 
somewhat lacking and access to such services varies across localities.  It seems groups such as 
that evaluated are important and well received first steps in providing assistance to and improving 
well-being for this valuable group of people.  
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The role of avoidance in eating disorders: A review. 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the eating disorders share a degree of similar features and 
maintaining mechanisms.  This has led to recent theoretical and clinical developments within the 
field which take a „transdiagnostic‟ approach to understanding and treating eating disorders 
(Fairburn, Cooper & Shafran 2003).  Recently certain cognitive behavioural processes have been 
considered to also be „transdiagnostic‟ and have been identified as being present across 
psychological disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran 2004).  Behavioural and cognitive 
avoidance has been suggested as one of these processes (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & 
Strosahl 1996; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson 1999; Harvey et al 2004).  This review will attempt to 
demonstrate the key role of avoidance of experience in understanding eating pathology, which is 
not addressed by current conceptualisations.  A summary of the research evidence will be 
presented.  The review will begin by giving a brief description of the eating disorders as they are 
classified, and some of the difficulties and questions eating disorders raise for clinicians and 
researchers.  This will be followed by a brief outline of the dominant model of understanding eating 
disorders.  The review will then consider a newer cognitive-behavioural model of psychopathology, 
part of the „third wave‟ that includes mindfulness and acceptance components (Hayes et al 1999), 
which may offer more to a clinical understanding of eating disorders by taking into account the 
process of avoidance. 
 
The importance of a psychological understanding of eating disorders  
 
Eating disorders refer to excessive behavioural attempts at weight control or a non-organic 
disturbance in eating habits resulting in a clinically significant impact in psychosocial functioning 
and physical health (American Psychiatric Association 1994; Garner & Garfinkel 1997; Garfinkel 
2002; Fairburn & Brownell 2002).  Eating disorders are highly prevalent in Western society (van 
Hoeken & Lucas 1998; Nielsen 2001) and are a common clinical problem.  In a health district of 
500, 000 it can be expected that there will be 200 new cases per year (Bell, Clare & Thorn 2001), 
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consisting of approximately 30% bulimia nervosa (BN), 20% anorexia nervosa (AN) and 50% eating 
disorder not otherwise specified (EDNOS).  Eating disorders are topical and attract much attention 
from clinicians and researchers and also from the public and the media.  Eating disorders are of 
concern to clinicians as they carry the highest mortality rate of all the psychiatric disorders, either 
via medical complications associated with the symptoms of the disorder or via suicide (Bell, et al 
2001; Bulik 2002; Garner & Garfinkel 1997; Harris & Barraclough 1998; Nielsen, Moller-Madsen & 
Isager 1998).   
 
The interaction of psychological, biological and social factors has been implicated in the cause and 
maintenance of the disorders (Fairburn & Harrison, 2003).  The primary explanatory and treatment 
models are psychological and as a result, clinical psychologists have much to offer the field in 
terms of advancing theory and treatment.  Cognitive behavioural models of the eating disorders 
have been at the forefront of new developments in treatment (Cooper 2005; Hay, Bacaltchuk, 
Claudino, Ben-Tovim, & Yong 2003; Hay PJ, Bacaltchuk J, Stefano 2004; Fairburn, Marcus, & 
Wilson 1993; Fairburn & Brownell 2002).  The NICE guidelines (2004) for BN are the first to 
recommend a psychological therapy, CBT-BN (Fairburn et al 1993), as the treatment of choice for a 
psychiatric disorder (Wilson, 2005).  However, the current state of the outcome trials for AN means 
that no current treatment intervention can be strongly recommended (NICE, 2004; Hay et al 2004; 
Wilson 2005).  EDNOS, while being the most clinically prevalent type of eating disorder has 
received little attention in the research.  Treatment guidelines tend to follow that of BN, where 
normal weight, binge-eating and compensatory strategies are present (Fairburn & Harrison, 2003).   
 
In order for cognitively based treatment models for eating disorders to be evidence based, there is 
a need to understand the cognitive processes underlying the disorders, which we might expect CBT 
to act on.  It would be easy to assume that all cognitive behavioural theories are the same, however 
recent developments in CBT theory have emerged that may be applicable to eating disorders.  
Information processing models may also have implications for eating disorders.  These will be 
addressed in due course. 
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A diagnostic description of eating disorders: AN, BN and EDNOS  
 
Within current DSM IV criteria (see Appendix A) eating disorders are categorised into AN, BN and 
EDNOS.  Binge Eating disorder (BED) is the most commonly found eating disorder within this 
category (Grilo, 2002).  The core diagnostic features that distinguish BN and AN are as follows; AN 
involves severe restrictive food intake in order to actively maintain a very low weight (e.g. body 
mass index ≤17kg/m²), in BN attempts to severely restrict food intake are punctuated by repeated 
periods of binge eating.  Binges are usually followed by compensatory behaviours such as 
vomiting, laxative use or excessive exercising.  Within BN sufferers can be within a normal weight 
range, another distinguishing feature from AN.  BED differs in that extreme weight control 
behaviours are not used. 
 
The eating disorders have many features in common and it is acknowledged that patients are likely 
to migrate across the disorders (Fairburn, Cooper & Shafran, 2003; Fairburn & Harrison 2003).  It is 
argued that BN, AN and EDNOS may share common cognitive and behavioural mechanisms which 
are implicated in their maintenance.  It is likely that there are common risk factors associated with 
the development of the disorders (Fairburn, Welch, Doll, Davies & O‟Connor 1997; Fairburn, Doll & 
Welch 1998; Fairburn, Cooper, Doll & Welch 1999).  It is also well established that the eating 
disorders have high diagnostic co-morbidity with disorders such as depression and anxiety, PTSD 
and personality disorders (see Fairburn & Brownell, 2002).  The degree of shared clinical features 
combined with the movement of patients between the disorders over time, has led to criticism of the 
existing diagnostic categories for eating disorders.  A cognitive-behavioural 'transdiagnostic' 
approach has been suggested as a more appropriate way of conceptualising eating pathology 
(Fairburn et al 2003).  This calls into question the specificity of the diagnostic groupings for eating 
disorders.  If as proposed, eating disorders share common mechanisms contributing to their 
development and persistence, it is feasible that there are underlying cognitive behavioural 
processes that may be common across all psychological disorders.  In other words, 
„transdiagnostic‟ processes (Harvey et al, 2004).   
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Cognitive-behavioural models of eating disorders  
 
A thorough description of the major cognitive models for BN and AN is beyond the scope of this 
review.  It is proposed that a set of beliefs concerning food, weight and body shape, promote and 
maintain the symptoms of BN, AN and EDNOS (Fairburn et al 1993; Fairburn 1997; Fairburn et al 
2003 Cooper 1997; 2003; 2005; Fairburn, Shafran & Cooper 1999; Wilson 1999).  The over-
evaluation of body shape and weight is seen to be the „core psychopathology‟ of eating disorders 
(Fairburn et al 2003).  This has been proposed as the major cognitive contributor to the 
maintenance of AN (Fairburn et al 1999) and the other eating disorders (Fairburn et al 2003).  The 
most prominent behavioural expression of this concern would be dietary restraint.  Other key 
clinical features would be aspects such as body checking and body avoidance (APA, 1994; 
Shafran, Fairburn, Robinson & Lask, 2004).  Fairburn and colleagues‟ CBT-BN protocol (1993) 
attempts to address the key behavioural features, in line with the DSM IV description of the 
disorders.  It is this version of CBT that the NICE guidelines recommend and it remains the most 
consistently evaluated and efficacious available (Hay et al 2004; Bell et al, 2001; Wilson, 2005; 
NICE, 2004).  However, due to findings that for some sufferers, CBT-BN is insufficient (Fairburn et 
al 2003) eliminating binge eating and purging in only 30-50% of cases (NICE 2004), the 
„transdiagnostic‟ model has been developed.  This includes proposed maintaining mechanisms of 
core low self esteem, clinical perfectionism, mood intolerance and interpersonal difficulties 
(Fairburn et al 2003).  Data has yet to be published regarding the efficacy of this adapted model.   
While this model states that “diagnosis is not of relevance to treatment” (Fairburn et al 2003, pg. 
522) the foundations of the „transdiagnostic‟ model remain grounded in the symptom-led categorical 
system, with add-on modules.  It may be beneficial to take a process approach to identify some of 
the key cognitive behavioural mechanisms underlying the core psychopathology, which may be 
„transdiagnostic‟ across eating and other disorders.  These processes would include attention, 
memory and avoidance (Harvey et al 2004).  The focus of this review will centre on cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance. 
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Cognitive processing of threatening information 
 
Research on cognitive processes in eating disorders has traditionally used self-report measures to 
assess individuals‟ attitudes toward their weight and shape, and thoughts surrounding food and 
eating (Bemis-Vitousek & Hollon 1990).  Recent research has seen the use of experimental 
methods adapted from cognitive psychology.  These experimental paradigms are increasingly 
popular as they may reduce some of the biases inherent in self-report methods and to allow 
processes outside of conscious awareness to be measured.  Many authors have commented on 
the utility of cognitive-experimental paradigms to increase the understanding of the cognitive 
processes involved in eating disorders (Bemis-Vitousek & Hollon 1990; Cooper 1997; 2005; 
Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). 
 
Research along these lines has suggested that people demonstrating eating pathology process 
information that they find threatening in two main ways.  There is a process involving an initial 
hyper-vigilance, or orientation, to the threat information, which suggests that eating disordered 
individuals are predisposed in some way to seek out stimuli relevant to their disorder (Waller, 
Quinton & Watson 1995; Davidson & Wright 2002; Dobson & Dozois 2004; Rofey, Corcoran & Tran 
2004; Faunce 2004; Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy 2002; Lee & Shafran 2004).  This is followed by 
an inability to sustain the attention for these negative disorder-related thoughts, indicated by a 
cognitive and emotional avoidance of the threat (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer, Waller & Watson 
2000; Israeli & Stewart, 2001; Meyer, Serpell, Waller, Murphy, Treasure & Leung 2005).  These two 
processes shall be discussed in turn below. 
 
Attentional bias to threat 
 
Attentional bias, or selective attention, refers to a cognitive process which occurs when two or more 
stimuli compete for limited cognitive resources.  It is suggested that people vulnerable to particular 
disorders will automatically give more attention to the stimuli that is of relevance to them.  This is 
likely to be stronger if the information is self-referent, considered to be a phenomenon common 
across psychopathology (Ingram, 1990; see review in Harvey et al, 2004).   
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There is a vast body of literature, not within the remit of the current review, using tasks thought to 
tap selective attention across a range of psychopathology.  This has indicated a propensity for 
individuals to consistently selectively attend to disorder-salient and self-referent information.  
Findings from this line of research for eating disorders consistently suggest an attentional bias to 
disorder-specific threat stimuli of eating, body shape and weight (see Harvey et al 2004; Dobson & 
Dozois 2004; Faunce 2004; Ainsworth et al 2002; Lee & Shafran 2004 for extensive reviews).  
Biases in attention are so commonly found for eating disordered individuals which is suggestive of 
a cognitive vulnerability similar to that found in anxiety disorders (Dobson & Dozois 2004).  Indeed 
it has been argued that in many ways eating disorders may have much in common with the anxiety 
disorders, such as OCD and social phobia, in that they represent a kind of „experience phobia‟ 
(Wilson 1997 in Wilson & Roberts 2002).  More recently biases in attention for stimuli more 
generally threatening to self esteem has been found among individuals displaying eating pathology 
(Quinton 2004).   
 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that the process of selective attention to disorder-salient 
threat cues is present across the eating disorders and across psychopathology in general (Harvey 
et al 2004).  Therefore, selective attention, with hypothesised links to cognitive avoidance (Lavy & 
van den Hout 1994) is likely to be a transdiagnostic process which may have a key role in the 
formation and maintenance of psychopathology such as eating disorders.   
 
Avoidance of threat in psychopathology 
 
Avoidance can be behavioural or cognitive, although this distinction is not commonly made in the 
literature.  A recent volume considering „transdiagnostic‟ cognitive behavioural processes only 
considered behavioural avoidance, possibly because cognitive forms of avoidance are more subtle 
and not as readily observable (Harvey et al 2004).  One can either avoid situations altogether, 
presumably grounded in some prior aversive experience, or one can attempt to „escape‟ from 
situations after entering them.  As such, behavioural avoidance is a clinical feature of certain 
disorders, such as specific phobia, social phobia and PTSD (APA 1994).   
 77 
 
Cognitive avoidance could include such aspects as thought control, suppression, distraction and 
worry.  Avoidance of painful thoughts and feelings is thought to play a key role in the development 
of psychopathology across a range of domains, although much of the work has been conducted 
within anxiety disorders (Power & Dalgleish 1997; Dalgleish & Power 1999; Wells & Matthews 
1994).  It is suggested that cognitive avoidance functions largely as a defensive strategy with a 
primary aim to improve emotional states by „blocking‟ negative or threat information, and as such it 
is a flawed process.  For example, the literature on thought suppression indicates that deliberate 
attempts to suppress target thoughts actually increased their occurrence (Wegner & Zanakos 1994; 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White 1987; Clark, Ball, & Pape 1991; Clark, Winton, & Thynn 1993).  
There is evidence to suggest that attempts to eliminate or suppress negative emotion and cognition 
can be counter productive over the longer term, as these efforts may lead to an amplification and 
re-occurrence of the suppressed thoughts (see review by Wenzlaff & Wegner 2000; Wilson & 
Roberts 2002; Pennebaker 1997 Hayes et al 1996).   
 
As a „process‟ model the Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF; Wells & Matthews 
1994; Wells 1997; Wells 2000) considers metacognitive processes such as worry and rumination 
as key factors in the development and maintenance of psychopathology (Wells 1997; 2000; 
Papageorgiou & Wells 2003; Cooper, Todd & Wells 2004).  It is argued that worry can act as a 
coping strategy for controlling thoughts.  Less distressing worrying thoughts can replace highly 
aversive ones (Wells & Davies 1994; Wells 2000) and therefore worry has been put forward as a 
process of cognitive avoidance (Borkovec, 1994; 2002; Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004).  It is 
proposed that worry permits people to process difficult emotional concerns at a more verbal 
conceptual level thus reducing physiological and emotional arousal.  However, this means that 
adequate emotional processing may not occur (Borkovec et al 2004).  It has been suggested that 
beliefs about the importance of controlling thoughts may lead to the use of cognitive avoidance 
strategies (Purdon, 1999).  The body of literature suggests that while avoidant styles of coping may 
work in the short term, these processes may worsen outcomes in the long-term (Purdon, 1999; 
Hayes et al, 1996).   
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Behavioural and cognitive avoidance in eating disorders 
 
People with eating disorders exhibit behavioural avoidance in a number of ways, although it is not a 
specific diagnostic feature (APA, 1994).  The clearest example of this is when restricting calorie 
intake, they will avoid fattening foods and attempt to „escape‟ from situations in which they are 
uncertain of the calorie content of food.  As previously mentioned, body avoidance is common, this 
includes refusal to be weighed and wearing baggy clothes to disguise body shape (Shafran et al 
2004).   
 
Studies of thought suppression in eating disorders are very limited and restricted to analogue 
samples (Johnston, Bulik & Anstiss 1999; Oliver & Huon 2001; O‟Connell, Larkin & Mizes 2005).  
The findings indicate no significant differences in intrusive thoughts following thought suppression 
in participants demonstrating higher risk of „eating pathology‟ compared to those of low risk.  
However, the pattern may be different for clinical populations and this remains to be explored within 
the research.  Work has been done to attempt to capture metacognitive beliefs in eating disorders, 
although once again this is very limited (Mizes et al 2000; Waller 2003; Waller et al 2003).  
Recently „thought-shape fusion‟ has been conceptualised, which is the belief that thoughts are able 
to cause weight gain or increase feelings of fatness (Shafran, Teachman, Kerry & Rachman 1999).  
One study has indicated the presence of these „thoughts about thoughts‟ in a clinical anorexic 
sample (Radomsky et al 2002). 
 
Cognitive avoidance is thought to play a role in disorders for which impulsivity is a key feature and 
BN would come into this category (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice 
2001).  An explanation put forward is that the initial attentional bias to personally-relevant threat 
cues leads to self-focused negative affect that the individual finds intolerable (Baumeister et al 
2001; Heatherton & Baumeister 1991).  In seeking to escape from this negative self-awareness, the 
individual may narrow the focus of cognitive attention from the abstract level of self-evaluation (e.g. 
“I‟m a failure”), to a more concrete and immediate stimulus environment (e.g. the sensations of 
eating).  Hence bulimic behaviours serve to block or shift attention from the negative thoughts and 
feelings about the self, to a concrete behaviour such as binge-eating (Heatherton & Baumeister 
 79 
1991).  In this way, binge eating would be seen as a form of avoidance or „escape‟ from threatening 
information the individual is biased toward attending to. 
 
In contrast to the volume of research into selective attention, there is limited evidence exploring the 
process of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders.  Table 1 provides a summary of the key studies 
to date and there now follows a brief review of this literature.   
 
Studies of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders 
 
Studies using self-report methods have found that women with eating disorders are more likely to 
engage in rumination and cognitive avoidance as coping strategies than women without an eating 
disorder (Troop & Treasure 1997; Troop, Holbery & Treasure 1998).  Research utilising cognitive-
experimental paradigms has lead to the proposition that eating disordered individuals demonstrate 
cognitive avoidance of particular threat stimuli which may be a factor in the maintenance of the 
disorders (Ainsworth et al 2002).  Cognitive processing paradigms such as such threat stimulus 
identification tasks (Waller et al, 1995), single word anagram solution tasks (Waller & Meyer 1997; 
Meyer et al 2005) and the modified Stroop task (Seddon & Waller 2000) have been used to date.  A 
full description of these tasks is beyond the scope of this review.  Table 1 presents each study and 
gives an overview of the measures used, the population studied and the main findings.   
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Study Participants Paradigm 
used 
Variables Self-Report 
Measures 
Main Findings 
 
Waller, Quinton & Watson 
(1995) 
 
Analogue sample 
– female students 
 
Computer-
driven word 
recognition 
test 
 
Neutral words & unspecific 
threat words 
Group 
 
EAT 26 – sample 
split into High & 
Low bulimic 
attitudes. 
 
Women with high bulimic attitudes group were slower to 
respond to threat words. No association with women in 
the restricting group 
 
Waller & Meyer (1997): 2 
part study 
 
Analogue sample 
– Study 1: female 
students  
Study 2: male & 
female students 
 
Anagram 
solution task 
 
Study 1: Anagrams of neutral, 
food and threat words 
Study 2: Anagrams of physical 
threat (e.g. burn), ego self (e.g. 
failure) & ego other threats 
(e.g. insult) 
 
EDI in both studies 
 
Study 1: No association found between solution times 
for food or threat words & scales of the EDI.  
Study 2: No correlation between physical threat, ego 
other threat & EDI subscales. Positive correlation  
between solution times for ego-self threats and „ego 
development‟ scales of EDI (i.e. Ineffectiveness, Social 
Insecurity) 
 
Meyer, Waller & Watson 
(2000) 
 
Analogue sample 
– female students 
 
Computer-
driven threat 
processing 
task 
 
Neutral & ego-self threats. 
Interstimulus intervals (ISI) of 
500, 1000, 1500, 2000ms 
 
EDI 
 
All women were slower to respond to threats following 
the 2000ms ISI.  Women with higher bulimic attitudes 
were slower to process threats after the 1500ms ISI. No 
links were found with restrictive features on the EDI. 
 
Seddon & Waller (2000) 
 
Analogue sample 
– female students 
 
Computer-
driven 
modified 
emotional 
Stroop task 
 
Group: split by age: older 
(>21), younger (≤21) & BITE 
Negative emotional words, 
positive emotional words, 
neutral words. 
Positive (attentional bias) or 
negative (cognitive avoidance) 
interference score 
 
BITE – sample 
split into High & 
Low BITE score. 
 
„Younger‟ women with bulimic attitudes showed 
cognitive avoidance of both positive & negative 
emotional cues. „Older‟ women showed an attentional 
bias for negative emotion cues. 
 
Meyer, Serpell, Waller, 
Murphy, Treasure & Leung 
(2005) 
 
Women with an 
eating disorder 
(n=50): AN-R*=13, 
AN-B/P*=15, 
BN=22 
50 non-clinical 
women 
 
Anagram 
solution task 
 
Group: eating disorder, no 
eating disorder; type of eating 
disorder; presence or absence 
of bulimic symptoms. 
Neutral, food & ego threat 
anagrams. 
 
EDI 
 
BN symptom group took longer to process ego-threat 
words than controls. No differences in solution times 
were observed for neutral or food related words. There 
was a general trend across the groups to process food 
words more rapidly, restrictive AN in particular (NS)*. 
* AN-R = Anorexia Restricting Type * AN-B/P= Anorexia Binge/Purge Type *NS = Not significant 
 
Table 1: Studies of eating pathology and cognitive avoidance using various experimental paradigms 
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The research presented in Table 1 raises many issues.  The use of more „automatic‟ processing 
tasks, such as the modified Stroop, is grounded in a debate regarding how successfully this task 
taps selective attention or avoidance (Lavy & van den Hout 1994; Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 
1996).  This suggests that the experimental paradigms that tap the very early stages of information 
processing may be unreliable in distinguishing cognitive avoidance (Ainsworth et al 2002).  
Therefore it is difficult to say whether the findings from the Waller et al (1995), Meyer et al (2000) 
and Seddon & Waller (2000) studies reflect cognitive avoidance per se.  Therefore the use of more 
strategic and selective processing tasks that may measure the later stages of information 
processing, such as the anagram task, is much needed (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005).  
The findings using this paradigm tend to suggest that individuals displaying BN psychopathology 
demonstrate cognitive avoidance of particular ego-threat stimuli.  This lends some support to 
Heatherton and colleagues‟ (1991; 2001) conclusion that threats to the self-esteem (ego-threats) 
are more relevant in the development of eating psychopathology than disorder-specific threats 
related to food and body image.   
 
It is clear that little empirical evidence is available investigating cognitive avoidance with a clinical 
eating disorder sample.  When research has been conducted with a clinical group, only those 
showing bulimic behaviours have demonstrated cognitive avoidance (Meyer et al 2005).  Therefore, 
while a cognitive avoidance mechanism could be proposed for those displaying binge-purge 
psychopathology, very little is known about the way the cognitive process of avoidance occurs in 
AN.  One might expect this to function differently, as those with restrictive eating do not use binge-
eating to shift the focus of their attention.  Indeed, the most recent research indicated a tendency 
for those with AN restrictive pathology to process food-associated stimuli more rapidly, although 
this was not significant (Meyer et al 2005).  The picture for AN is far from clear. 
 
This is compounded by a lack of clarity in the internal cognitive mechanisms involved in avoidance.  
One proposition, based on Beck & Clark‟s (1997) information processing account of anxiety, 
suggests that cognitive avoidance (strategic information processing) follows on from an initial 
attentional bias (automatic information processing).  Within this model cognitive avoidance is a 
defensive process in which threatening information is processed more strategically and thus more 
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slowly (Beck & Clark 1997; Ainsworth et al 2002).  The proposed reason for this is that eating 
disordered individuals will engage in internal strategies, dissociation would be an example of this 
(Waller 2003), to diminish the activation of painful thoughts and feelings which may be triggered by 
threat information.  This is particularly apparent when the threatening information being processed 
is personally relevant to the individual, such as threats to one‟s self esteem (Heatherton & 
Baumeister 1991).   
 
The evidence base for the presence of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders is clearly at an early 
stage.  There is scope for refinement and development of the paradigms and for exploring the 
processes within eating disorders other than BN to examine if cognitive avoidance is truly a 
„transdiagnostic‟ process. 
 
Models that may account for avoidance in psychopathology 
 
The experimental work presented in Table 1 is largely grounded within a schema information 
processing account (Young 1999; Beck & Clark 1997).  Models linking cognitive and behavioural 
processes and emotion within psychopathology can offer alternative explanations and a context for 
cognitive avoidance.  Theories that fit within this category are the S-REF (Wells & Mathews 1994; 
Wells 1997; Wells 2000), which implicates metacognitive processes such as worry and rumination 
in the development and maintenance of disorders; and the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model 
(ICS; Teasdale & Barnard 1993).  A full description or review of these models is beyond the scope 
of the current review however, they have relevance and applicability to the field of eating disorders 
as „transdiagnostic‟ accounts of emotional disorders (see Harvey et al 2004). 
 
A theoretical model which holds avoidance at the centre of the cause and maintenance of 
psychopathology is Relational Frame Theory (RFT) and the therapy derived from this, Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson 1999).  ACT is a part of the „third wave‟ 
of cognitive behaviour therapies (after behaviour therapy and cognitive therapy); a theoretical 
movement that makes use of acceptance and mindfulness processes (Hayes 2004; Hayes, Follette 
& Linehan 2004).  The „third wave‟ and ACT in particular take a second-order metacognitive stance 
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and as such are somewhat at odds with the traditional CBT approach to cognition.  Within the 
theoretical stance of these methods the emphasis is not on changing the content of thought through 
rational dispute rather the emphasis is on altering the awareness, relationship and the context of 
the thought.  This latter point is specific to ACT (Hayes et al 1999).  Hayes and colleagues (Hayes, 
Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl 1996; Hayes et al 1999; Hayes 2004) also suggest that common 
processes of aetiology or maintenance should be the basis for research and practice.  They 
therefore focus on a process approach, rather than the syndrome-specific categorical approach 
which DSM IV proposes.   
 
The therapeutic goal of ACT is to teach acceptance of unpleasant emotions, physical sensations 
and cognitions.   To achieve this, the emphasis of ACT is experiential rather than didactic, with the 
aim of helping clients to recognise and ultimately dispense with attempts to avoid or suppress 
negative private experience.  The importance of commitment to valued outcomes is emphasised 
alongside the development of behaviours that will help to achieve these outcomes.  ACT assumes 
that in psychopathology functional diagnostic dimensions (Hayes et al 1996) like experiential 
avoidance “prevent a behavioural commitment to living a valued life” (p.81, Hayes et al 1999).  
Supported by research, functional diagnostic dimensions are behavioural and cognitive processes 
involved in the aetiology and maintenance of clinical disorders (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & 
Lillis 2006; Harvey et al 2004).   
 
ACT is grounded in a tradition of empirical research and is evidence based.  Positive outcomes 
have been found across a number of disorder categories and the intervention has been found to be 
superior to treatment-as-usual and CBT in some cases (see Hayes et al 2006 for a review of the 
studies to date). 
 
Experiential avoidance in ACT 
 
Hayes and his colleagues describe experiential avoidance as an unwillingness to experience 
negative unwanted „private events‟ (thoughts, feelings, images, memories) and engaging in 
behaviours to suppress and reduce them, even when attempts to do so are harmful (Hayes et al 
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1996; 1999).  From an ACT perspective, attempts to avoid, control and suppress unwanted 
experiences are common, as these strategies help to reduce the negative state in the short term.  
However, over the longer term they can become problematic as it may be difficult to maintain 
constant efforts in these avoidant processes.  This is why poorer long term outcomes in a range of 
disorders are expected for those prone to experiential avoidance (Purdon, 1999; Hayes et al, 
1996).   
 
Experiential avoidance is considered within ACT to be a transdiagnostic process that is common 
across disorders and central to the maintenance of disorders (Hayes et al, 1996; Harvey et al, 
2004).  ACT does not differentiate between behavioural and cognitive avoidance, rather it proposes 
that experiential avoidance leads to a restricted repertoire of behaviours (behavioural rigidity).  This 
could be applicable to eating disorders as binge eating in BN and BED and food restriction in AN 
can be viewed as attempts to avoid negative emotional, food, weight and body image thoughts and 
feelings, in line with other theoretical suggestions (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991).  An ACT 
treatment manual for AN has recently been written (Hefner & Eifert, 2004) and a group of papers 
based on a case study applying ACT therapeutic principles to an AN sufferer has been recently 
published (Heffner, Sperry, Eifert & Detweiler, 2002; Wilson & Roberts, 2002; Hayes & Pankey, 
2002).  The role of experiential avoidance in eating disorders would appear to be crucial.  However 
at this time specific ACT research for the process in eating disorders is scarce. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This review has attempted to provide an overview of avoidance, a cognitive behavioural process 
proposed to be of importance transdiagnostically and to an understanding of the routes to and 
maintenance of eating pathology.  The full clinical implications of cognitive behavioural avoidance 
are widespread but beyond the present discussion.  However this review has highlighted the ACT 
model, which considers experiential avoidance as a key process in psychological disorders.  To 
back up the theory for eating disorders and avoidance it is essential that more research is 
conducted.  At present the research base is inadequate to draw any conclusions regarding the role 
of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders.  Little is understood about the process within a clinical 
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group, particularly with AN and EDNOS.  Studies using strategic processing tasks should be 
conducted to adequately distinguish selective attention and cognitive avoidance.  It has been 
highlighted that concerns other than those of food, weight and body shape may have more 
relevance in cognitive avoidance among eating disordered individuals.  Further work considering 
the importance of avoidance of threats to self esteem (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991) will be 
useful for advancing the knowledge concerning cognitive content in eating disorders.  It has been 
acknowledged that further empirical research is required into the role of experiential avoidance in 
eating disorders (Hayes & Pankey, 2002).   
 
Research into these types of cognitive behavioural processes across the eating disorders may 
have important implications for the future development and adaptation of theoretical models.  This 
may further increase our understanding and improve treatment outcomes.  Establishing evidence 
for the role of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders may provide support for treatment 
approaches that emphasise acceptance of previously avoided negative private events as a key 
route to recovery, and potentially improve treatment efficacy.   
 
References 
 
Ainsworth, C., Waller, G., & Kennedy, F. (2002). Threat processing in women with bulimia. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 22, 1155-1178. 
 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). DSM-IV: Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th ed.). Washington: American Psychiatric Association 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (2001). Losing Control: how and why people fail 
at self-regulation. London: Academic Press. 
 
Beck, A. T., & Clark, D. A. (1997). An information processing model of anxiety: automatic and 
strategic process. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 49-58. 
 
103 
Bell, L., Clare, L., & Thorn, E. (2001). Service guidelines for people with eating disorders. The 
British Psychological Society, Occasional Paper, No. 3. 
 
Bemis-Vitousek, K., & Hollon, S. D. (1990). The investigation of schematic content and processing 
in eating disorders. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 191 – 214. 
 
Borkovec, T. D. (1994). The nature, functions and origins of worry. In G.C. Davey & F. Tallis (Eds). 
Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. (pp. 5 – 33). Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Borkovec, T. D. (2002). Life in the future versus life in the present. Clinical Psychology: Science 
and practice, 9, 76 – 80. 
 
Borkovec, T. D., Alcaine, O., & Behar, E. (2004). Avoidance theory of worry and generalised 
anxiety disorder. In R. G. Heimberg, C. L. Turk & D. S. Mennin (Eds.), Generalised anxiety 
disorder: Advances in research and practice (p. 77 – 108). New York; Guilford Press. 
 
Bulik, C. (2002). Anxiety, depression, and eating disorders. In C.G. Fairburn & K. D. Brownell 
(Eds.), Eating Disorders and Obesity: A Comprehensive Handbook (2nd ed., pp. 155–161). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
 
Clark, D. M., Ball, S., & Pape, D. (1991). An experimental investigation of thought suppression. 
Behaviour Research & Therapy, 29, 253-257. 
 
Clark, D. M., Winton, E., & Thynn, L. (1993). A further experimental investigation of thought 
suppression. Behaviour Research & Therapy, 31, 207-210. 
 
Cooper, M. J. (1997). Cognitive theory of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa: A review. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 25, 113–145. 
 
Cooper, M. J. (2003). Bulimia nervosa: a cognitive perspective. Oxford; Oxford University Press. 
104 
 
Cooper, M. J., Wells, A., & Todd, G. (2004). A cognitive model of bulimia nervosa. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 43, 1 – 16. 
 
Cooper, M. J., (2005). Cognitive theory in anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa: progress, 
development and future directions. Clinical Psychology Review, 25, 511–531 
 
Dalgleish, T., & Power, M. (1999). Handbook of Cognition and emotion. Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 
Davidson, E. J. & Wright, P. (2002). Selective processing of weight- and shape-related words in 
bulimia nervosa: use of a computerized Stroop test. Eating Behaviours, 3, 261-273. 
 
Dobson, K. S. & Dozois, D. J. A. (2004). Attentional biases in eating disorders: a meta-analytic 
review of Stroop performance. Clinical Psychology Review, 23, 1001-1022. 
 
Fairburn, C.G., Marcus, M.D., & Wilson, G.T. (1993). Cognitive-behavioural therapy for binge eating 
and bulimia nervosa: A comprehensive treatment manual. In C.G. Fairburn & G.T. Wilson (Eds.), 
Binge eating: Nature, assessment and treatment (pp. 361–404). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Fairburn, C. G., Welch, S. L., Doll, H. A., Davies, B. A., & O‟ Connor, M. E. (1997). Risk factors for 
bulimia nervosa: a community-based case-control study. Archives of General Psychiatry; 54, 509–
17. 
 
Fairburn, C. G., Doll, H. A., & Welch, S. L. (1998). Risk factors for binge eating disorder: a 
community-based case-control study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 425–32. 
 
Fairburn, C. G., Cooper, Z., Doll, H. A., & Welch, S. L. (1999). Risk factors for anorexia nervosa: 
three integrated case-control comparisons. Archives of General Psychiatry, 56, 468–76. 
 
105 
Fairburn, C.G., Shafran, R., & Cooper, Z. (1999). A cognitive-behavioural theory of anorexia 
nervosa. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 1–13 
 
Fairburn, C. G., & Brownell, K. D. (2002). Eating disorders and obesity: a comprehensive handbook 
(2nd edn). New York: Guilford Press, 2002: 
 
Fairburn, C. G., Cooper, Z., & Shafran, R. (2003). Cognitive behaviour therapy for eating disorders: 
A „transdiagnostic‟ theory and treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 509–528. 
 
Fairburn, C. G., & Harrison, P. J. (2003). Eating Disorders. The Lancet, 361, 407-416. 
 
Faunce, G. J. (2004). Eating disorders and attentional bias: A review. Eating Disorders, 10, 125 – 
139. 
 
Garfinkel, P. E. (2002). Classification and diagnosis of eating disorders. In C.G. Fairburn & K. D. 
Brownell (Eds.), Eating Disorders and Obesity: A Comprehensive Handbook (2nd Ed., pp. 155–
161). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Garner, D. M., & Garfinkel, P. E. (1997). Handbook of treatment for eating disorders (2nd Ed.). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
 
Grilo, C. M. (2002). Binge Eating Disorder. In C.G. Fairburn & K. D. Brownell (Eds.), Eating 
Disorders and Obesity: A Comprehensive Handbook (2nd Ed., pp. 155–161). New York: Guilford 
Press. 
 
Harris, E. C. & Barraclough, B. (1998). Excess mortality of mental disorder. British Journal of 
Psychiatry,173: 11-53. 
 
106 
Harvey, A., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive behavioural processes across 
psychological disorders: a transdiagnostic approach to research and treatment. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hay P, Bacaltchuk J, Claudino A, Ben-Tovim D, Yong PY. Individual psychotherapy in the 
outpatient treatment of adults with anorexia nervosa. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
2003, Issue 4. Art. No.: CD003909. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD003909. 
 
Hay PJ, Bacaltchuk J, Stefano S. Psychotherapy for bulimia nervosa and binging. Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews 2004, Issue 3. Art. No.: CD000562. DOI: 
10.1002/14651858.CD000562.pub2. 
 
Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. G., Gifford, E. V., Follette, V. M. & Strosahl, K. D. (1996) Experiential 
avoidance and behavioural disorders: A functional dimensional approach to diagnosis and 
treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64 (6) 1152 – 1168.  
 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D. & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy: an 
experiential approach to behaviour change. New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Hayes, S. C. & Pankey, J. (2002). Experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, and an ACT approach 
to anorexia nervosa. Cognitive and Behavioural Practice, 9, 243-247. 
 
Hayes, S. C., Follette, V. M., & Linehan, M. M. (2004). Mindfulness and acceptance: Expanding the 
cognitive-behavioural tradition. New York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory and the third 
wave of behavioural and cognitive therapies. Behaviour Therapy, 35, 639-665. 
 
107 
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1 –
25 
 
Heatherton, T. F., & Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Binge eating as escape from self-awareness. 
Psychological Bulletin, 110, 86–108. 
 
Heffner, M., Sperry, J., Eifert, G. H. & Detweiler, M. (2002). Acceptance and commitment therapy in 
the treatment of an adolescent female with anorexia nervosa: A case example. Cognitive and 
Behavioral Practice, 9, 232-236. 
 
Heffner, M. & Eifert, G. H. (2004). The anorexia workbook. Oakland: New Harbinger Publications. 
 
van Hoeken, D. & Lucas A. R. (1998). Epidemiology. In H. W. Hoek, J. L. Treasure & M. A. 
Katzman  (Eds.) Neurobiology in the treatment of eating disorders (pp. 97 -  126). Chichester: 
Wiley. 
 
Israeli, A. L. & Stewart, S. H. (2001). Memory bias for forbidden food cues in restrained eaters. 
Cognitive Therapy & Research, 25 (1), 37-47. 
 
Johnston, L., Bulik, C. M., & Anstiss, V. (1999). Suppressing thoughts about chocolate. 
International Journal of Eating Disorders, 26, 21 -27. 
 
Lavy, E. D. & van den Hout, M. A. (1994). Cognitive avoidance and attentional bias: causal 
relationships. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18 (2), 179 – 191. 
 
Lee, M. & Shafran, R. (2004). Information processing biases in eating disorders. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 24, 215 – 238. 
 
108 
Meyer, C., Waller, G. & Watson, D. (2000). Cognitive avoidance and bulimic psychopathology: the 
relevance of temporal factors in a non-clinical population. International Journal of Eating Disorders; 
27, 405-410. 
 
Meyer, C., Serpell, L., Waller, G., Murphy, F., Treasure, J., & Leung, N. (2005). Cognitive 
avoidance in the strategic processing of ego-threats among eating-disordered patients. 
International Journal of Eating Disorders; 38, 30–36 
 
Mizes, J. S., Christiano, B., Madison, J., Post, G., Seime, R., & Varnado, P. (2000). Development of 
the Mizes Anorectic Cognitions Questionnaire-Revised: psychometric properties and factor 
structure in a large sample of eating disorder patients. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 28, 
415-421. 
 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE; 2004). Eating disorders: Core interventions in the 
treatment and management of anorexia, bulimia and related eating disorders. Retrieved from 
http://www.nice.org.uk/download.aspx?o=cg009niceguidance 
 
Nielsen, S., Moller-Madsen, S., Isager, T. (1998). Standardized mortality in eating disorders: a 
quantitative summary of previously published and new evidence. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 44, 413–34. 
 
Nielsen S. (2001). Epidemiology and mortality of eating disorders. Psychiatric Clinics of North 
America, 24, 201–14. 
 
O‟Connell, C., Larkin, K. & Mizes, S. J. (2005). The impact of caloric preloading on attempts at food 
and eating related thought suppression in restrained and unrestrained eaters.  International Journal 
of Eating Disorders, 38 (1), 42 – 48. 
 
Oliver, K. G. & Huon, G. F. (2001). Eating-related thought suppression in high and low disinhibitors. 
International Journal of Eating Disorders, 30, 329-337. 
109 
 
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2003). Depressive Rumination: Nature, Theory and Treatment. 
Chicester: Wiley & Sons. 
 
Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Writing about emotional experiences as a therapeutic process. 
Psychological Science, 8, 162 – 166. 
 
Power, M. & Dalgleish, T. (1997). Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder. Hove UK: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Prato, F. & John, O. P. (1991). Automatic vigilance: the attention grabbing power of negative social 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61 (3), 380-391. 
 
Purdon, C. (1999). Thought suppression and psychopathology. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
37, 1029-1054 
 
Quinton, S. (2004). Processing of five types of „threat‟ information in anorexic and bulimic women. 
European Eating Disorders Review, 12, 184–189. 
 
Randomsky, A.S., de Silva, P., Todd, G., Treasure, J., & Murphy, T. (2002). Thought-shape fusion 
in anorexia nervosa: an experimental investigation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 1169-
1177. 
 
Rofey, D. L., Corcoran, K. J., & Tran, G. Q. (2004). Bulimic symptoms predict food relevant Stroop 
interference in women with troubled eating patterns. Eating Behaviours, 5, 35 – 45. 
 
Seddon, K., & Waller, G. (2000). Emotional processing and bulimic psychopathology: Age as a 
factor among non-clinical women. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 28 (4) 364-369. 
 
110 
Shafran, R., Teachman, B. A., Kerry, S., & Rachman, S. (1999). A cognitive distortion associated 
with eating disorders: thought-shape fusion. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 167-179. 
 
Shafran, R., Fairburn, C. G., Robinson, P. & Lask, B. (2004). Body checking and it‟s avoidance in 
eating disorders. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 35, 93–101.  
 
Teasdale, J., & Barnard, P. (1993). Affect, cognition and change. Hove UK: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Ltd. 
 
Troop, N. A., & Treasure, J. L. (1997) Psychosocial factors in the onset of eating disorders: 
Responses to life-events and difficulties. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 70 (4) 373-385. 
 
Troop, N. A., Holbrey, A., & Treasure, J. L. (1998) Stress, coping, and crisis support in eating 
disorders. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 24 (2) 157-166. 
 
Waller, G., Quinton, S. & Watson, D. (1995). The processing of threat-related information among 
women with bulimic eating attitudes. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 18, 189–193. 
 
Waller, G., Watkins, H., Shuck, V., & McManus, F. (1996). Bulimic psychopathology and attentional 
biases to ego threats among non-eating-disordered women. International Journal of Eating 
Disorders, 20, 169–176. 
 
Waller, G. & Meyer, C. (1997). Cognitive avoidance of threat cues: Association with Eating Disorder 
Inventory scores among a non-eating-disordered population. International Journal of Eating 
Disorders, 22, 299–308. 
 
Waller, G. (2003). Schema-level cognitions in patients with binge-eating disorder: a case control 
study. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 33, 458-564. 
 
111 
Waller, G., Babbs, M., Milligan, R., Meyer, C., Ohanian, V. & Leung, N. (2003). Anger and core 
beliefs in the eating disorders. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 33, 458-464  
 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R. III., & White, L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 5-13. 
 
Wegner, D. & Zanakos, S. I. (1994). Chronic Thought Suppression. Journal of Personality, 62, 615 
– 640. 
 
Wells, A., & Davies, M. I. (1994). The Thought Control Questionnaire: A measure of individual 
differences in the control of unwanted thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 871-878. 
 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and Emotion: A Clinical Perspective. Hove UK: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders: A Practice Manual and Conceptual 
Guide. Chicester: Wiley & Sons. 
 
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional Disorders and Metacognition. Chicester: Wiley & Sons. 
 
Wenzlaff, R. M. & Wegner, D. M. (2000). Thought suppression. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 
59 – 91. 
 
Williams, J. M., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional Stroop task and 
psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 3-24. 
 
Wilson, K. G. & Roberts, M. (2002). Response Paper: Core principles in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy: an application to anorexia. Cognitive and Behavioural Practice, 9, 237 – 
243. 
 
112 
Wilson, T. G. (1999). Cognitive behaviour therapy for eating disorders: progress and problems. 
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 37, S79 – S95. 
 
Wilson, T. G. (2005). Psychological treatment of eating disorders. Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology, 1, 439 – 465. doi: 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.144250 
 
Young, J. E. (1999). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: A schema-focused approach (3rd 
ed.). Sarasota FL: Professional Resource Press. 
113 
Appendix A: Diagnostic Descriptions for Eating Disorders (Modified from DSM-IV) 
 
Diagnostic description of anorexia nervosa: 
a. Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age and height, (e.g. weight 
loss leading to maintenance of body weight less than 85% of that expected; or failure to make expected 
weight gain during period of growth, leading to body weight less than 85% below that expected) 
b. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight, 
c. Disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced, undue influence of body 
weight or shape on self evaluation, or denial of the seriousness of the current low body weight 
d. In post-menarcheal females, amenorrhea, i.e. absence of at least three consecutive menstrual cycles (a 
woman is considered to have amenorrhea if her periods occur only following hormone, e.g. oestrogen, 
administration). 
 
Anorexia nervosa may be further defined as meeting criteria for either the restrictive type (during the current 
episode of anorexia nervosa, the person has not regularly engaged in binge-eating or purging behaviour, i.e. 
self-induced vomiting or the misuse of laxatives, diuretics, or enemas), or the binge-eating/purging type 
(during the current episode of anorexia nervosa, the person has regularly engaged in binge-eating or 
purging behaviour, i.e. self-induced vomiting or the misuse of laxatives, diuretics or enemas). 
 
Diagnostic description of bulimia nervosa: 
a. Includes recurrent episodes of binge eating;  
b. Recurrent inappropriate compensatory behaviour to prevent weight gain;  
c. The average frequency of both binge eating and compensatory behaviour should be at least twice a week 
for three months  
d. Self evaluation is unduly influenced by body shape and weight and the disturbance occurring not 
exclusively during episodes of anorexia nervosa. 
 
Types of bulimia nervosa include: purging: using self induced vomiting, laxatives, diuretics, or enemas. Non-
purging: fasting, exercise, but not vomiting or other abuse as in the purging type. 
 
Diagnostic description of binge eating: 
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Eating, in a discrete period (e.g. hours), an objectively large amount of food, accompanied by a lack of 
control over eating during the episode. 
 
Appendix B: Search Strategy for the identification of relevant studies 
 
The references listed in this literature review were chosen on the basis of their importance, accessibility, and 
usefulness as sources of further information on the topic and eating disorders, transdiagnostic processes 
and cognitive behavioural avoidance. 
 
Detailed journal and book searching: 
 
A detailed search of each issue of The International Journal of Eating Disorders was carried out for the years 
2005 – 2006 to identify some of the most current papers regarding theoretical models of eating disorders, 
treatment outcomes and papers on the topic of avoidance.   
 
Much of the data on prevalence and epidemiology was gained from the most recent large scale reviews, 
including the NICE guidelines and Cochrane reviews, and major reviews or commentaries in the field.  This 
was felt to be adequate as the main focus of the review was not on epidemiology.  Key articles referenced in 
these reviews were obtained. 
 
Additionally, relevant professional key texts and books on eating disorders, attention, cognition, cognition 
and emotion (written in English) were reviewed. 
 
Electronic searching: 
 
PsycINFO was the major source of information for the purposes of this literature review.  A MEDLINE search 
was also conducted and a search of the Cochrane Library was carried out.  The Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology and Clinical Psychology Review was searched for articles on eating disorders since the year 
2000 to obtain the most up-to-date major review papers for psychological treatment of eating disorders.  It 
was not essential to the literature review to access evidenced based trials or treatment research, as 
randomised controlled trials only provide indirect evidence for the processes that maintain disorders.  
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Due to the extensive volume of literature and reviews on the subject of eating disorders, identified in an 
initial search setting no limits, only articles published since 1990 were considered.  Only articles written in 
English, conducted with human participants were reviewed.  Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT) and the 
truncation technique was used.  The key terms identified in the main articles were used within the search.   
 
Relevant material was identified by searching the electronic databases using the following terms: 
 
#1. EATING DISORDERS or BULIMIA or BULIMIA NERVOSA, ANOREXIA or ANOREXIA NERVOSA, 
BINGE EATING or BINGE EATING DISORDER or EATING DISORDERS NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED, 
EDNOS or ATYPICAL EATING DISORDER 
 
#2. AVOIDANCE or COGNITIVE AVOIDANCE or BEHAVIOURAL AVOIDANCE or EXPERIENTIAL 
AVOIDANCE or STRATEGIC PROCESSING or CONTROLLED PROCESSING 
 
#3 (#1 AND #2) 
 
#4 THOUGHT SUPPRESSION or WHITE BEAR THOUGHT SUPPRESSION or THOUGHT CONTROL or 
DISSOCIATION 
 
#5 (#1 AND #4) 
 
#6 ATTENTION or SELECTIVE ATTENTION or ATTENTIONAL BIAS or AUTOMATIC PROCESSING or 
STROOP or STROOP TEST or DOT PROBE or DOT PROBE TEST 
 
#7 (#1 AND #6) 
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Example of electronic search strategy: 
 
The table below gives a detailed example of the search procedure using PsycINFO to identify the studies 
concerning cognitive avoidance in eating disorders.   
 
# 
Search 
Terms Database Limits Date of 
most 
recent 
search 
Number 
of 
records 
# 1 EATING DISORDERS or 
BULIMIA or BULIMIA 
NERVOSA or 
ANOREXIA or 
ANOREXIA NERVOSA 
or BINGE EATING or 
BINGE EATING 
DISORDER or EDNOS 
or ATYPICAL EATING 
DISORDER  
PsycINFO (LA:PSYI = ENGLISH) and 
(PO:PSYI = HUMAN) and 
(PY:PSYI = 1990-2007)  
05/10/06 12550 
# 2 AVOIDANCE or 
COGNITIVE 
AVOIDANCE or 
BEHAVIOURAL 
AVOIDANCE or 
EXPERIENTIAL 
AVOIDANCE or 
STRATEGIC 
PROCESSING or 
CONTROLLED 
PROCESSING 
PsycINFO (LA:PSYI = ENGLISH) and 
(PO:PSYI = HUMAN) 
05/10/06 12736 
# 3 #1 AND #2 PsycINFO  05/10/06 227 
# 4 COGNITIVE 
AVOIDANCE 
PsycINFO (LA:PSYI = ENGLISH) and 
(PO:PSYI = HUMAN) and 
(PY:PSYI = 1990-2007) 
05/10/06 161 
# 5 #1 AND #4 PsycINFO (LA:PSYI = ENGLISH) and 
(PO:PSYI = HUMAN) and 
(PY:PSYI = 1990-2007) 
15/10/06 8 
 
For search #3 the abstracts were initially scanned for relevance.  The most relevant citations were obtained 
wherever possible (it was not possible to obtain some Dissertation Abstracts).  As the focus of the review 
was specifically on new experimental paradigms for measuring cognitive avoidance, date limits were set and 
a specific search using the term „COGNITIVE AVOIDANCE‟ was carried out. 
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Reference searching: 
 
The reference lists of all the papers selected were inspected for further relevant citations which were 
obtained.  PsychINFO and the Web of Science ISI Citation Index were used to obtain cited references and to 
search the authors and articles which had cited the relevant references. 
 
Web searching: 
 
The search engines www.google.com and „google scholar‟ were used.  The internet was particularly helpful 
in accessing the NICE guidelines and department of health documents, British Psychological Society 
information and information from the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy website 
www.contextualpsychology.org.  
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1. Abstract 
 
This study considers and explores the relationship between eating disorders and the cognitive 
processes of attentional bias and cognitive avoidance.  These processes are also considered in 
terms of their contribution to the current theoretical conceptualisations of eating disorders and how 
this may potentially inform treatment.  Previous research in the field is limited yet indicates that 
attentional biases exist in eating disorders, at least for disorder-specific stimuli using well 
recognised experimental paradigms.  The research into cognitive avoidance is scarce yet has 
indicated that those with bulimic tendencies may use this cognitive strategy.   
 
A modified emotional Stroop task and an anagram solution task were used to evaluate 
experimental hypotheses postulating that attentional bias to and cognitive avoidance of disorder 
relevant and self-esteem threat stimuli would be present in a group of patients with an eating 
disorder (N=23) in comparison with a control group (N=34).   Using the emotional Stroop, the 
results showed limited support for the presence of attentional biases in eating disorders.  For the 
anagram solution task, some limited evidence was found for the presence of cognitive avoidance in 
the clinical eating disorder sample.  The limitations of the study were considered and discussed, 
with an emphasis on improvements for future research using these experimental paradigms.  The 
findings of the study were also discussed in relation to the implications for eating disorder theory 
and treatment.   
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2. Introduction  
 
2.1 Overview of the study rationale and theoretical background 
 
This study aims to explore the nature of attentional biases and cognitive processes of avoidance in 
patients with clinical eating disorders (ED).  Cognitive biases have a key role in the explanatory and 
treatment models of eating disorders, yet the research literature into these processes is limited and 
they are often overlooked within therapeutic interventions.  There is evidence that existing cognitive 
behavioural (CBT) treatments have limitations for some patients.  This may be due to a focus on 
the disorder-specific symptoms (i.e. binge-purge behaviour) rather than on the underlying 
dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural processes (e.g. the avoidant function of binge eating) that 
may maintain the disorder. 
 
Recent advancements in cognitive behavioural theory suggest a theoretical shift in the function 
underpinning pathological behaviour, for example the functional role of eating behaviour in 
regulating emotion or avoiding intolerable experience.  These theoretical discussions highlight and 
offer an explanation of attentional and avoidant cognitive processes.  These may be usefully 
applied to eating disorders in an attempt to generate a functional conceptualisation of eating 
behaviour that can extend the dominant disorder-led models which tend to focus on the specific 
content over a wider view of the function of pathological eating behaviour.   
 
It is important to demonstrate the existence of cognitive biases within the eating disorders as there 
may be implications for theory and treatment models.  For instance, attentional biases may have a 
role in confirming negative beliefs about body shape and thus have a role in perpetuating these 
beliefs (Fairburn, Shafran & Cooper 1999; Fairburn, Cooper & Shafran 2003).  As a result of 
attention being drawn to these negative beliefs, people with eating disorders may subsequently 
attempt to divert their attention away to more concrete behaviours (e.g. binge eating) as an attempt 
to “escape” or avoid their increased self awareness (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; McManus & 
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Waller 1995).  Therefore an understanding of the role of cognitive processes in eating disorders 
can contribute to the evidence-base of models and the treatments derived from them.   
 
The overall goal of this study was to investigate whether patients with eating disorders show 
attentional biases and cognitive avoidance for food, body and self-esteem threat stimuli in 
comparison to neutral stimuli and in relation to a control group.  This study is in line with previous 
research into the nature of cognitive processes in the eating disorders, yet aims to take this further. 
 
This introduction section will broadly cover the following key areas: 
 
 a description of the eating disorders as they are classified, including a focus on 
epidemiology and distinguishing features of the disorders. 
 an overview and critique of the dominant CBT model for conceptualising and treating 
eating disorders. 
 an alternative conceptualisation of eating disorders will then be presented which draws 
upon a variety of models of cognitive and behavioural processes in order to develop an 
understanding of the self-regulatory function of eating-disordered pathology. 
 from this conceptualisation, two key cognitive processes of attention and avoidance will be 
drawn out and the research evidence and theoretical understanding of these processes will 
be presented, including the rationale for why they are worthy of further exploration. 
 the contribution of the present study to understanding the role of cognitive processes of 
attention and avoidance in eating disorders will be presented, including potential clinical 
implications. 
 the research hypotheses for the study will be outlined. 
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2.2 Clinical features unique to eating disorders  
 
The multi-factorial interaction of psychological, biological (e.g. genetic) and environmental (e.g. 
familial, social and cultural) factors have been implicated in the cause and maintenance of the 
disorders (Fairburn & Harrison, 2003).  The primary explanatory and treatment models are 
psychological yet these remain grounded in a diagnostic, disorder-specific classification system (i.e. 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed; DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association 1994).  This has drawbacks and limitations for the way that eating disorders are both 
conceptualised and treated, which will be outlined further.  The DSM-IV is currently under review 
and it is proposed that the classifications of eating disorders are altered to make them more 
representative of the clinical realities of the disorders (Fairburn et al 2007).  The current diagnostic 
descriptions of the eating disorders are summarised and presented in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Diagnostic descriptions for eating disorders (Modified from DSM-IV; APA 1994) 
 
 
 
Anorexia Nervosa (AN)  
 
Bulimia Nervosa (BN) 
 
Eating Disorders Not Otherwise Specified 
(EDNOS) or atypical eating disorders 
 Refusal to maintain body weight at or 
above a minimally normal weight for age and 
height, (e.g. Body Mass Index <17.5); 
 Intense fear of weight gain; 
 Disturbances in the experience of body 
weight/shape, undue influence of body weight/ 
shape for self evaluation, or denial of the 
seriousness of the current low body weight; 
 In post-menarcheal females, 
amenorrhea, of least three consecutive 
menstrual cycles. 
 May be further classified as Restricting 
subtype (AN/R) or binge-eating/purging subtype 
 Includes recurrent episodes of binge 
eating;  
 Recurrent inappropriate compensatory 
behaviour to prevent weight gain;  
 The average frequency of both binge 
eating and compensatory behaviour should be at 
least twice a week for three months;  
 Self evaluation is unduly influenced by 
body shape/weight. 
 Types of BN include: purging: using self 
induced vomiting, laxatives, diuretics, or enemas. 
Non-purging: fasting, exercise, but not vomiting 
or other abuse as in the purging type. 
 All criteria for AN are met except the 
individual has regular menses 
 All criteria for AN are met except that, 
despite substantial weight loss, the individual's 
BMI is in the normal range 
 All criteria for BN are met except binges 
occur less than twice a week or for less than 3 
months 
 Use of inappropriate compensatory 
behaviour after eating small amounts of food or 
spitting out food (yet with normal BMI) 
Binge eating disorder (BED); recurrent episodes 
of binge eating in the absence of  regular use of 
compensatory behaviours (usually associated 
with obesity) 
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2.2.1 Clinical prevalence and prognosis in eating disorders 
 
Eating disorders are considered to be highly prevalent in Western society (van Hoeken & Lucas 
1998; Nielsen 2001).  However, despite numerous published epidemiological studies concerning 
the prevalence of eating disorders, community estimates are at best cautionary due to 
methodological weaknesses in the research (Fombonne 1995; Hoek & Van Hoeken 2003; Hoek 
2006; Keel & Klump 2003; Machado, Machado, Goncalves & Hoek 2006).  Some of the most 
recent published data on the prevalence of eating disorders (ED) puts rates at 0.3% in young 
females for Anorexia Nervosa (AN), approximately 1% for Bulimia Nervosa (BN) and 1% for Binge 
Eating Disorder (BED; Hoek & Van Hoeken 2003).   
 
Eating disorders are a common and concerning clinical problem.  In a health district of 500, 000 it 
can be expected that there will be 200 new cases per year (Bell, Clare & Thorn 2001), consisting of 
approximately 30% Bulimia Nervosa (BN), 20% Anorexia Nervosa (AN) and 50% Eating Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified (EDNOS).  Studies of community eating disorder services serve to 
highlight that the majority of cases seen by services do not meet the formal diagnostic criteria for 
AN and BN (see Table 1).  It has been reported that individuals meeting a diagnosis of EDNOS 
most commonly make up the population of outpatient clinics, with the average prevalence being 
60% of cases, with 14.5% for AN and 25.5% for BN (Fairburn & Bohn 2005).   
 
Eating disorders are problematic not least in terms of clinical prognosis.  A recent 21 year follow up 
of AN patients (Lowe, Zipfel & Buchholz 2001) indicated a standardised mortality rate of 9.8% 
consistent with other findings (Sullivan 1995; Sullivan, Bulik & Fear 1998).  This represents a 
mortality rate higher than that of any other psychiatric disorder (Nielsen 2001).  A chronic course of 
the disorder was found to be common, with Body Mass Index (BMI) remaining low after 21 years.  It 
is interesting to note that within the course of the disorder, binge-purge behaviour was 
commonplace and many patients initially diagnosed with AN met a diagnosis of EDNOS at the later 
stages of their illness (Lowe et al 2001).   
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It is also well established that the eating disorders have high diagnostic co-morbidity with disorders 
such as depression and anxiety (Bulik 2002; Sexton, Sunday, Hurt & Halmi 1998), personality 
disorders (DeJonge, Van Furth, Lacey & Waller 2003), substance abuse (Fairburn & Brownell, 
2002) as well as anxiety, PTSD and obsessive compulsive disorder (Scottish Executive 2001).  The 
co-morbid relationship between the eating disorders and Axis I and II psychiatric disorders is not 
well understood.  One possible way to understand this is that particular disorders may share 
common features and vulnerabilities, and may be maintained by similar processes.  This will be 
explored further below.   
 
2.2.2 Are eating disorders maintained by shared mechanisms? 
 
Rather than making categorical distinctions between the eating disorders, as shown in Table 1 it 
has been acknowledged that many of the clinical features overlap across the diagnoses (Fairburn & 
Harrison 2003; Waller 1993; Walsh & Garner 1997).  It is argued that BN, AN and EDNOS may 
share common cognitive and behavioural mechanisms which are implicated in their maintenance.  
It is likely that there are common risk factors associated with the development of the disorders 
(Fairburn, Welch, Doll, Davies & O‟Connor 1997; Fairburn, Doll & Welch 1998; Fairburn, Cooper, 
Doll & Welch 1999).  As mentioned above in the longitudinal study by Lowe and colleagues (2001) 
there is a high degree of migration across the disorders over their course.  Some studies indicate 
substantial movement across diagnostic categories, with around 50% of those initially diagnosed 
with AN going on to develop BN or an atypical ED (Eddy et al 2002; Fairburn et al 2003; Fairburn & 
Harrison 2003).  As such it has been argued that the current cross-sectional classifications serve to 
create artificial boundaries which can lead to misdiagnoses (e.g. The Price Foundation group 
2001).   
 
The degree of shared clinical features combined with the movement of patients between the 
disorders over time, has led to criticism of the existing diagnostic categories for eating disorders.  A 
cognitive-behavioural 'transdiagnostic' approach has been suggested as a more appropriate way of 
conceptualising eating pathology (Fairburn et al 2003).  This calls into question the specificity of the 
diagnostic groupings for eating disorders.  If as proposed, eating disorders share common 
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mechanisms contributing to their development and persistence, it is feasible that there are 
underlying cognitive behavioural processes that may be „transdiagnostic‟ across all psychological 
disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran 2004; as reviewed by Carmen 2006 this volume).   
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2.3 Theoretical background 
 
2.3.1 Therapies aimed at addressing psychopathology related to eating disorders 
 
A number of treatments from differing theoretical orientations have been used with individuals 
experiencing eating disorders and have shown some degree of efficacy, such as Cognitive Analytic 
Therapy (CAT; Dare, Eisler, Russell, Treasure & Dodge 2001; Bell 1999) and Interpersonal 
Psychotherapy (IPT; Agras, Walsh, Fairburn, Wilson, & Kraemer 2000).  More recently therapies 
addressing the potential functional processes behind eating pathology have been proposed as 
useful therapeutic approaches for the disorders, such as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; 
Linehan 1993) adapted for use with eating disorders (Safer, Telch & Agras 2001) and schema 
focused work (Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy 2001).  Each of these interventions is based upon 
theoretical models to explain aspects of experience relevant to the function of eating pathology and 
they each aim to act on specific therapeutic targets (e.g. the link between emotion and behaviour in 
DBT).   
 
The treatments currently recommended by clinical guidelines are those that specifically target the 
symptom-focused cognitions and behaviours associated with ED.  At least for BN, CBT treatments 
are the most widely used and recommended available (Wilson 1999; NICE 2004) and have been at 
the forefront of new developments in treatment (Cooper 2005; Fairburn, Marcus, & Wilson 1993; 
Fairburn & Brownell 2002; Hay, Bacaltchuk, Claudino, Ben-Tovim, & Yong 2003; Hay, Bacaltchuk & 
Stefano 2004).  Remission rates for symptoms (i.e. binge eating and purging) in CBT for BN are 
moderate; 30% to 50% of all cases remit following treatment (Craighead & Agras 1991; Fairburn, 
Jones, Peveler, Hope & O‟Connor 1993; Garner & Garfinkel 1997; Wilson 1999).  It is 
acknowledged that there are certain groups of patients with which the treatment has limited 
success (Wilson 1999; Wilson 2005). 
 
The current state of the outcome trials for AN means that no current treatment intervention can be 
strongly recommended (Hay et al 2004; NICE, 2004; Wilson 2005).  Only family therapy for 
adolescents has come through as an effective intervention for AN in the NICE guidelines (2004; 
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Eisler et al 2000).  EDNOS, while being the most clinically prevalent type of eating disorder has 
received little attention in the research.  Treatment guidelines tend to follow that of BN, where 
normal weight, binge eating and compensatory strategies are present (Fairburn & Harrison, 2003).   
 
2.3.2 Cognitive Behaviour Theory of ED 
 
In response to dissatisfaction with the diagnostic groupings for eating disorders and in an attempt to 
advance the theory and improve outcome for eating disorder-specific CBT, Fairburn, Cooper & 
Shafran (2003) have proposed a transdiagnostic theory and treatment.  This is outlined in Figure 1 
below.  This is also in line with a shift towards identifying and understanding the role of common 
maintaining mechanisms in psychopathology, put forward in a recent volume by Harvey et al 
(2004).  The transdiagnostic model of ED was based on an adaptation of the existing CBT models 
for BN and AN (Cooper 1997; 2003; 2005; Fairburn et al 1993; Fairburn 1997; Fairburn, Shafran & 
Cooper 1999; Fairburn et al 2003; Wilson 1999).   
 
The cognitive behavioural treatment models of ED state that a set of beliefs concerning food, 
weight and body shape promote and maintain the core symptoms of dietary restriction, binge eating 
and purging.  Dysfunctional over-concern with body shape and weight is seen to be the „core 
psychopathology‟ of ED (Fairburn et al 1999; Fairburn et al 2003), contributing to the maintenance 
of the disorders.  The defining clinical features of BN, AN and EDNOS such as excessive dietary 
restraint and/or purging behaviours operate in a counter-regulatory relationship (i.e. starvation 
symptoms associated with strict dieting promote binge eating) and are considered to be directly 
linked to concerns regarding shape and weight.  The transdiagnostic model includes the proposed 
additional maintaining mechanisms of core low self-esteem, clinical perfectionism, mood 
intolerance and interpersonal „life‟ difficulties (Fairburn et al 2003).  Comprehensive data has yet to 
be published regarding the efficacy of this adapted model.  However, an initial report has indicated 
that it may be considerably more effective than the prior manual-based treatment (Fairburn et al 
1993; Fairburn 2004; Wilson 2005). 
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Briefly, CBT treatment for BN based on the Fairburn et al (1993; 2003) model is a structured 
intervention with three planned stages which are designed to be cumulative.  Across the stages 
there is shift in focus from being primarily centred upon addressing problematic eating behaviour 
(e.g. through structured eating) to a cognitive focus addressing problematic thoughts about body 
shape and weight.  The third stage is focused on preventing relapse and developing a maintenance 
plan.  The extended version of CBT based upon the transdiagnostic model (see Figure 1) includes 
modules to address the four proposed additional maintaining mechanisms.  The relevant modules 
are applied when there are clear difficulties with the relevant mechanism that are related to the core 
psychopathology of the disorder (Fairburn et al 2003). 
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Figure 1: the transdiagnostic model of eating disorders (adapted from 
Fairburn, Cooper & Shafran 2003 and Dalle Grave 2005) 
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Over-evaluation of shape, weight    Over-evaluation of  
and eating control achieving - 
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2.3.3 Consequences of a transdiagnostic view of eating disorders 
 
The transdiagnostic model represents advancement to the cognitive behavioural theory and 
treatment for ED (Wilson 2005).  The model attempts to account for the key maintaining processes, 
which set the stage for further treatment advancements.  To this end, recent accounts and 
treatment protocols have been developed for addressing mood intolerance in ED (Corstorphine 
2006) and clinical perfectionism (Shafran, Cooper & Fairburn 2002).  However, the theoretical 
foundations of the transdiagnostic model remain grounded in a symptom-led categorical system, 
with additional formalised therapeutic modules to address identified maintaining mechanisms.  
Using categorical classification as a basis for therapeutic intervention has been argued to 
compromise efficacy (First et al. 2004) as limited efforts have been made to evaluate the clinical 
utility of diagnostic categories.  Essentially, attempts to classify the content of people‟s experience 
into diagnostic groupings may be less valid than attempting to understand the processes behind the 
experience.  There may be benefits in broadening the focus further from a transdiagnostic to a 
transtheoretical account that encompasses theories attempting to explain cognitive and behavioural 
processes common across psychopathology, including ED.  This would include attentional, memory 
and reasoning processes (Harvey et al 2004).   
 
To illustrate this and draw a contrast with CBT maintenance models of ED (e.g. Fairburn et al 
2003), it may be relevant to put forward a psychological formulation-based account of the functional 
processes involved in eating behaviour, informed by a number of explanatory models.  This is 
presented in Figure 2.  This illustration also shows therapies that have been previously 
implemented to address the various points of the model.  Theoretical models incorporated into the 
conceptualisation, considered to be relevant to understanding the links between cognition, emotion 
and behaviour in ED will be outlined below.  This conceptualisation differs from the transdiagnostic 
model in that it attempts a shift from the symptom-focused behaviours required for an ED 
diagnosis, to an attempt to understand ED behaviour as the primary means of managing internal or 
emotional experience. 
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Figure 2: an overview of links between cognition, emotion and behaviour with examples of theoretical accounts & 
treatments used to address specific features (adapted from Keville, Byrne, Tatham & McCarron unpublished; and 
Corstorphine 2006) 
 
Core Beliefs/Schema 
(Enduring & repeating themes relating to the self, others, the 
world & emotions) 
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Cognitions: Rules & Assumptions  
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that influence thinking & coping style) 
e.g. Emotions are dangerous & should be suppressed 
Binge eating helps me control my emotions 
Attentional Vigilance 
(what the patient is most on the 
look out for in trigger situations) 
E.g. monitoring for signs of 
„threat‟, on the lookout for 
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Behaviour  
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styles.) 
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(Young 1999); Linehan 
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(e.g. Fairburn et al 
1995 
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learning experiences 
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135 
 
The conceptualisation presented in Figure 2 attempts to outline the underlying function of ED 
behaviour (i.e. binge eating or dietary restraint) as a way of avoiding or managing negative 
experiences which one may be hyper-vigilant towards.  The theoretical links between the key 
perpetuating factors of ED proposed in the above conceptualisation will now be addressed.   
 
2.3.4 What are the links between pathological eating behaviour and emotion? 
 
This conceptualisation aims to highlight functional links between emotion and eating behaviour 
(Agras & Telch, 1998; Meyer, Waller & Waters 1998).  There is good evidence that problematic 
eating behaviour operates as a coping strategy for managing emotion.  For example, there are 
clinical indications that both positive and negative emotions can act as antecedents, triggers and 
consequences of binge eating (Arnow, Kenardy & Agras 1992; Masheb & Grilo 2006).  Control over 
one‟s emotions is also a central aspect in the aetiology and maintenance of eating pathology 
(Fairburn et al 1999; Cooper 2003), as is the difficulty in tolerating affect (Fairburn et al 2003; 
Linehan 1993) and patient‟s difficulties with emotional engagement and accurate identification of 
emotions (Corstorphine 2006).   
 
2.3.5 How does eating behaviour function in the management of negative cognition and regulation 
of emotion? 
 
The process of using binge eating and food restriction in response to emotional distress have been 
put forward within the “blocking” model, in which eating behaviours are suggested to have a short 
term blocking function to keep intolerable affect outside of awareness (Root & Fallon 1989).  The 
„escape from awareness‟ model (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice 
2001) suggests that binge eating occurs as a motivated attempt to reduce or remove negative self-
focus and reduce awareness of cognitions and emotional states that the individual finds intolerable.  
The concrete behaviour of binge eating is suggested to function to narrow the focus of cognitive 
attention from the abstract level of self-evaluation (e.g. “I‟m a failure”) and affect associated with 
this, to the more immediate stimulus environment (e.g. the sensations of eating).  Cognitive 
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suppression (e.g. dissociation) might also serve this function (Vanderlinden, Vandereycken, van 
Dyke & Vertomnen 1993).   
 
A theoretical model which holds the avoidance of negative unwanted experience at the centre of 
the cause and maintenance of psychopathology is Relational Frame Theory (RFT) and the therapy 
derived from this, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson 1999).  
ACT is a part of the „third wave‟ of cognitive behaviour therapies (after behaviour therapy and 
cognitive therapy); a theoretical movement that makes use of acceptance and mindfulness 
processes (Hayes 2004; Hayes, Follette & Linehan 2004).  Experiential avoidance has been put 
forward as a transdiagnostic process (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl 1996; Hayes et al 
1999; Harvey et al 2004).  This refers to a cognitive-behavioural process in which an individual is 
unwilling to remain in contact with their undesirable internal private events (e.g. negative memories 
or thoughts). There are two modes of expression; either behavioural suppression of experiences or 
cognitive and emotional distancing from situations and contexts that may give rise to the aversive 
experience.  Experiential avoidance, together with ineffective behavioural and cognitive emotional 
control strategies (e.g. dietary restriction in ED) have been implicated in the aetiology and 
maintenance of eating pathology (Heffner, Sperry, Eifert, & Detweiler 2002; Heffner & Eifert 2004).   
 
2.3.6 How might early experience impact on cognition, emotion and behaviour? 
 
The theories outlined above suggest that disordered eating behaviours serve a specific „coping‟ 
function for controlling and regulating negative affect.  In exploring how these avoidant-based 
strategies might be set up, one needs to first consider environmental factors that may give rise to 
them and how this may influence cognitive style.  Invalidating environments (Linehan 1993; 
Corstorphine 2007) and an associated critical parenting style or parental coping characterised by a 
lack of emotional expression (Corstorphine 2006), traumatic and abusive experiences 
(Corstorphine, Waller, Lawson & Ganis 2007) are all implicated in the development of problematic 
ways in which people learn to manage and express their emotional experience.  This is thought to 
be due to the impact of negative early experience on developing problematic schemata about the 
self, world and others and the way to manage emotions (Young 1999; Linehan 1993).  In order to 
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manage this, strategies and processes of avoidance may be set up (Hayes et al 1999; Hayes et al 
1996).  Eating behaviour may serve this function (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; Baumeister, 
Heatherton & Tice 2001; Root & Fallon 1989).  The individual may also become automatically more 
attuned to information that fits with, and thus confirms their developing schema and core beliefs 
(Quinton 2004).  In a situation where the person‟s schemata or assumptions are activated, and 
distressing affect is triggered, these processes of avoidance (e.g. binge eating) may come into 
operation. 
 
2.3.7 What might be the links between attention, cognition, emotion and behaviour? 
 
Models attempting to explain the link between emotion and ED symptomatology intimate that 
attentional processes may be a feature in the persistence of the disorders.  For example the 
„escape‟ hypothesis (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; Baumeister et al 2001) suggests that binge 
eating functions to reduce the person‟s focus of cognitive attention.  This implies that an individual 
may initially focus their attention on information or stimuli that evokes distress for them and thus the 
need to „escape‟.  Models such as the Self-Referent Executive Function model (S-REF; Wells & 
Matthews 1994; Wells 1997; 2000) highlight the role of attentional processes in the development 
and maintenance of emotional disorders, including ED (Cooper, Wells & Todd 2004; Cooper 2003).  
The model proposes that sets of self-beliefs and procedural plans or „maps‟ of being are set up and 
stored in long-term memory.  Subsequently people will engage in monitoring for information that is 
consistent with and confirms these beliefs and plans (e.g. commonly internal state information such 
as thoughts, physical feelings and mood).  This process prevents attention being given to new 
information that may contradict the beliefs or disrupt the ongoing behaviours, thus maintaining the 
experience of distress. 
 
2.3.8 What information do people attend to and how might this be related to their psychological 
disorder?  
 
Models in addition to the S-REF have proposed that people may attend to information that provides 
a good fit with their beliefs and current concerns (Klinger 1996; Lavy & van den Hout 1994).  This is 
138 
largely because limited cognitive resources lead an individual to select information that is of most 
relevance to them and their daily functioning (reviewed in Harvey et al 2004).  It has been 
demonstrated that in general, people are distracted by positive or negative emotional stimuli over 
other types of information (Kinderman, Prince, Waller & Peters 2003; Martin, Williams & Clark, 
1991; Spinks & Dalgleish, 2001).  However, negatively valenced stimuli have been suggested to 
attract attention over that with a positive valence, in other words „bad is stronger than good‟ 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs 2001; Taylor 1991).  As such it would appear that 
there is a certain inherent bias toward negative emotional stimuli, particularly so when the 
information is of personal relevance.   
 
Selecting information in line with one‟s personal concerns might account for the differences in the 
expression of particular disorders.  Within ED, according to the cognitive model (Fairburn 1997) an 
individual‟s current concerns can be expected to be in line with information pertaining to shape, 
weight and eating.  More specifically, a person with AN whose concern is to achieve weight loss 
(and thus avoid weight gain) may focus their attention on any perceived signs of weight gain.  If 
these were detected, emotions such as disgust and fear may be triggered, leading that individual to 
become more focused on further weight loss and food avoidance, possibly as a means to manage 
these feelings (Harvey at al 2004).  Alternatively, a person with social phobia may selectively 
retrieve from memory negative information about social circumstances that fits with their negative 
social view of themselves.  Processes of rumination about performance prior to a social situation 
and an internal self-focus while in the situation (i.e. on symptoms like trembling and sweating) are 
likely to exacerbate the individual‟s symptoms of anxiety.  Ultimately avoidance of social situations 
(or avoidance within them like avoiding eye contact) maintains the anxiety as the individual receives 
no information with which to disconfirm their beliefs (Clark & Wells 1995). 
 
Attentional processes have been implicated in the development and maintenance of several 
emotional disorders, for example Panic Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder (Wells, 1997; 
2000), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards 1998), Specific Phobia 
(Arntz, Hildebrand & van den Hout 1994) and Depression (Papageourgio & Wells 2003) as well as 
ED. 
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2.3.9 If people are biased toward negative information that provokes distress, might they also try to 
avoid it? 
 
It is possible to make theoretical links between the propositions of models such as the S-REF 
(Wells & Matthews 1994; Wells 1997; 2000), the „escape‟ model of binge eating (Heatherton & 
Baumeister 1991; Baumeister et al 2001), ACT (Hayes et al 1999) and disorder-specific CBT 
models (e.g Clark & Wells 1995) to generate ideas regarding the links between attention and 
avoidance.  For example, if an individual automatically attends to information that confirms their 
negative beliefs (i.e. monitoring a social situation for signs of perceived social „failure‟), then when 
this information is detected the person is likely to feel high levels of emotion (i.e. anxiety).  The 
emotional state itself may be considered aversive (i.e. taken as a sign of imminent danger) leading 
the person to leave the situation, avoid it for future, thus confirming their belief in the danger of the 
event.  This has the long-term consequence of reinforcing the person‟s beliefs as due to avoidance, 
no disconfirmatory information is provided and so the avoidance cycle is perpetuated (Clark & 
Wells 1995).   
 
Conceptualisations of eating pathology such as the „escape from awareness‟ (Heatherton & 
Baumeister 1991) and „blocking‟ model (Root & Fallon 1989) suggest that when an individual‟s 
attention is drawn to information that promotes states of emotional distress, the eating behaviour 
can function as a form of cognitive-behavioural avoidance that enables the person to shift the focus 
of their attention away from the threat and thus regulate their emotion.  So in regaining control over 
emotions via food restriction or suppressing emotion by binge-eating, an individual gains a sense of 
mastery over their distressing emotions and thoughts (Heffner et al 2002; McManus & Waller 
1995).  
 
Many of the behaviours exhibited by people with eating disorders can be viewed as avoidant 
strategies.  The clearest example of this is when restricting calorie intake, people will actively avoid 
fattening foods and attempt to „escape‟ from situations in which they are uncertain of the calorie 
content of food.  Avoidance of one‟s body and appearance is common, including refusal to be 
weighed and wearing baggy clothes to disguise body shape (Shafran, Fairburn, Robinson & Lask 
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2004).  It is possible to conceptualise these behaviours as dysfunctional anxiety management 
strategies or „safety behaviours‟ to avoid weight gain (Harvey et al 2004).   
 
Other forms of avoidant coping might include cognitive suppression, such as dissociation 
(Vanderlinden, Vandereycken, van Dyke & Vertomnen 1993), ruminative processes where the 
function is to replace highly aversive thoughts with less distressing thoughts (Wells & Davies 1994; 
Wells 2000; Borkovec, 1994; 2002; Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004) and distraction when used 
consistently to suppress experience (Keville et al unpublished).  It has been suggested that beliefs 
about the importance of controlling thoughts may lead to the use of avoidant styles of coping 
(Purdon, 1999; Wells 2000).   
 
2.3.10 The ineffectiveness of avoidance as an emotional regulation strategy in ED 
 
An individual‟s efforts to avoid, control and suppress experience may function to reduce their 
negative emotional state in the short term yet there is good evidence to suggest that attempts to 
regulate emotion in this way may exacerbate and perpetuate distress (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999).  Not only is it difficult to maintain constant efforts in avoidance over the longer term, it is also 
indicated that attempting to avoid in this way also serves to increase the frequency and subsequent 
distress associated with the initial experiences (John & Gross 2004; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White 1987; Wegner & Zanakos 1994).  For example, studies have shown the cyclical nature of 
attempts to suppress thoughts in the presence of an emotion, in that ultimately the emotion evokes 
the thought and the suppression strategies evoke both (Wenzlaff & Wegner 2000).  This is why 
poorer long term outcomes in a range of disorders are expected for those prone to avoid and 
suppress experience (Purdon, 1999; Hayes et al, 1996).   
 
This may have particular consequences for ED, as it may explain why without adequately 
addressing avoidant and suppressive strategies in the disorders, emotional distress may be 
perpetuated and may have an impact on the efficacy of treatment.  Without adequate focus on 
attentional and avoidant processes and providing alternatives, interventions run the risk of treating 
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disorder-specific behaviours without acting on the underlying function of their use in attempting to 
regulate negative affective experience.   
 
2.3.11 How processes of attention and avoidance operate together in eating disorders 
 
Research into processes of attention and avoidance commonly use self-report measures to assess 
eating-disordered individuals‟ attitudes toward weight, shape and eating (Bemis-Vitousek & Hollon 
1990).  Recent research has seen the use of experimental methods adapted from cognitive 
psychology.  These experimental paradigms are increasingly popular as they may reduce some of 
the biases inherent in self-report methods and to allow processes outside of conscious awareness 
to be measured.  Many authors have commented on the utility of cognitive-experimental paradigms 
to increase the understanding of the cognitive processes involved in eating disorders (Bemis-
Vitousek & Hollon 1990; Cooper 1997; 2005; Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). 
 
Research along these lines has suggested that people demonstrating eating pathology process 
information relevant to their current concerns in two main ways.  There is an initial lowered 
threshold for identifying and filtering salient stimuli relevant to the disorder (i.e. attentional bias).  
This has led to suggestions that eating-disordered individuals may be predisposed in some way to 
seek out stimuli relevant to their specific concerns (Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy 2002; Davidson & 
Wright 2002; Dobson & Dozois 2004; Faunce 2004; Lee & Shafran 2004; Rofey, Corcoran & Tran 
2004; Waller, Quinton & Watson 1995).  It is then suggested that individuals are unable to sustain 
this initial attention and thus engage in cognitive (e.g. thought suppression) or behavioural 
processes (e.g. binge eating) to avoid the threat and the affect associated with it (Israeli & Stewart, 
2001; Meyer, Waller & Watson 2000; Meyer, Serpell, Waller, Murphy, Treasure & Leung 2005; 
Waller & Meyer 1997).  Drawing this all together, the links between these processes might be 
diagrammatically illustrated as in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: diagrammatic representation of the hypothesised mechanism between attentional bias 
and cognitive avoidance 
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2.4 How might attentional bias function in ED? 
 
Despite the proposed importance of the processes of attentional bias and cognitive avoidance 
suggested in the models reviewed here, the research on these topics is limited.  The two processes 
themselves and the existing research evidence shall be discussed in turn below. 
 
2.4.1 Attentional bias in the eating disorders 
 
An attentional bias refers to a cognitive filtering process which occurs when one stimulus gets 
priority in terms of processing over others (Harvey et al 2004).  Biases in attention found in 
individuals with eating pathology have been likened to that observed in anxiety disorders 
(Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy 2002; Dobson & Dozois 2004; Faunce 2002; Lee & Shafran 2004; 
Williamson, Muller, Reas & Thaw 1999).   
 
Although the research is limited, biases in attention have been found for information that is specific 
to the eating pathology for example for words and pictures related to food, weight and body shape 
(Ainsworth, Waller & Kennedy 2002; Cooper & Fairburn 1993; Davidson & Wright 2002; Dobson & 
Dozois 2004; Fairburn, Cooper, Cooper, McKenna & Anastasiades 1991; Faunce 2004; Lee & 
Shafran 2004; Prato & John 1991; Rofey, Corcoran & Tran 2004; Shafran, Lee, Cooper, Palmer & 
Fairburn 2007; Waller, Quinton & Watson 1995).  More recently, some very limited evidence has 
indicated that individuals with symptoms of eating pathology may display attentional biases to 
information beyond disorder-specific parameters, particularly for threat information related to social 
anxiety and self-esteem (McManus, Waller & Chadwick 1996; Meyer, Waller & Watson, 2000; 
Meyer et al, 2005; Waller, Watkins, Shuck & McManus, 1996; Waller & Meyer, 1997).   
 
The majority of this research uses a modified emotional Stroop task (Stroop 1935; Williams, 
Mathews & MacLeod 1996).  The emotional Stroop has its origins in the field of anxiety disorders 
(Williams et al 1996).  However, disorder-specific variants of the emotional Stroop test have now 
been developed and have been used to indicate attentional biases in a number of other disorders.  
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It remains a popular experimental paradigm to assess attentional bias; a recent PsycINFO search 
revealed 3084 studies using versions of the Stroop paradigm (search conducted April 2007). 
 
2.4.2 The „Stroop Effect‟: a brief overview 
 
The classic Stroop task (1935) was based upon two conditions; a colour−congruent condition in 
which the colour word presented (i.e. the word 'red') was written in the same ink colour (i.e. written 
in the colour red) and a colour−incongruent condition in which the colour word presented (i.e. the 
word 'red') was written in a conflicting ink colour (i.e. the colour blue).  Participants were instructed 
to name the ink colour the word was printed in, while ignoring the meaning of the word.  The 
„Stroop effect‟ refers to the greater response times commonly found for the colour-incongruent 
words than the colour-congruent words.  This is thought to arise from a conflict in processing 
between the ink colour and the word meaning (Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland 1990; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994; Stroop, 1935).   
 
Within the modified version, word meaning is unrelated to ink colour, therefore the conflict in 
processing does not occur in the same way as in the classic Stroop task.  Participants are asked to 
name the colour of disorder-related words (e.g. the word „panic‟) and of neutral words (e.g. the 
word „paint‟) as quickly as possible.  The test measures the difference between the participant‟s 
response time for the emotional stimuli and their response time for neutral stimuli.  This indicates 
how a participant‟s performance is affected by the attentional bias to semantic aspects of the 
stimulus that should be ignored during the task.  Participants consistently show longer latencies for 
disorder-specific words (Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996) suggesting difficulties in ignoring the 
emotional content of the stimuli, particularly if it is relevant to their current concerns (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994; Matthews & Wells, 2000; Wells & Matthews 1994).  This may be a result of the 
relationships that have been set up between a word and an experience that triggers an emotional 
reaction (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche 2001).  
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2.4.3 Limitations of the current research exploring attentional bias in eating disorders 
 
A major limitation of the research to date is the limited amount of studies exploring the process of 
attentional biases specific to eating disorders (Shafran et al 2007; Harvey et al 2004).  The studies 
of attention have tended to group the various eating disorder subtypes together which may mask 
important differences between them (Harvey et al 2004), for example attentional differences in 
those who restrict their intake in comparison to those who binge.  Other shortcomings include the 
reliance on non-clinical populations displaying disordered eating or symptoms of eating pathology 
such as bulimic behaviours (Dobson & Dozois 2004).  The research into selective attention in ED is 
also limited in terms of the predominant focus on ED specific cues (e.g. food and body word stimuli) 
as opposed to considering attentional processes to other stimuli that might reflect underlying 
concerns related to beliefs, such as threats to one‟s self-esteem (e.g. „failure‟; McManus et al 
1996). 
 
The Stroop task has also been challenged as a measure of selective attention, as it is suggested 
that the longer latencies might be caused by factors other than a bias in attention, such as an 
emotional reaction or preoccupation with the word cue (Harvey et al 2004; Lee & Shafran 2004).  It 
has also been proposed that increased latencies for particular words may reflect attempts by the 
individual to suppress the threatening meanings and associations of the word.  As such it has been 
argued that the emotional Stroop may in fact be measuring cognitive avoidance (de Ruiter & 
Brosschot 1994; Lavy & van den Hout 1994).  The Stroop task has been criticised for not being 
able to effectively differentiate that the observed effect is due to attention oriented towards the 
threat stimulus (i.e. attentional bias) or attention diverted away from it (i.e. cognitive avoidance).  
However, other tasks put forward as alternatives to the Stroop have been found to be subject to 
similar criticism in terms of their ability to distinguish between these processes (Mogg & Bradley 
1999).  It has also been suggested that cognitive avoidance and attentional bias are related and 
interdependent processes and thus difficult to tap into separately (Lavy & van den Hout 1994).    
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2.4.5 Methodological limitations of the modified emotional Stroop task 
 
A number of commentators have drawn attention to some methodological issues of concern 
specific to the emotional Stroop task for ED (Faunce 2002; Lee & Shafran 2004; Dobson & Dozois 
2004).  These are primarily related to the nature of the stimuli used and the presentation and 
recording of stimuli, which it is suggested future research needs to take into account (Cox, Fadardi 
& Pothos 2006). 
 
a) Nature of emotional Stroop Stimuli: There has been some variation in terms of mixing semantic 
categories (i.e. eating, shape and weight words presented together as one „eating disorder‟ 
category; e.g. Cooper, Anastasiades & Fairburn 1992) or separating them as different semantic 
categories (e.g. Cooper & Todd 1997).  It is important for future research to address this and match 
the semantic relatedness of the words used (e.g. if threat stimuli used belongs to two semantic 
categories, the neutral stimuli should also belong to two categories).  This enables one to more 
reasonably argue that differences in latency are related to the disorder-salient categories rather that 
the neutral categories of the stimulus information.   
 
It has been found that words closely linked to colours (e.g. „sky‟, „grass‟, „banana‟) produce greater 
latencies (Macleod, 1991) and are suggested to be avoided in word selection.  There is evidence to 
suggest that words appearing more frequently in a language result in increased response times 
(Burt, 2002 in Cox et al 2006).  Therefore this dimension needs to be carefully attended to when 
selecting stimuli to ensure that longer latencies can be attributed to the relatedness of the stimuli to 
ED concerns.  The linguistic properties of stimuli for selection should be carefully considered, 
including the word length (number of letters), syllables, the number of words used and their 
semantic relatedness (McManus et al 1996).   
 
b) Presentation & recording of stimuli: In the literature to date (see reviews by Faunce 2002; Lee & 
Shafran 2004; Dobson & Dozois 2004; Harvey et al 2004) the presentation of stimuli and method of 
recording response times has varied.  Stimuli have traditionally been presented on cards in blocks 
of words or in single word presentations and times recorded by the investigator with a stopwatch 
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(e.g. Ben-Tovim, Walker, Fok & Yap 1989).  This is problematic in terms of accuracy and 
introduces experimenter effects into the study design.  Recent studies have employed 
computerised or keyboard activated presentation and recording (e.g. Davidson & Wright 2002).  
Computerised presentation has many methodological advantages, including the ability to randomly 
present stimuli and the minimisation of experimenter involvement.  Computerised presentation of 
stimuli and recording of response times is recommended for future research. 
 
2.5 How might cognitive avoidance function in ED? 
 
2.5.1 Studies of cognitive avoidance in ED 
 
As mentioned previously, cognitive avoidance can be used to broadly describe a range of covert 
processes which may include thought suppression (Johnston, Bulik & Anstiss 1999; Oliver & Huon 
2001; O‟Connell, Larkin & Mizes 2005), distraction (Keville et al unpublished), dissociation 
(Vanderlinden et al 1993) and processes such as worry and rumination (Mizes et al 2000; Waller 
2003; Waller et al 2003).  Processes of cognitive avoidance could be reasonably encompassed by 
the concept of experiential avoidance (Hayes et al 1996; 1999) which takes into account avoidant 
forms of coping such as attempts to escape stressful experiences (i.e. avoidant coping), to become 
separate from aversive events and accompanying emotions (e.g. detached coping), or to inhibit the 
expression of emotions (e.g. emotional suppression).   
 
In contrast to the literature investigating the role of attentional bias in eating pathology, even fewer 
studies have been conducted investigating processes of cognitive avoidance.  Studies using self-
report methods have found that women with eating disorders are more likely to engage in 
rumination and cognitive avoidance as coping strategies than women without an eating disorder 
(Troop & Treasure 1997; Troop, Holbrey & Treasure 1998).  Experimental studies have expanded 
on this by using cognitive processing paradigms.  However the conclusions drawn from this 
research are limited by the predominant use of non-clinical populations.  For example, in a 
computer driven word recognition test involving neutral words and unspecified „threat‟ words 
(Waller, Quinton & Watson 1995), women with higher bulimic attitudes (measured via 
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questionnaire) were slower to recognise threat words.  No such effect was found for participants 
displaying restrictive attitudes.  In a further computer driven task (Meyer, Waller & Watson 2000), 
female college students displaying eating pathology on a self-report measure were presented with 
threat and neutral word stimuli with varying intervals between the presentation of the stimuli (i.e. 
intervals of 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 milliseconds).  Participants with higher bulimic attitudes on the 
questionnaire were slower to process the threat words after the longer trial interval (i.e. 1500-
2000ms), suggesting that the longer they were required to engage with the stimulus the more they 
sought to avoid it.  No associations were found between participants with restrictive features on the 
questionnaire and the speed of response to threat (Meyer et al 2000).   
 
Most recently, researchers have used strategic processing tasks to measure cognitive avoidance.  
This has involved the solution under timed conditions of single-word anagrams for food (e.g. 
„cake‟), self-esteem threat (e.g. „fail‟) and neutral words (e.g. „your‟).  Using this paradigm with a 
college sample, Waller & Meyer (1997) found no associations found between the anagram solution 
times for food or threat words and eating pathology scores as measured by the self-report 
inventory.  In the second stage of this study, threat words in comparison with neutral words were 
focused upon.  No associations were found between the threat words and features of eating 
pathology.  However a significant relationship was found between solution times for the anagrams 
related to threats to self-esteem and the „ego development‟ scales of the questionnaire (i.e. those 
measuring personal ineffectiveness and social insecurity).   
 
Using this paradigm with a mixed clinical ED population, Meyer et al (2005) found that bulimic 
individuals took longer to process the self-esteem threat anagrams than controls.  There were no 
differences in anagram solution time observed for the food related words, indeed there was an 
inclination across the groups to process these food words more rapidly, particularly among the 
restrictive anorexic group.  This may suggest that processing of food related concerns is a more 
general process, rather than one indicative of pathology that may be common across individuals. 
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2.5.2 Limitations of the current research exploring cognitive avoidance in eating disorders 
 
The studies by Waller & Meyer (1997) and Meyer et al (2005) lend some support to a proposition 
within the „escape‟ model (Heatherton et al 1991) that threats to self-esteem (termed ego-threats) 
might be more relevant in the development of eating psychopathology than disorder-specific threats 
related to food.  While these effects have been demonstrated somewhat in individuals with bulimic 
features, very little is known about the way the cognitive process of avoidance occurs in AN.  One 
might expect this to function differently, as those with restrictive eating do not use binge-eating to 
shift the focus of their attention (see Figure 3).  Indeed, this research found the strongest patterns 
of avoidance amongst females with bulimic pathology, and found that those with AN restrictive 
pathology actually processed food-associated stimuli more rapidly (Meyer et al 2005).  The picture 
for AN is far from clear and further exploration is required in the research.   
 
It is clear that there is little empirical evidence available investigating cognitive avoidance with a 
clinical eating disorder sample.  In general, the evidence base for the presence of cognitive 
avoidance in eating disorders is at an early stage.  There is scope for refinement and development 
of the paradigms and for exploring the processes within eating disorders other than BN to examine 
if cognitive avoidance is a process which can be found across eating pathology. 
 
2.6 Contribution of the present study to understanding to role of attentional bias and cognitive 
avoidance in eating disorders 
 
As indicated by the conceptualisation in Figure 2, if one proposes that particular attentional and 
avoidant processes function to predispose and maintain eating disorders, then it is crucial to 
provide solid evidence that these processes are present in the disorders.  To this end the two 
processes of attentional bias and cognitive avoidance, with hypothesised links between them (de 
Ruiter & Brosschot; Lavy & van den Hout) were decided upon for investigation in the present study.  
The overall goal of the present research was to establish whether patients with eating disorders 
demonstrate these cognitive processes for eating, shape/weight and self-esteem threat stimuli and 
if so whether this process is one specific to patients with eating disorders.   
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Attentional bias followed by subsequent cognitive avoidance of disorder-relevant threats has been 
suggested to be present in participants with eating-disordered behaviour.  Currently the research 
into these processes is limited.  As outlined, there are methodological weaknesses within some of 
the studies which need to be addressed where possible (see Sections 2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.5.2).  This 
study aimed to utilise a computerised version of the modified emotional Stroop to contribute to a 
growing evidence base and address some of these weaknesses.   
 
The modified Stroop paradigm was chosen as it represents the most widely utilised paradigm 
proposed to assess attentional bias, allowing for the comparison of „disordered‟ samples with 
normal controls in a task that affords tight experimental control.  It is acknowledged that other 
paradigms exist which also offer ways in which to measure attentional bias.  The dot-probe 
paradigm has been suggested as an alternative measure of attentional bias and has been used 
with ED samples (Shafran et al 2007; Lee & Shafran 2004).  However, the research is limited at this 
time and questions have arisen as to the reliability of the dot-probe task in effectively measuring 
attentional allocation, leading to inconsistent findings in the literature (Fox et al 2002; Schmukle 
2005).  In order to balance the use of a relatively novel proposed measure of cognitive avoidance, it 
felt important to make use of a well researched measure of attentional bias such as the Stroop.  
The decision to use the Stroop task was also affected by some of the pragmatics of this study, for 
example the degree of sophistication of the programming software available. 
 
While attentional biases have been consistently found predominantly in the domains of food and 
body shape stimuli within the Stroop research, it has been noted that there is still a lack of evidence 
for selective attention to emotional stimuli (Dobson & Dozois, 2004).  By using self-esteem threat 
cues within the proposed measure of attentional bias, this study attempted to address this limited 
evidence.  The literature presented within the Introduction has highlighted shortcomings in the 
earlier Stroop research in that grouping the sub-types of ED together may mask key differences 
between them.  Evidence has also been presented that indicates that processes of attentional bias 
may also be different in AN and BN individuals.  To address this, the current study aimed to explore 
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the role of eating-disordered behaviour (i.e. binge-purge or restricting) on attentional bias and 
cognitive avoidance. 
 
To contribute to the theory for the role of processes of cognitive avoidance in the maintenance of 
eating disorders it is essential that more research is conducted.  At present the research base is 
inadequate to draw any conclusions regarding the presence of cognitive avoidance in eating 
disorders.  Little is understood about the process within a clinical group, particularly with individuals 
with AN or atypical eating disorders.  In the first instance, this study attempted to address this by 
targeting a population across ED diagnoses.  Attempts were then made to explore the effect of 
different ED behaviours as moderators of cognitive avoidance.   
 
Studies using strategic processing tasks should be conducted to attempt to distinguish between 
selective attention and cognitive avoidance.  This study aimed to address some of the limitations of 
previous research using paradigms proposed to measure cognitive avoidance by using a 
computerised modification of an anagram solution task (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005).  
This task involves participants solving threat-related or neutral anagrams.  The hypothesis 
underlying the task proposes that if cognitive avoidance of threatening information occurs, then 
participants will be slower at solving these anagrams.  It has been highlighted that concerns other 
than those of food, weight and body shape may have more relevance in cognitive avoidance 
among eating-disordered individuals.  Further work considering the importance of avoidance of 
threats to self-esteem (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991), using strategic processing tasks will be 
useful to demonstrate this.   
 
This study attempted to explore experiential avoidance in eating disorders, as this has close links 
and indeed is likely to subsume cognitive avoidance.  As such, the current study is one of the first 
using an experimental paradigm and a self-report measure to explore the presence of experiential 
avoidance in an eating disorder population.  It has been acknowledged that further empirical 
research into experiential avoidance is needed, in particular with people with eating disorders 
(Hayes & Pankey, 2002).   
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The specific research questions will be stated below, after outlining the potential clinical benefits of 
the current study. 
 
2.6.1 Clinical implications of the proposed study 
 
Research into these types of cognitive processes across the eating disorders may have important 
implications for the future development of relevant theoretical models by looking at eating disorders 
from a transtheoretical standpoint.  This may further increase our understanding and improve 
treatment outcomes.  Establishing evidence for the role of cognitive avoidance in eating disorders 
may provide support for treatment approaches such as ACT that emphasise acceptance of 
previously avoided negative private events as a key route to recovery.  It is acknowledged that 
exploring these processes transdiagnostically has the potential to obscure differences between 
those who use binge-eating and those that do not.  In an attempt to explore this, the role of ED 
behaviour as a moderator in the cognitive processes was explored.  It is hoped that this study will 
add further weight to the findings that cognitive concerns other than those of food, weight and body 
shape (Fairburn, 1997; Fairburn et al., 2003) are relevant in the development and maintenance of 
eating pathology (Baumeister et al, 2001; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991, Cooper, 2005).  This will 
be useful for advancing the theory around cognitive content in eating disorders.   
 
Experimental paradigms have strengths in the ability to capture discrete cognitive processes that 
are not as readily accessed by measures such as self-report.  However, it is acknowledged that the 
modified Stroop paradigm and anagram task are proxy measures of the processes of attentional 
bias and cognitive avoidance and as such certain suppositions must be made in order to relate the 
findings to clinical practice.  In drawing conclusions about the clinical relevance of this research, 
theoretical extrapolations from these lower order cognitive processes may be made in order to 
develop links with clinical presentations.  For example, it may be that the modified Stroop task 
relevant to ED captures a bias towards weight and shape related material that can be observed in 
clinical practice (e.g. the tendency for ED individuals to give greater attention to media that reflects 
a thin ideal body type).  The Stroop task may also reflect the tendency for ED individuals to 
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selectively attend more to social comments or interactions that confirm their negative beliefs about 
themselves.   
 
The anagram solution task may reflect what follows on from this initial vigilance to personally salient 
information.  It is possible that in the process of completing this task, a participant may be more 
attuned to a target stimulus anagram beyond conscious awareness, yet seek to avoid the solution 
of the word as they find it threatening.  Anecdotally, those with ED appear to either be very 
connected to their initial experience and find this so painful that they engage in attempts to avoid 
contact with it (i.e. through binge eating or self-harm) or they are so adept at avoiding they appear 
disconnected or unaware of their experiences to the point of having no language with which to 
describe them.  Often at the beginning of therapy it is important to be aware of the way in which an 
individual engages with emotional and interpersonal experience.  It may be necessary to point out 
that „things may get worse before they get better‟ as they begin to connect and work through issues 
in therapy.  A strategic task such as the anagram solution task may prove a useful clinical tool to 
identify whether processes of cognitive avoidance are pertinent for an individual with ED and help 
to inform a treatment package that may address this.   
 
Addressing the content of negative automatic thoughts is a key part of existing CBT treatments for 
ED and is possibly why attentional biases to weight and shape stimuli have been found to reduce 
following CBT treatment (Carter, Bulik, McIntosh & Joyce 2002).  However, clinical experience 
suggests a focus on the initial attentional processes involved may also be relevant to treatment and 
improve outcomes.  The use of paradigms such as the Stroop may highlight the benefits of 
attentional training interventions for eating-disordered patients (Davidson & Wright 2002; Wells 
2000).   
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2.7 Experimental Hypotheses 
 
2.7.1 Experimental hypotheses related to the attentional bias paradigm: the modified Stroop task 
 
As outlined above, attentional bias has been found in eating-disordered participants in previous 
research, particularly for disorder relevant stimuli but the evidence base is small and has 
methodological limitations.  Attentional biases have been indicated for stimuli thought to relate to 
underlying beliefs (e.g. threats to self-esteem), although again this research is limited.  For this 
reason, it was decided to investigate attentional biases to disorder relevant and self-esteem threat 
stimuli using a computerised version of the modified emotional Stroop task.  Research using clinical 
ED samples is also limited and for this reason participants of this nature were chosen as a target 
population, with a matched comparison group.  There were specific experimental hypotheses to 
explore attentional bias in ED, as follows; 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Female participants with an eating disorder will have slower response times 
(indicating attentional bias) for naming the colour of three categories of word (food, body 
and negative self-esteem threats) in relation to neutral words.   
 Hypothesis 2:  Female participants with an eating disorder will have slower response times 
for naming the colour of disorder relevant and threat words than a non-clinical comparison 
group of females.   
 Hypothesis 2a: Furthermore, no differences in response times were expected between the 
clinical and control groups for the neutral Stroop stimuli. 
 
2.7.2 Experimental hypotheses related to the cognitive avoidance paradigm: the anagram solution 
task 
 
The research exploring cognitive avoidance is minimal and has only focused on food and ego 
threat stimuli.  Only one study has explored cognitive avoidance with a clinical sample.  For these 
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reasons a computerised strategic anagram solution paradigm was chosen to measure cognitive 
avoidance with the addition of body anagrams to bring the research more in line with that of the 
attentional bias literature.  This was to be employed with a clinical ED sample and a comparison 
group without an eating disorder.  Again there were specific experimental hypotheses, as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Female participants with an eating disorder will demonstrate slower 
performance times for solving anagrams (indicating cognitive avoidance) of food, body and 
self-esteem threat anagrams in relation to neutral anagrams.   
 Hypothesis 4: Female participants with an eating disorder will demonstrate slower 
response times for solving body, food and self-esteem threat anagrams (indicating 
cognitive avoidance) than a non-clinical comparison group of females.   
 Hypothesis 4a: Furthermore, no differences in solution times were expected between the 
clinical and control groups for the neutral stimuli. 
 
2.7.3 Hypotheses related to eating disorder diagnoses 
 
There has been some variation in the previous research in terms of differences in attentional biases 
between AN and BN participants.  Cognitive avoidance has only been found in those displaying BN 
behaviours in the literature to date.  For this reason, it was considered valid to explore the potential 
moderating effect of ED behaviour on attentional bias and cognitive avoidance. 
 
 Hypothesis 5a: It was proposed that ED behaviour (i.e. binge-purge (B/P) behaviour or 
restricting (R) behaviour) may have a moderating effect on the Stroop latencies for food, 
body and self-esteem threat words.   
 Hypothesis 5b: It was hypothesised that ED behaviour (i.e. B/P or R behaviour) may have 
a moderating effect on anagram solution time for particular food, body and self-esteem 
threat words.    
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2.7.4 Additional correlational hypotheses relating to experiential avoidance 
 
Hypothesis 6a: It was predicted that there would be positive correlations between 
experiential avoidance and selected key subscales of the questionnaires related to anxious 
thoughts and cognitive coping styles associated with psychopathology, as well as eating 
pathology for the clinical ED group.  It was also predicted that these relationships may be 
present for the comparison group in relation to experiential avoidance and the subscales 
depicting content of worry and problematic efforts at coping with worry. 
Experiential avoidance was measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; 
Hayes et al 2004a; Appendix M).  The AAQ is used to assess the tendency to make 
negative evaluations of private events (e.g. „„anxiety is bad‟‟), and an unwillingness to 
remain in contact with these events and a need to control or alter the form and frequency of 
internal experience.  This relates to the construct of experiential avoidance within the ACT 
model (Hayes et al 1996). 
 Hypotheses 6b: For the clinical ED group, it was predicted that there would be a 
relationship between higher experiential avoidance and performance on the Stroop and 
anagram tasks.   
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3. Method 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
This study was an experimental investigation employing factorial quasi-experimental design, with 
within-subjects and between-subjects comparisons.  A group of people with an eating disorder (ED) 
and a matched non-clinical control group were recruited.  The clinical sample was drawn from 
individuals attending a local ED service and the non-clinical group were drawn from a university 
sample.  The non-clinical control group consisted of a female university student group.   
 
This study employed two experimental tasks as proxy measures of the variables of interest.  The 
emotional Stroop task was proposed to measure attentional bias and an anagram solution task 
proposed to measure cognitive avoidance.  The independent variables were the threat provoking 
stimuli of Stroop and anagram word category (i.e. food, body or self-esteem threat words) which 
represented the constructs of interest. 
The dependent variables (DV) of interest were response time (latency) on the Stroop task which 
represented attentional bias and anagram solution time which represented cognitive avoidance. 
 
3.2 Participants 
 
3.2.1 Participants – Clinical Group 
 
Estimates as to the total population pool available were based upon a within-service audit that 
suggested an approximate total of 60 active patient cases that might meet the inclusion criteria 
based upon weight.  There was an average new referral rate to the service of 13 patient cases per 
month.  It was necessary to establish a good working relationship with the clinical service to 
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effectively negotiate procedures for identifying and recruiting participants.  Potential difficulties 
specific to recruiting ED populations were anticipated, such as low motivation, poor concentration 
and a relatively ambivalent relationship with services.  Therefore the procedure for participant 
recruitment was undertaken collaboratively with the service in order to maximise recruitment 
without compromising clinical practice or ethics.   
 
A total of 23 patients being seen by the ED service participated in the study.  The experimental 
group consisted of females with a diagnosed ED, i.e. those displaying behaviour associated with 
Anorexia, Bulimia or EDNOS.  The group were further split by ED diagnostic behaviour.  Due to the 
response rate this resulted in only 15 participants in the Binge-purge group and 8 in the Restricting 
group.  This limited the comparisons that could be made between the ED behaviour groups and the 
control group.  7 participants who met the criteria for inclusion into the study declined to take part.  
3 of these participants declined having expressed initial interest in the study, 1 of those had 
disengaged from the ED service. 
 
3.2.2 Recruitment – Clinical Group 
 
Potential participants were identified via a local NHS specialist eating disorder service.  Clinical 
staff at the site were given information about the study and asked to consider patients for the study.  
Inclusion criteria for the clinical group included females aged 16 and above who were 
demonstrating ED symptoms of food restriction, binge eating and purging and had a Body Mass 
Index (BMI) of not less than 13 and not greater than 27.  Additionally patients were required to be 
able to type using a computer keyboard.  Exclusion criteria included those unable to use written 
English, those with colour blindness or dyslexia, with current psychotic illness or significant 
substance abuse which would impair their performance on the tasks.  Exclusion criteria were 
checked via clinical notes and by asking the participants (i.e. regarding colour blindness) during the 
consent process. 
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A flowchart displaying the procedure for recruitment into the study for the clinical group is shown in 
Figure 4.  Clinicians were asked to approach suitable patients as part of their routine contact with 
them to hand out an information sheet about the study (Appendix B) and a covering letter 
(Appendix A).  Patients were asked to give their contact details and sign a form indicating their 
consent to be contacted by the researcher and to return the form in a self-addressed envelope to 
the researcher if they were interested in participating.  The researcher attempted to contact the 
patient within one week to to arrange to meet them to discuss the research further and obtain 
informed consent to participate in the study, if applicable (Appendix D). All participants had the 
information sheet for a minimum of 3 days before being contacted.  
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Eating Disorder Service (EDS) Team 
member identifies possible participants 
 Mention the research project to the client 
 Ask if they are interested in taking part 
 give them the letter & information sheet 
Contact details passed to researcher 
by EDS clinician (with patient‟s 
agreement) 
 
OR 
 
Client completes slip & posts to 
researcher in envelope provided 
 
 
Not entered into study. 
 
Record refusal (initials & D.O.B) 
Interested Not interested 
 
Figure 4: flowchart displaying the recruitment procedure for the clinical ED group 
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3.2.3 Participants - Control Group 
 
The majority of the participants in the control group were undergraduate level students, largely 
recruited from psychology or related courses.  A total of 41 participants signed up to take part in the 
study, of this number 7 did not attend, leaving a total of 34 participants in the control group. 
 
3.2.4 Recruitment – Control Group 
 
Inclusion criteria for the control group were female university students who were within the normal 
weight guidelines (BMI range 20-25), were not currently dieting or displaying problematic eating 
behaviour (as measured by 3 subscales of the EDI 3).  Additionally they were required to be able to 
type using a computer keyboard.  The study was advertised on the university‟s research database 
and participants were recruited through course research credit procedures. 
Exclusion criteria included those unable to use written English, those with colour blindness or 
dyslexia.  This was checked with the participant in person prior to their taking part in the study. 
 
3.3 Statistical Power & Sample Size 
 
The sample size in this study was based upon a power calculation assuming a medium effect size 
of around Cohen‟s d = .50 (Cohen, 1992).  A medium effect size was selected based upon prior 
research using the disorder-specific Stroop with ED groups (Dobson & Dozois 2004).  Effect sizes 
have not been previously reported within the research using the anagram task, therefore the 
conventional medium effect size was also used.  The calculations indicated that for the main within-
group comparison involving a threatening and neutral stimulus a sample size of 27 would be 
sufficient for a medium effect size with an alpha level of 0.05 (1-tailed) and a power of .80.  It is of 
note that the clinical ED group was slightly underpowered (N=23).  However, post hoc power 
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calculations indicated that the power to detect a medium effect size was still sufficient to detect a 
medium power of 75% at an alpha level of 0.05 (1-tailed).   
 
3.4 Questionnaire Measures 
 
Questionnaire measures were chosen by being mindful of completion time and response type given 
potential difficulties with engagement, attention and concentration for the clinical ED group.  The 
psychometric properties of each scale were carefully considered.   
 
3.4.1 Demographic Information & Questionnaire 
 
Background information about participants in both groups was recorded via a questionnaire 
including: age, height and current weight (to calculate Body Mass Index; BMI), first language, 
current employment status and educational level.   
 
A brief questionnaire to measure current eating-disordered behaviour was administered to the 
clinical group, based on the Bulimic Investigatory Test-Edinburgh (BITE; Appendix H).  With 
consent, medical notes for the clinical group were examined for background information regarding 
eating disorder diagnosis, co-morbid diagnosis, time since diagnosis, treatment history, prescribed 
medication and stage of therapeutic intervention.   
 
3.4.2 Eating Disorder Pathology: Eating Disorder Inventory 3 (EDI-3; Garner, 2004):   
 
The EDI-3 is a widely utilised self-report measure of eating disorder symptoms and associated 
psychopathology (Appendix I and J).  The EDI-3 has been shown to have good internal consistency 
(r=.90-.97), content and criterion-based and construct validity (α=.80) with good test-retest reliability 
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(r=.98).  It has norms available for AN (Restricting and Binge-Eating/Purging type), BN and EDNOS 
individuals.  Mean raw scores are available for non-clinical samples.  The inventory consists of 91 
items comprising 12 primary scales, 3 eating disorder-specific scales (i.e. Drive for Thinness - DT, 
Bulimia - B and Body Dissatisfaction - BD) and 9 general psychological scales that relate to 
features associated with eating disorders (i.e., Ineffectiveness, Interpersonal Problems, Affective 
Problems, Overcontrol, General Psychological Maladjustment).   
 
Participants in the clinical group completed the questionnaire in full, whereas the control group 
completed the EDI-RF (Garner 2004) that comprises the 3 eating disorder-specific scales 
amounting to 25 items.  This has been validated with non-clinical samples and has clinical utility in 
identifying those at risk for the development of an eating disorder.  For the 3 scales of DT, B and 
BD, clinical range percentiles are available.  It is acknowledged that a moderate DT raw score is 
relatively common among non-clinical adult females (79% of participants will score ≤16).  For the B 
subscale, a score in the low clinical range (≤4) is found in 69% of the population.  For BD, it is 
acknowledged that scores within the typical clinical range (a raw score between 22 and 35) are 
likely to occur within a non-clinical female sample; between 55 and 93% produced raw scores 
within this range.  This possibly reflects commonly held beliefs concerning weight, shape and 
attractiveness for women within a Western culture (Garner 2004).  Therefore it was expected that a 
proportion of the female control group would have EDI-RF scores within the lower or typical clinical 
ranges, particularly as they were likely to fall within a younger age range (i.e. university 
undergraduates).   
 
3.4.3 Measure of Avoidance: Acceptance & Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al, 2004a)  
 
The AAQ (Hayes et al., 2004a) was used as the measure of experiential avoidance (Appendix M).  
The psychometric properties of this scale, including the presence of a single overarching factor 
structure that co-varies with concurrent indicators of anxious arousal and distress, have been 
established in clinical and non-clinical samples (Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira 2003; Hayes et 
al., 2004a; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis 2006; Karekla, Forsyth & Kelly 2004).  However, 
the AAQ is a relatively new measure and is currently undergoing validation.  The AAQ has 
164 
demonstrated moderate correlations with general psychopathology checklists (Hayes et al. 2004a).  
It has reasonable internal consistency; Cronbach‟s α of .70 and on comparison with the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (a measure of avoidant coping; Wegner 1994) showed convergent validity of 
r =0.44−0.50.   
 
For the purposes of this study, the 16-item factor solution was used as this is currently 
recommended for use in research (Hayes, 2005).  Respondents rate the degree to which each 
statement applies to them on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true) with 
half of the items reverse scored.  The possible range of scores on the AAQ is 16 to 112, and the 
AAQ can be scored in either direction.  For the purposes of this study, as is recommended for 
clinical groups, higher scores indicate greater experiential avoidance (Hayes et al. 2004a).  Due to 
the ongoing validation of the scale information regarding norms and interpretation is limited (Hayes 
et al, 2004a).   
 
The AAQ was used in this study to measure experiential avoidance in participants with eating 
disorders in comparison to controls and to investigate if greater degrees of experiential avoidance 
were related to other forms of thought control strategy in a clinical ED population.  It was also used 
to explore the relationship between experiential avoidance, attentional bias and cognitive 
avoidance. 
 
3.4.4 Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) 
 
The TCQ is a well utilised and researched measure of thought control strategies believed to have a 
link to psychopathology, which may be employed to manage unwanted and intrusive, distressing 
thoughts (Appendix K).  The TCQ is a 30-item self-report measure designed to assess five thought 
control strategies; Distraction, Punishment, Re-appraisal, Social Control and Worry.  The subscales 
have been shown to have moderate to strong internal consistency (Cronbach α of .64 - .79 for the 
subscales) and have good test re-test reliability (r=.68-.83; Wells 1994).  It has been indicated that 
a tendency to use worry and punishment to control unwanted thoughts has important associations 
with emotional disorder and psychological disturbance (Wells 2000).   
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The TCQ was used in this study to explore the thought control strategies of relevance to an ED 
population and to compare this to a control group. 
 
3.4.5 Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994): 
 
The AnTI has been widely used in clinical research and is a measure of the content of anxious 
thoughts (Appendix L).  It comprises 22 items which can be summed to give a total score which 
comprises 3 subscales; Social worry, Health worry and Meta-worry.  The subscales have good 
internal consistency (Cronbach α of 0.84, 0.81 and 0.75 respectively).  This measure is particularly 
useful in assessing the content of pathological worry and difficulties in the regulation of thought.  
The meta-worry scale assesses dysfunctional beliefs about cognition, and excesses in the self-
regulation of thought. 
The AnTI was used in this study to assess the specific content of worry in an ED population, in 
comparison to a control sample. 
 
3.5 Experimental Paradigms 
 
3.5.1 Apparatus 
 
The experimental paradigms comprised three laptop based tasks, designed specifically for this 
study, as outlined below.  Participants received the task instructions on the screen prior to 
beginning each task (Appendices N-P).  These were also written out for them and displayed next to 
the computer.  Briefly, they were instructed to work as quickly as possible, to try not to make any 
mistakes and that they would be timed for each task.  Participants completed a short practise trial 
(4 neutral stimulus items) for each of the tasks described to minimise incorrect key hits and to 
familiarise themselves with the task and keyboard.  Data for practice tasks were not included in the 
analyses.  The stimuli related to the experimental paradigms were presented on a 15” Sony Vaio 
FX101.  A software programme presented the stimuli and recorded responses and reaction times. 
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The computer programme comprising the modified Stroop task, distracter task and anagram 
solution task was piloted on a small group (n=4) of non-clinical volunteers to check for ease of use 
and the logistics of the software.  The programme was also viewed and approved by the ED clinical 
team as suitable for use with their patients.  As a result of this brief pilot work, a number of the 
anagrams were removed due to difficulty and the maximum anagram word length was set at 6 
letters. 
 
3.5.2 Modified Stroop task: 
 
The Stroop task consisted of three semantic categories of word stimuli; food and body stimulus 
words, and self-esteem threat words with corresponding neutral stimulus words (Appendix N and 
Table 2 below).  The food and body words were selected from those reported in the existing 
literature (e.g. Channon, Hemsley & de Silva 1988; Davidson & Wright, 2002).  The studies using 
ego-threat words were limited.  Therefore word selection was based stimulus words used in a prior 
research study by McManus and colleagues (1996).  The neutral stimulus words followed a similar 
format to prior research, forming three semantic categories; animals, household objects and neutral 
adjectives.  Strategies were employed to match the disorder-salient words with the neutral stimulus 
for word length where possible (number of letters), initial letter and frequency of use in the English 
language, consistent with previous research.  Stimulus words were presented in four colours (red, 
blue, yellow, green) that corresponded to coloured keys on the keyboard.  The words were 
randomised across semantic categories, however the sequence of the words was fixed, i.e. „threat‟ 
word – neutral word.  The order of presentation of the Stroop stimuli was the same for all 
participants.   
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Table 2: Examples of Stroop stimuli for the target and neutral categories 
Food words Body words 
Self-esteem 
words Neutral words 
dinner figure failure rabbit 
chips hips lonely penny 
chocolate large bad draw 
 
3.5.3 Distracter task 
 
The neutral cognitive task was based upon the digit span subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-III (Weschler, 1997) and involved correctly reproducing numbers presented on a screen.  
There were two parts to the test.  Firstly, numbers appeared briefly (.25 – 1.25 seconds depending 
on the length of string of numbers) on screen in random order, participants were required to type 
them in the order that they appeared, increasing in difficulty up to a string of 6 numbers.  Then 
participants were instructed to reproduce the numbers in the reverse order to that presented 
(Appendix O).  This task was considered to be sufficiently cognitively demanding to counter the 
effects of cross-over between the Stroop and the anagram tasks.   
 
3.5.4 Anagram solution task: 
 
Participants were asked to complete 32 anagrams consisting of words up to a maximum of 6 letters 
(see Appendix P and Table 3 below).  Anagrams consisted of food, body, self-esteem threat and 
neutral words.  There were 8 words in each category.  Food and self-esteem threat words were 
based upon those previously reported in research (Meyer et al, 2005; Waller & Meyer, 1997).  As 
body threat anagrams had not previously been used in the literature, body words were selected 
from those reported in modified Stroop research.  The same matching criteria were employed for 
the neutral anagrams as in the modified Stroop task (see Section 2.5.2).  The anagrams were 
randomised across the semantic categories and presented to the participants in the same order.    
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Table 3: Examples of anagram stimuli for the target and neutral categories 
Food words Body words 
Self-esteem 
words Neutral words 
milk (kmil) heavy (ahyev) dumb (budm) calf (lacf) 
bread (abder) body (dbyo) empty (temyp) hedge (ehegd) 
cheese (esehce) weight (etwigh) ugly (gluy) clip (licp) 
 
3.6 Procedure 
 
A flowchart detailing the procedure for the experimental tasks and assessment is shown in Figure 5 
below.  Following consenting to take part, participants completed the computer-based tasks and 
questionnaires in one session.  This session lasted approximately an hour.  All participants initially 
completed the background information questionnaire, for the clinical group this included the 
information about their current eating behaviour.  Participants then completed the laptop-based 
Stroop test, followed by the neutral cognitive task and the anagram solution task.  Following this, 
participants were asked to complete the questionnaires in the following order: EDI-3, AnTI, AAQ, 
and TCQ.   
 
All assessment sessions were conducted at the clinical participant‟s home or at eating disorder 
clinic sites if more convenient.  Assessment sessions for the control group took place at university 
premises, in experimental laboratories.  The participants completed the experiment by working 
individually on a personal laptop computer.  At the end of the assessment, all participants were fully 
debriefed as to the purpose of the study.  They were asked if the assessment had made them think 
or worry about anything, and if they had any questions.  Participants were given the option to 
receive feedback about their performance and a summary of the findings of the study if they wish 
this.  They were then thanked for their time.   
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Figure 5: flowchart displaying the procedure for conducting the experimental tasks and 
questionnaire measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1: Computer-based Stroop Task:   
 
36 disorder-specific and „threat‟ colour words (self esteem, food, body) & 36 
neutral colour words     
All participants completed the following tasks: 
Distracter Task:  
 
Digit span attention task  
Experiment 2: Computer-based Anagram Task: 
 
32 single solution anagram words of a maximum 6 letters 
8 Threat words, 8 body words, 8 food word & 8 neutral words 
Clinical Measures: 
 
EDI-3, AnTI, AAQ, TCQ 
DEBRIEF  
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3.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the Local Research Ethics Committee, the 
relevant Trust Research and Development group and the University Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee in September 2006 (see Appendices Q-S).   
 
All participants were given an information sheet and asked to sign an accompanying consent form 
which informed them that their involvement was voluntary and that they had the option to choose to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without explanation.  Clinical participants were informed that if 
they chose not to participate, or to withdraw, their care would not be affected.  Participants in the 
clinical group were introduced to the study by a member of clinical staff already known to them.  
Confidentiality was assured at all times throughout the research process.   
 
To ensure anonymisation, all participants were assigned a number prior to initial contact.  This 
number was used on data sheets and the statistical database.  This database complied with the 
Data Protection Act and was password protected.  Participants names were recorded on a separate 
word document which was password protected.  In order to calculate the response rate and ensure 
people were not approached more than once, the initials and date of birth of all people asked to 
participate in the study was recorded.  All sheets of this nature were stored in a locked drawer.  
 
With permission of the clinical participants, an information sheet was placed in their medical 
records and their GP was informed of their participation (see Appendix F).  It was acknowledged 
that completing the questionnaires may have resulted in distress for some of the participants.  
Provision was made for all participants to have the opportunity to talk through any issues arising 
with the researcher.  No participants reported distress at taking part.  It was considered unlikely that 
the researcher would discover clinical issues which the participant‟s care team was not aware of.  
However, provision was made for the researcher to conduct a risk assessment if concerned about 
the safety of the participant for any reason.  This was not necessary for any of the patients taking 
part in the study.   
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In the event of a control group participant experiencing distress, provision was made for the 
researcher to give the participant the opportunity to talk about their concerns, as well as providing 
information on accessing mental health services.  As part of the university ethics protocol, all 
participants were given an information leaflet detailing the support systems available at the 
university.   
 
To minimise the demand characteristics of the task, initial information given to participants about 
the study involved disguising the hypothesis.  Therefore, participants were told the study was 
measuring perceptual abilities in people.  Following the completion of the assessment session, 
participants were fully debriefed as to the actual aims of the study (see Appendix G).  Participants 
were given the opportunity to receive individual feedback on their performance on the self-report 
questionnaires if they wished.  Participants were offered the opportunity to receive a summary of 
the findings of the research if they wished to receive this. 
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4. Results 
 
The results of the data analysis first cover a description of the sample and the preparatory analysis 
related to the experimental tasks.  Then the results pertaining to the main research hypotheses 
concerning attentional bias and cognitive avoidance for food, body and self-esteem related threat 
words in eating disorders will be explored.  This will be followed by further analyses in relation to 
experiential avoidance.   
Statistical testing was performed at an alpha level of .05 throughout the results section, either 1 or 2 
tailed depending on the hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Sample description 
 
Demographic data for the clinical ED and control group can be found in Table 4.  T tests or chi 
square analyses were used to inspect the data for differences between the groups in terms of 
demographic features.  As would be expected there was a significant difference in BMI between the 
two groups, with the control group having a significantly higher mean BMI of 21 (range 18.30 – 
29.00) than the clinical group with a mean BMI of 17 (range 13.80 – 23.00).  The BMI range for the 
control group was different from that stated in the inclusion criteria (BMI of 20-25).  This perhaps 
reflected an initially conservative estimate of healthy weight for the control group, as none of the 
control group reported dieting or having eating difficulties.  The difference in BMI from that of the 
inclusion criteria may also reflect the ethnic diversity of the control group.  Although this was not 
formally recorded, participants recruited for the control group were more likely to be from a range of 
ethnic backgrounds.  It is acknowledged that BMI can vary across racial and ethnic groups 
(Gallagher et al 1996; Nishida 2004).   
 
There was a significant difference between the participants‟ ages, with the control group being 
younger (mean age 22; range 18-43) than the clinical ED group (mean age 28; range 19-53).  
Additionally, the group differed significantly in terms of their educational status with more 
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participants in the clinical group being already educated to degree level or above (χ² Fishers Exact 
Test (1, n=57) = 9.50, p=.01).  However all participants in the control group were currently studying 
to obtain a degree.   
 
The clinical and control groups did not differ significantly in terms of their first language being 
English (χ² Fishers Exact Test (1, n=57) =.46, NS), or in their marital status, with the majority of 
participants in both groups being single (χ² Fishers Exact Test (1, n=57) = 2.40, NS).  It was 
therefore concluded that level of English and marital status would be unlikely to contribute to any 
differences found between the groups in subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 4: Frequencies, percentages (and SDs) and group statistics of demographic variables 
for the clinical ED and control group 
 
Clinical ED Group 
(N=23) 
Control group 
(N=34) 
p level 
Mean age 28.61 (8.60) 22.15 (4.74) .001ª 
Mean BMI 17.90 (2.74) 21.70 (2.44) .001ª 
English as 1st Language 21      (91.30%) 29      (85.30%) NS 
Education –to degree level  
                   to A level 
9        (39.10%) 
14      (60.90%) 
2        (5.90%) 
32      (94.10%) 
.01 
Marital Status – single 16      (69.60%) 29      (85.30%) NS 
ªt-test; all other comparisons were chi square (Fisher‟s exact test) 
NS=no significant difference 
 
4.2 Features of the ED clinical group 
 
4.2.1 Eating Disorder Classification 
 
Eating disorder status was ascertained by using the diagnosis assigned by the service and also 
confirmed by the report of binge-purge (B/P) and restricting (R) behaviours in the adapted BITE.  
While this is not diagnostic, its purpose was merely to obtain a measure of B/P and R behaviours.  
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Of the 23 participants in the clinical group, 8 (34.8%) were classified as having Anorexia Nervosa 
Restricting type (AN-R), 8 (34.8%) as Anorexia Nervosa Binge-purge subtype (AN-B/P) and 7 
(30.4%) as having Bulimia Nervosa (BN) or EDNOS with clinically significant binge eating.   
The mean age of self-reported onset of ED pathology was 16 years (SD 3.6 years; age range 10-
25), being 17 years of age for the AN-R group, 16 for the AN-B/P group and 14 for the BN/EDNOS 
group.   
 
4.2.2 Clinical Features of the ED group 
 
The mean time (in months) since referral to the service was 12 months (SD 7 months; range 3 -24 
months).  This data was not available for 7 participants.  13 (56.5%) of the clinical participants were 
on prescribed medication for their eating disorder and 7 (30.4%) ED participants were on no 
medication.  Medication use was unavailable for 3 participants.  A total of 8 (34.8%) participants 
had a recognised co-morbid psychiatric diagnosis, this occurred most commonly within the 
BN/EDNOS group (71.4% of this group had a co-morbid psychiatric diagnosis). 
 
4.2.3 Eating disorder psychopathology 
 
In order to further explore ED features among the clinical group, T scores on the primary subscales 
of the EDI-3 were examined.  These relate to specific ED pathology, namely drive for thinness (DT), 
bulimic behaviours and cognitions (B) and degree of body dissatisfaction (BD).  The distribution of 
the EDI-3 subscale scores are shown in the box plot (Figure 6).  The horizontal line through each 
box represents the line of central tendency, the median score.  The lower boundary of the box 
represents the 25th percentile, whilst the upper boundary represents the 75th percentile.  The 
whiskers, the lines above and below the box indicate the largest and smallest scores.  The Y axis 
line indicates the upper limit of the typical clinical range.  Figure 6 illustrates that as would be 
expected, the clinical ED group reported high levels of drive for thinness, bulimic psychopathology 
and body dissatisfaction scores.   
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Figure 6: Box plot displaying the mean T scores for the eating disorder pathology subscales 
of the EDI 3; DT, B and BD for the clinical ED group. 
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Raw score means and standard deviations (SD) for the three eating disorder pathology subscales 
of the EDI 3 are presented in Table 5 for both groups.  On the EDI-3 and RF questionnaire, the raw 
score range for DT is 0-28, with a DT raw score of 17 to 24 reflecting the typical clinical range.  The 
raw score range for B is 0-32, with scores of 5 to 18 being the typical clinical range.  For BD, raw 
scores range from 0-40 with a raw score of 22 to 35 representing the typical clinical range.  As 
would be expected between clinical and non-clinical samples, there was a large discrepancy 
between the subscale scores between the groups.  Non-parametric statistics for independent 
samples revealed that these differences were significant for DT (z=6.23, p=.001), B (z=4.90, 
p=.001) and BD (z=5.80, p=.001).   
Upper limit of typical 
clinical range (55) 
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Table 5: EDI 3 Eating pathology subscales descriptive statistics 
 
Group  Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
ED 
(N=23) 
DT 24.00 11 28 5.60 -.95 -.16 
B 13.40 0 32 10.50 .58 -.99 
BD 33.60 19 40 7.70 -.93 -.76 
Control 
(N=34) 
DT 4.60 0 18 5.03 1.13 .42 
B 2.30 0 14 3.33 2.16 4.6 
BD 12.4 1 35 8.70 .71 .13 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Styles of coping with anxious thoughts (Thought Control Questionnaire; TCQ)  
 
The descriptive statistics for the TCQ total score and the five subscales of Distraction, Social 
Control, Worry, Punishment and Re-appraisal are shown in Table 6.  Higher scores on the TCQ 
reflect greater use of that particular strategy for controlling anxious thoughts.  Higher scores on the 
strategies of Punishment and Worry have been found consistently in diagnostic and symptom 
groups (i.e. panic and major depression; Davey & Wells 2006).  Typically non-clinical samples 
make more use of the strategies of Re-appraisal and Distraction, reflected in higher scores on 
these scales.  Indications of case-ness are not currently available for this measure.  Box plots and 
graphs of the distribution relating to the TCQ are shown in Appendix T.  The two groups were then 
compared on these scales using non-parametric tests due to abnormalities in the distribution of the 
data.   
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the TCQ subscales for the clinical and control groups 
 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Control 
(N=34) 
TCQ Total 63.85 30.00 87.00 11.00 -.34 2.00 
Distraction 16.70 11.00 24.00 3.40 .62 -.30 
Punishment 9.90 7.00 16.00 2.50 1.30 .71 
Re-appraisal 14.80 6.00 26.00 4.12 .46 .38 
Worry  9.80 6.00 20.00 3.04 1.40 2.62 
Social Control 13.85 6.00 23.00 4.70 -.04 -.22 
ED 
(N=23) 
TCQ Total 61.00 42.00 77.00 9.62 -.20 -.87 
Distraction 13.22 7.00 21.00 3.40 .94 1.35 
Punishment 13.52 8.00 20.00 4.03 .30 -1.24 
Re-appraisal 12.35 7.00 20.00 3.14 .40 .60 
Worry  13.00 9.00 19.00 3.10 .95 .001 
Social Control 9.22 6.00 19.00 4.22 1.25 .54 
 
A Mann Whitney U test revealed significant differences between the clinical and control groups on 
each of the five subscales of Distraction, Punishment, Re-appraisal, Worry and Social Control 
(Table 7).  There were large effect sizes between the groups for the majority of the subscales and a 
moderate effect size for the Worry subscale.  These results indicated that the clinical group have 
higher scores on the control strategies found to be associated with psychopathology and 
problematic coping styles (i.e. Punishment and Worry).   
 
For the more functional coping strategies of Reappraisal, Distraction and Social Control the results 
indicate that the control group showed greater use of these strategies.  There was no significant 
difference between the two groups on the total TCQ score.  This was to be expected as the total 
score amounts to a summation of potentially helpful and unhelpful thought control strategies.   
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Table 7: Comparison of TCQ scores between groups 
 
Comparison Mean difference 
(SE) 
Z p value 
(2-tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. ED Total TCQ score –  
Control Grp Total TCQ score 
-2.90    (2.8) -1.10  .30 -0.30 
2. ED Distraction score –  
Control Grp Distraction score  
-3.50    (.91) -4.00  .001 -1.00 
3. ED Punishment score - 
Control Punishment score 
3.60    (.87) 3.60  .001 1.10 
4. ED Re-appraisal score - 
Control Grp Re-appraisal score 
-2.44  (1.01) -2.30  .02 -.70 
5. ED Worry score –  
Control Grp Worry score 
3.20    (.83) 4.00 .001 0.50 
6. ED Social Control score - 
Control Grp Social Control score 
-4.63  (1.20) -3.30  .001 -1.00 
*negative effect sizes indicate higher scores on these subscales for the Control group 
 
4.2.5 Nature of anxious thoughts (Anxious Thoughts Inventory; AnTI)  
 
The descriptive statistics for the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI) total score, which measures 
the content and type of worry, and the three subscales of Social worry, Health worry and Meta-
worry are displayed in Table 8.  Box plots and graphs of the distribution relating to the AnTI are 
shown in Appendix T.  The two groups were then compared on these AnTI subscales.   
Higher scores on the AnTI reflect greater worry for each subscale.  Typically clinical samples are 
found to have higher worry scores on all scales with mean clinical ranges for Social worry being 
around 24 to 25; approximately 14 to 15.5 for Health worry and 15.5 to 20 for Meta worry.  Mean 
scores for non-clinical samples are around 18, 10 and 12.8 for these scales respectively (Wells 
1994; Wells & Carter 2001).  
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the AnTI subscales for the clinical and control groups 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Control 
(N=34) 
AnTI Total 40.50 24.00 75.00 11.30 .96 1.20 
Social worry 19.00 10.00 33.00 5.60 .60 -.12 
Health worry 9.20 6.00 19.00 3.40 1.80 3.20 
Meta worry 12.50 7.00 23.00 4.31 1.0 .33 
ED 
(N=23) 
AnTI Total 56.00 35.00 80.00 12.00 .01 -.18 
Social worry 26.00 19.00 36.00 5.30 .65 -.76 
Health worry 11.10 4.00 24.00 5.70 .95 -.04 
Meta worry 19.10 9.00 25.00 4.70 -.76 -.08 
 
There were significant differences between the groups on total AnTI score, social worry and meta-
worry with large effect sizes between the groups (Table 9).  These results were in the direction that 
would be expected, with the clinical ED group obtaining higher scores for anxious thoughts.  The 
difference between the two groups on the health worry subscale was not significant, although there 
was a tendency for the ED participants to produce higher scores on this subscale.   
 
Table 9: Comparison of AnTI scores between groups 
Comparison Mean difference 
(SE) 
Z p value 
(1-tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. ED Total AnTI score –  
Control Grp Total AnTI score 
15.5 (3.1) 4.30 .001 1.30 
2. ED Social Worry score - 
Control Grp Social Worry score 
7.0 (1.5) 4.10 .001 1.80 
3. ED Health Worry score - 
Control Health Worry score 
1.9 (1.3) .80 .40 0.40 
4. ED Meta Worry score - 
Control Grp Meta Worry score 
6.6 (1.2) 4.30 .001 1.50 
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4.2.6 Experiential avoidance (Acceptance & Action Questionnaire; AAQ) 
 
It was expected that the clinical group would have higher experiential avoidance scores than the 
control group, as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ).  Higher scores are 
indicative of greater experiential avoidance, with lower scores representing the tendency towards 
acceptance of negative private events and taking action to achieve personal goals.  Because the 
AAQ is a relatively new measure, little has been published currently with respect to norms or how to 
interpret the scores.  The descriptive statistics for the AAQ are reported in Table 10 (see Appendix 
T for box plots).  
 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the AAQ for the clinical and control groups 
 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Control 
(N=34) 
AAQ Total 51.20 37.00 74.00 9.40 .64 -.30 
ED 
(N=23) 
AAQ Total 67.10 40.00 83.00 12.00 -.53 -.24 
 
The two groups were then compared on the AAQ score.  Non-parametric tests for independent 
samples revealed significant differences between the groups on total AAQ score (z=4.4, p=.001), in 
the direction predicted with a large effect size (Cohen‟s d. 1.47). 
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4.3 Preparatory analysis in relation to the experimental tasks 
 
As the computer programme used did not allow for control of errors and extreme response times on 
the modified Stroop or anagram tasks, it was necessary to censor invalid responses in both tasks 
by performing post hoc error analysis.   
 
4.3.1 Error Analysis for Stroop 
 
If a participant named the wrong colour by key stroke, miss hit a key, or made no response an error 
was recorded.  The frequency of participants making one or more error responses on the Stroop 
task was 47.4% (see Appendix U).  However, an exploration of the data indicated that no single 
Stroop item exceeded an error rate of 15% and that an error response on a Stroop item did not 
result in a significantly slower reaction time (t=1.45, df = 53, p = .15, NS).  For this reason, there 
appeared to be no reason to exclude any single Stroop item on the basis of error in subsequent 
analyses.  Additionally, there were no significant differences between the clinical (52.2%) and 
control groups (52.9%) in Stroop error (χ² Fishers Exact Test (df =1, n=57) = .10, NS). 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of the distribution of latencies 
 
The reason for screening the Stroop data for error was to arrive at a reliable DV that would 
represent the mean for each individual across the trials.  Box plots for the mean Stroop latencies for 
the clinical and control groups on food threat words, body threat words, self-esteem threat words 
and the corresponding neutral words for each category are shown in Figures 7 and 8.  After 
inspection of the box plots the decision was taken to remove scores for one participant from each 
group (participant 25 from the control group and participant 38 from the clinical group).   
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Figure 7: Box plot displaying the mean latencies (in seconds) for food, body, self-esteem 
threat words and the corresponding control words for the comparison group. 
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In summary then, it can be concluded that the Stroop task did not prove too difficult as the error 
rate was acceptably low.  It was not necessary to exclude any stimuli and finally, scores from just 
one participant from each group needed to be removed.  For each participant the mean was 
concluded to be the best representation of performance on the Stroop task. 
 
4.3.3 Error Analysis for the anagram task 
 
The rationale for this error analysis was to arrive at a reliable measure for this DV.  If a participant 
produced a miss-spelt word, produced an incorrect word, made no response or produced one of 
the few alternative solutions to some of the anagrams, an error was recorded.  One anagram 
produced a high degree of error in both groups (67.6% for controls and 52.4% for the clinical group) 
and was automatically excluded from the analysis (see Appendix V).  There was a significant 
difference between the amount of error for the control group (5.9% made no error) and the clinical 
Figure 8: box plot displaying the mean latencies (in seconds) for food, body, self 
esteem threat words and the corresponding control words for the clinical ED group. 
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ED group (34.8% made no error) on individual anagram items (Mann Whitney U test; z=3.51, p = 
.001).  Due to the variation in the percentage of error per anagram between the groups, it was not 
appropriate to exclude any individual anagram on the basis of a percentage error rate.  As it was 
unclear how to manage error within the anagram data based on previous research (Meyer et al 
2005; Waller & Meyer 1997), all individual anagram errors were excluded case wise.  Additionally 
any solution times in excess of 50 seconds or extreme values that fall 3 box-lengths from the 75th 
and 25th percentile were excluded (see box plots Appendix V).  
 
4.3.4 Analysis of the distribution of anagram solution times (in seconds) 
 
As a key dependent variable, the distribution of solution times for those anagrams correctly solved 
were inspected using box plots (Figures 9 and 10).  Rather than using the mean, these box plots 
clearly indicated abnormalities in the distribution of the data and thus a more robust measure of 
central tendency, the median was decided upon to compute subsequent analyses for the anagram 
tasks.  Non-parametric tests were used due to abnormalities in the distribution of the data.  The box 
plots in Figures 9 and 10 indicate the median scores for each domain of word after all exclusions 
were performed as described above.  
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Figure 9: Box plot displaying the median solution times (in seconds) for the control group 
for food, body, self-esteem threat and neutral anagrams 
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In summary then the anagram tasks produced a high degree of error, particularly so for the control 
group.  Due to the differences in error between the groups, it was necessary to exclude anagram 
error and excess latencies on a casewise basis.  For each participant the median was concluded to 
be the best representation of performance on the anagram task. 
 
Figure 10: Box plot displaying the median solution times (in seconds) for the clinical 
ED on group for food, body, self esteem threat and neutral anagrams 
187 
4.4 Experimental hypotheses related to the attentional bias paradigm: the modified Stroop task 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics for the modified Stroop task 
 
The descriptive statistics for the Stroop categories are presented in Table 11.  Descriptives for the 
Stroop task are reported in tenths of a second.  It was considered appropriate to use the mean 
statistic and parametric tests to analyse the Stroop data as there appeared to be few abnormalities 
in the data. 
 
To answer the key experimental hypotheses relating to the modified Stroop paradigm, a series of 
planned comparisons within and between groups were conducted and tested 1-tailed.  These are 
outlined below. 
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Table 11: descriptive statistics for disorder-relevant and self-esteem threat words and the 
corresponding control words. 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Control 
(N=33) 
Body Word .78 .52 1.02 .125 -.01 -.37 
Body neutral .76 .54 1.02 .126 .20 -.67 
Food Word .75 .50 1.12 .124 .71 1.20 
Food neutral .75 .52 1.02 .110 .36 .25 
Self-esteem 
threat  
.76 .46 1.00 .130 -.03 .02 
Self-esteem 
neutral 
.75 .43 1.00 .115 -.02 1.30 
ED 
(N=22) 
Body word .84 .50 1.15 .147 -.091 .61 
Body neutral .83 .55 1.12 .136 -.095 .81 
Food word  .83 .51 1.23 .156 .366 2.10 
Food neutral .80 .57 1.05 .116 -.116 .25 
Self-esteem 
threat 
.82 .53 1.07 .139 -.458 -.23 
Self-esteem 
neutral 
.83 .58 1.13 .141 .322 .38 
Mean latencies for Stroop word stimuli reported in tenths of a second. 
 
4.4.2 Hypothesis 1:  
 
Female participants with an eating disorder will have slower response times (indicating attentional 
bias) for naming the colour of three categories of threat word in relation to neutral words.  In order 
to test this hypothesis three within groups planned comparisons were conducted to compare the 
domains of body words, food words and self-esteem threat words with the matched neutral words 
for each domain.   
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As can be seen from Table 12, a related samples t test did not reveal significant differences 
between clinical ED participants mean latencies on the paired neutral words and the body, food and 
self-esteem threat words.  The corresponding effect sizes were very small.  Therefore, the 
experimental hypothesis could not be accepted.   
 
Table 12: Results of planned within group comparisons for Hypothesis 1. 
Planned comparison Mean difference 
(SE) 
t (df) p value (1-
tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. Body Mean –  
Body neutral Mean 
.01 (.016) .57 (53) .29 .06 
2. Food Mean –  
Food neutral Mean 
.02 (.015) 
1.57 
(53) 
.07 .17 
3. Self-esteem threat Mean - 
Self-esteem neutral Mean 
.01 (.018) .75 (53) .23 .09 
 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 2  
 
It was hypothesised that participants in the clinical group would have slower response times for 
naming the colour of threat words than the control group.  In order to test this hypothesis, three 
between groups planned comparisons were performed to compare the clinical group and the 
control group on response times for the body, food and self-esteem threat words.   
 
As can be seen from Table 13, an independent samples t test revealed significant differences 
between clinical group and the control groups mean latencies on the food words and self-esteem 
threat words.  The difference between the two groups on body words almost reached significance.  
The difference in mean latencies on each domain of disorder relevant or threat word occurred in the 
direction predicted.  The corresponding effect sizes were all moderate hence the experimental 
hypothesis that the clinical ED group would have longer latencies on the disorder relevant and self-
esteem threat stimuli was accepted.   
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Table 13: Results of planned between groups comparisons for Hypothesis 2. 
Planned comparison Mean difference 
(SE) 
t (df) p value (1-
tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. ED Grp Body Mean – 
Control Grp Body Mean 
.06 (.04) 
1.60 
(53) 
.06 .45 
2. ED Grp Food Mean – 
Control Grp Food Mean 
.07 (.04) 
1.90 
(53) 
.03 .50 
3. ED Grp Self-esteem threat 
Mean – Control Grp Self-
esteem threat Mean 
.06 (.04) 
1.70 
(53) 
.05 .45 
 
Hypothesis 2a: 
 
It was predicted that there would be no difference between the groups for latencies on the neutral 
Stroop words.  However, an independent samples t test revealed that this difference was 
significant, contrary to prediction (t=1.90 (53), p=.03).  The effect size for this comparison was 
moderate (Cohen‟s d=.52) indicating that the clinical group were generally slower to respond on the 
Stroop.  This has an implication for Hypothesis 2 in that slower response times in the clinical group 
may not be related solely to threat stimuli. 
 
4.5 Experimental hypotheses related to the cognitive avoidance paradigm: the anagram solution 
task 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics for the anagram solution task 
 
The descriptive statistics for the anagram task categories are presented in Table 14.  Descriptives 
for the anagram solution times are reported in seconds.  Due to abnormalities, in particular 
skewness and kurtosis, non-parametric tests were used to analyse the anagram data. 
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Table 14: descriptive statistics for disorder relevant, self-esteem threat and neutral 
anagrams. 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Control Body anagram 
(N=33) 
9.30 2.70 22.90 4.90 1.50 2.20 
Food anagram 
(N=33) 
9.80 3.00 27.10 5.90 1.30 1.30 
Self-esteem 
threat anagram 
(N=32) 
11.60 3.20 29.00 5.00 1.80 4.60 
Neutral anagram 
(N=34) 
6.50 2.70 19.70 3.40 1.90 5.90 
ED 
 
Body anagram 
(N=23) 
8.30 2.90 24.50 5.10 1.90 4.30 
Food anagram 
(N=22) 
8.80 2.90 18.10 4.20 .50 -.66 
Self-esteem 
threat anagram 
(N=22) 
8.90 3.30 17.40 4.30 .70 -.70 
Neutral anagram 
(N=23) 
7.40 2.60 24.30 5.10 2.00 4.55 
Anagram solution times are reported in seconds. 
 
To answer the key experimental hypotheses relating to the anagram solution task, a series of 
planned comparisons within and between groups were conducted and planned to be tested 1-
tailed.  These are outlined below. 
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4.5.2 Hypothesis 3:  
 
It was hypothesised that female participants with an eating disorder would demonstrate slower 
performance times for solving anagrams (indicating cognitive avoidance) of food, body and self-
esteem threat words in relation to neutral words.   
 
In order to test this hypothesis three within-subjects planned comparisons were conducted to 
compare the domains of body, food and self-esteem threat anagrams with a set of matched neutral 
anagrams. The means and standard deviations for each anagram domain for the clinical and 
control group are illustrated in Table 14. 
 
As can be seen from Table 15, a Mann Whitney U test revealed significant differences between 
clinical participants mean anagram solution times on the neutral anagrams, food anagrams and 
self-esteem threat anagrams.  There were no statistically significant differences for solution times 
between body anagrams and neutral anagrams.  Therefore, the experimental hypothesis can only 
be partially accepted because the effect size for the first comparison was very small.  It was 
concluded that eating disorder participants produce longer latencies for food and self-esteem threat 
anagrams in comparison to neutral anagrams.   
 
However, from surveying the mean solution times (Table 14), it appeared the control group 
produced longer solution times than the clinical group which had the potential to obscure the 
findings.  This was further explored in a post hoc investigation in Section 4.8.   
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Table 15: Results of planned within group comparisons for Hypothesis 3. 
Planned comparison Mean difference 
(SE) 
Z p value (1-
tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. Body anagram –  
Neutral anagram 
.86 (.70) 1.20 .10 .16 
2. Food anagram –  
Neutral anagram 
2.00 (.80) 2.20 .01 .40 
3. Self-esteem threat anagram 
- Neutral anagram 
1.90 (.70) 2.70 .01 .40 
 
 
4.5.3 Hypothesis 4: 
 
Female participants with an eating disorder will demonstrate slower response times for solving 
body, food and self-esteem threat anagrams (indicating cognitive avoidance) than a control group.  
In order to test this hypothesis, three between subjects planned comparisons were performed to 
compare the clinical group and the control group on anagram solution times for the body, food and 
self-esteem threat anagrams.  To further investigate if the control group were significantly different 
from the clinical group the Mann Whitney U tests were performed 2 tailed. 
 
As can be seen from Table 16, the Mann Whitney U test did not reveal significant differences 
between the clinical ED group and the control group anagram solution times for the body anagrams 
or food anagrams.  The significant finding for the self-esteem threat anagrams was likely to be a 
result of a significantly slower response time for the control group (see Table 14).  For this reason 
the experimental hypothesis that the clinical ED group would demonstrate slower response times 
for solving threat anagrams than the control group was rejected. 
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Planned comparison Mean difference (SE) Z p value 
(2-tailed) 
Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
1. ED Grp Body Median – 
Control Grp Body Median 
-1.01 (1.40) -1.10 .30 -.21* 
2. ED Grp Food Median – 
Control Grp Food Median 
-.62 (1.50) -.30 .80 -.11 
3. ED Grp Self-esteem threat 
Median – Control Grp Self-
esteem threat Median 
-2.42 (1.30) -2.20 .03 -.50* 
*a negative effect size indicates that the control group were slower to process these anagrams 
 
Hypothesis 4a: 
 
It was predicted that there would be no difference between the groups on anagram solution time for 
the neutral words.  A Mann Whitney U tests for independent samples revealed this to be the case 
(z=.15, p=.90).   
 
The indication that the mean anagram solution times for the disorder-relevant and self-esteem 
threat appeared to be longer for the control group (Table 14) will be further explored in post hoc 
analysis in Section 4.8 where an attempt will be made to probe into the negative results.  
 
Table 16: Results of planned comparisons between groups for Hypothesis 4. 
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4.6 Experimental hypotheses relating to eating-disordered behaviour 
 
4.6.1 Hypotheses 5a: 
 
It was proposed that ED diagnostic behaviours (i.e. binge-purge (B/P) behaviour or restricting (R) 
behaviour may have a moderating effect on the Stroop latencies for particular categories of word 
(i.e. food, body and self-esteem threat words).  The clinical ED group was split along these lines 
with 15 participants in the B/P group and 8 in the R group.  Due to the small sample sizes, the 
means were initially explored, indicating that the B/P group had longer latencies on the target 
Stroop words (see Table 17).   
 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics for the disorder-relevant and self-esteem Stroop categories, 
split by eating-disordered behaviour 
 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Binge-
purge 
(N=15) 
Body words .86 .65 1.15 .13 .61 .53 
Food words .87 .70 1.23 .14 1.50 2.40 
Self-esteem 
threat words 
.84 .64 1.07 .12 -.110 -.42 
Restricting 
(N=7) 
 
Body words .80 .50 1.05 .18 -.41 .10 
Food words .74 .51 .88 .16 -.90 -1.20 
Self-esteem 
threat words 
.77 .53 .97 .17 -.50 -1.10 
 
A Mann Whitney U test was then performed on the data for the two groups (2-tailed).  The 
difference between the groups was not significant for body, food or self-esteem threat anagrams 
(Table 18).  However the effects sizes for these comparisons were moderate for the body and self-
esteem threat anagrams and large for the food anagrams.  This indicates a strong trend for those 
with B/P behaviours to show longer latencies for these categories, indicating greater attentional 
bias.   
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Table 18: Planned comparisons for Hypothesis 5b between the binge-purge and restricting 
groups on anagram words 
Planned comparison Z p value  
(2-tailed) 
Effect size  
(Cohen’s d) 
1. B/P Grp Body Mean –  
R Grp Body Mean 
.74 .40 .40 
2. B/P Grp Food Mean –  
R Grp Food Mean 
1.00 .30 .90 
3. ED Grp SE threat Mean –  
R Grp Self-esteem threat Mean 
.10 .30 .50 
 
4.6.2 Hypotheses 5b: 
 
It was further hypothesised that ED behaviour (i.e. B/P or R behaviour) may have a moderating 
effect on anagram solution time for particular words (i.e. food, body and self-esteem threats).   As 
the sample sizes were small, potential differences were explored descriptively in Table 19. 
 
 
 
Group 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Binge-
purge 
(N=15) 
Body anagram 8.15 2.90 24.47 5.12 2.50 7.80 
Food anagram 9.06 2.90 14.81 3.90 -.05 -1.50 
Self-esteem 
anagram 
8.47 3.32 16.92 3.91 .80 .10 
Restricting 
(N=7) 
 
Body anagram 8.50 3.36 19.56 5.40 1.40 1.70 
Food anagram 8.26 3.90 18.07 5.00 1.40 2.10 
Self-esteem 
anagram 
9.86 4.34 17.43 5.17 .40 -1.90 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics for the disorder-relevant and self esteem threat anagrams 
for the ED group, split by eating-disordered behaviour 
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A Mann Whitney U test was performed on the data for the two groups (see Table 20).  The 
difference between the groups was not significant for body, food or self-esteem threat anagram 
solution time.  The effect sizes were small and so the hypothesis that type of eating-disordered 
behaviour would have a moderating effect of anagram solution time was rejected. 
 
Table 20: Planned comparisons for Hypothesis 5b between the Binge-Purge and Restricting 
Groups on anagram words 
Planned comparison Z p value  
(2-tailed) 
Effect size (Cohen’s 
d) 
1. B/P Grp Body Median –  
R Grp Body Median 
-.13 .90 -.06* 
2. B/P Grp Food Median –  
R Grp Food Median 
.81 .40 .17 
3. B/P Grp SE threat Median –  
R Grp SE threat Median 
-.53 .60 -.36* 
*negative effect sizes indicate that the restricting group were slower to process these anagrams 
 
4.7 Correlational analyses of the AAQ 
 
4.7.1 Hypothesis 6a:  
 
It was predicted that there would be positive correlations between the AAQ and selected key 
subscales of the questionnaires for the clinical ED group; AnTI Total, AnTI Meta Worry, AnTI Social 
Worry, TCQ Worry, TCQ Punishment, TCQ Distraction and the 3 eating disorder composite scores 
of the EDI 3; DT, BN and BD.  It was further predicted that these relationships would be present for 
the control group in relation to the AAQ and the subscales depicting content of worry and 
problematic efforts at coping with worry; AnTI Total, AnTI Meta Worry, AnTI Social Worry, TCQ 
Worry, TCQ Punishment and Distraction.  However the correlations were expected to be stronger in 
the ED group and for this reason the results for each group are presented separately. 
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Non-parametric correlational analyses (Spearman‟s rho; 1-tailed) were conducted between the 
AAQ score with the selected key variables.  Table 21 shows which of these subscales correlated 
significantly with the AAQ total score for each group.  For the clinical group, AAQ scores on the 
TCQ Worry and the EDI 3 Drive for Thinness (DT) scale were not significant, against the 
hypothesis.  For the control group, the AAQ correlated with all key scales apart from Distraction and 
Bulimia (BN) on the EDI 3.  This indicates a relationship between level of experiential avoidance, 
anxious thoughts and pathological coping strategies in the control group. 
 
Table 21: Correlational analyses for the AAQ with selected key questionnaire variables for 
the clinical ED and control group 
 Clinical ED Group 
(N=23) 
                   Control Group (N=34) 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p 
value 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p 
value 
AAQ with Anti Total .50 .01 .54 .001 
AAQ with Meta Worry 
(AnTI) 
.40 .03 .70 001 
AAQ with Social Worry 
(AnTI) 
.41 .02 .45 .004 
AAQ with Worry (TCQ) .23 .15 NS .55 .001 
AAQ with Punishment 
(TCQ) 
.37 .04 .45 .003 
AAQ with Distraction 
(TCQ) 
-.41 .02 -.11 .2 NS 
AAQ with DT (EDI 3) .30 .08 NS .31 .03 
AAQ with BN (EDI 3) .60 .002 .08 .32 NS 
AAQ with BD (EDI 3) .38 .03 .43 .005 
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4.7.2 Hypothesis 6b: 
 
In terms of correlational analysis a relationship was also expected between the measure of 
experiential avoidance (AAQ) and the Stroop and anagram tasks.  However, contrary to prediction 
no significant relationships were found between the AAQ and either of the experimental tasks (see 
Tables 22 and 23). 
 
Table 22: Correlational analyses for the AAQ with the target Stroop words 
 Clinical ED 
Group (N=22) 
                   Control Group (N=33) 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p value Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p value 
AAQ with Stroop Body Mean .05 .82 .06 .75 
AAQ with Stroop Food Mean .18 .42 .05 .76 
AAQ with Stroop Self-esteem 
Threat Mean 
.07 .75 .04 .837 
 
Table 23: Correlational analyses for the AAQ with the target Anagram words 
 Clinical ED 
Group (N=22) 
                   Control Group (N=33) 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p value Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p value 
AAQ with Body Anagram 
Median 
.24 .30 .10 .60 
AAQ with Food Anagram 
Median 
.05 .80 .23 .20 
AAQ with Self-esteem 
Anagram Median 
.27 .23 .05 .80 
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4.8 Post hoc analysis relating to the control group 
 
During testing of the planned comparisons for Hypotheses 3 and 4, it emerged that the mean 
anagram solution times for the disorder-relevant and self-esteem threat seemed to be longer for the 
control group (Table 14).  As this was in the opposite direction to that predicted it was considered 
necessary to explore this further.  Within-subjects post hoc comparisons indicated that participants 
in the control group produced significantly longer anagram solution times for food words (z=3.50, 
p=.001), body words (z=3.48, p=.001) and self-esteem threat anagrams (z=4.64, p=.001) than 
neutral anagrams.  These effects are much greater than for the clinical group (Cohen‟s d of .72, .70 
and 1.22 respectively).   
 
Between groups comparisons conducted for Hypothesis 4 (Table 16) indicated a negative effect in 
that the control group produced longer anagram solution times for self-esteem threat words than 
clinical ED group.  Investigations into the amount of error produced by both groups on the anagram 
solution task indicated that the control group produced significantly more errors than the clinical ED 
group (see Section 3.3.3 and Appendix V).  In combination, these findings limit the conclusions that 
can be drawn for the clinical group as the findings suggest that the effect of cognitive avoidance is 
more apparent for the control group without an eating disorder.  The possible explanations and 
accounts for this negative finding will be discussed within the next Section. 
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5. Discussion 
 
The main aims of this study were twofold.  Firstly, to investigate whether female participants with an 
eating disorder would demonstrate attentional bias to the disorder relevant information of food, 
body stimuli and self-esteem threat stimuli in comparison to neutral stimuli and in contrast to a 
control group.  Secondly, to investigate whether cognitive avoidance of the above stimuli exists in 
female eating disorder participants in comparison to neutral stimuli and a control group.  Additional 
hypotheses related to the presence of experiential avoidance and the relationship between this and 
cognitive ways of coping was explored in both groups.   
 
This section will present and discuss the following main areas in relation to these aims; 
 
 an overview of the main findings in relation to the experimental hypotheses. 
 a review of the main findings in relation to previous research on attentional bias and 
cognitive avoidance in eating disorders. 
 a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the present study in the context of the 
existing research. 
 a consideration of the theoretical and clinical implications of the findings in the context of 
the present study and existing literature. 
 an overview of the general limitations of the present study and suggestions for 
improvements.  
 a discussion of ideas generated for future research. 
 
5.1 Overview of results 
 
5.1.1 Characteristics of the sample: 
 
It appeared that the two groups did differ in terms of eating disorder pathology, as would be 
expected.  The clinical ED group of participants had a significantly lower mean BMI than the control 
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group and obtained significantly higher scores on the EDI 3 key eating disorder subscales.  The 
means for these subscales amongst the control group were comparable with non-clinical samples 
in previous research (Garner 2004; Waller & Meyer 1997).  However, some of the scores on the BD 
and DT scales were elevated in some control subjects suggestive of negative body image for some 
participants in this group. 
 
The groups were significantly different in terms of age, with the control group being younger than 
the clinical group.  This perhaps should have been anticipated given that the control group were 
predominantly drawn from an undergraduate university sample and the clinical group from a 
community sample.  The groups were also significantly different in terms of educational level with 
more participants in the clinical group having a level of education to degree status or above. 
However, all control group participants were studying for a degree at the time of taking part in the 
experiment which may over-ride this finding.  These findings were important in relation to the 
experimental hypotheses as they meant that it was not possible to rule out performance on the 
tasks being down to age or level of education.  This will be discussed further in due course. 
 
On the clinical scales related to anxiety, as expected the clinical group demonstrated significantly 
greater degrees of worry than the control group and reported strategies for coping with worry which 
were more associated with psychopathology (e.g. coping strategies of punishment and ruminative 
worry).  The control group demonstrated significantly higher reports of adaptive coping strategies, 
such as distraction and the re-appraisal of anxious thoughts.  The clinical group reported greater 
levels of experiential avoidance, which was a highly significant large effect.   
 
5.1.2 Experimental hypotheses relating to attentional bias 
 
The key findings in relation to the Stroop task are outlined in Table 24 below.   Preparatory analysis 
had indicated acceptable rates of error for the Stroop items and therefore no Stroop item was 
excluded on the basis of error in the analyses.  However, extreme cases in terms of latencies were 
removed from the analysis.   
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Table 24: Key findings for hypotheses relating to attentional bias 
Hypothesis  Result 
Hypothesis 1 
(within group) 
The clinical group will have slower response 
times for naming food, body and negative self-
esteem threats in relation to neutral words.   
No significant difference. 
Effect sizes small. 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 & 
2a (between 
group) 
 
The clinical group will have slower response 
times for naming the colour of threat word than 
the control group.   
 
There will be no significant difference between 
the groups on neutral words. 
Significant difference for 
food & self-esteem. 
Moderate effect sizes for 
these comparisons. 
However clinical group 
slower on neutral words. 
Hypothesis 2 not 
corroborated. 
Hypothesis 5a  
(between ED 
behaviour) 
ED binge-purge (B/P) behaviour or restricting 
(R) behaviour will have a moderating effect on 
the Stroop latencies for food, body and self-
esteem threat words. 
No significant effect. 
Moderate – large effect 
sizes, indicating some 
support for the hypothesis. 
 
 
5.1.3 Experimental hypotheses relating to cognitive avoidance 
 
The key findings in relation to the anagram task are shown in Table 25.  Preparatory analysis for 
the anagram solution task had indicated some problems in the data in terms of error.  Higher error 
rates appear to have been generated exclusively by controls.  Individual anagram errors were case 
wise excluded from the analysis, together with excessive anagram solution times.  The rate of error 
is a concern in terms of the potential impact on the results for the hypotheses relating to cognitive 
avoidance.  This will be discussed in the context of the study limitations below.   
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Table 25: Key findings for the hypotheses relating to cognitive avoidance 
Hypothesis  Result 
Hypothesis 3 
(within group) 
The clinical group will have slower 
performance times for solving food, 
body & self-esteem threat anagrams in 
relation to neutral anagrams. 
Significant difference; neutral & 
food & self-esteem anagrams.  No 
significant differences for body-
neutral anagrams. 
Moderate effect sizes. 
Partial support for hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 & 4a 
(between group) 
The clinical group will have slower 
response times for body, food & self-
esteem threat anagrams than the 
control group.   
 
There will be no significant difference 
between solution times for neutral 
anagrams. 
No significant differences in 
direction predicted. 
Moderate effect sizes indicated 
control group were slower on body 
& self-esteem anagrams. 
Hypothesis rejected. 
Hypothesis 5b 
(between ED 
behaviour group) 
ED behaviour (B/P or R) will have a 
moderating effect on anagram solution 
time for food, body and self-esteem 
threats. 
No significant differences. 
Small effect size. 
Hypothesis rejected. 
 
5.1.4 Summary of correlational analysis related to experiential avoidance 
 
Experiential avoidance was found to be related to greater degrees of anxious thoughts, with 
pathological cognitive coping strategies for managing anxious thoughts (e.g. Punishment) and with 
some features of eating disorder pathology (e.g. Body Dissatisfaction).  There was evidence of a 
relationship between experiential avoidance and these features in both the control and clinical 
groups.  Unexpectedly, no relationships were found between experiential avoidance and the tasks 
relating to attentional bias or cognitive avoidance. 
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5.2 Interpretation of findings 
 
The theoretical and research literature reviewed in the introduction highlighted the importance of 
the shared features and maintaining mechanisms considered to be common to eating disorders 
(Fairburn & Harrison 2003; Fairburn et al 2003).  A transtheoretical approach (Figure 2) was 
proposed drawing on theories that encompassed the cognitive processes considered to be 
important in the development and maintenance of eating disorders, which were not adequately 
considered in existing disorder-specific CBT models.  Attentional bias and cognitive avoidance 
were two such processes and were selected for further investigation within this study.  The findings 
from this study relating to the processes of attentional bias and cognitive avoidance will now be 
discussed with reference to the existing literature.   
 
5.2.1 Interpretation of findings related to attentional bias in the context of previous research  
 
The experimental literature appeared to consistently demonstrate the existence of attentional 
biases to stimuli in line with the current concerns (Klinger 1996) of individuals with eating disorders; 
for example food, weight and body shape information (Cooper et al 1992; Cooper & Fairburn 1993; 
Davidson & Wright 2002; Dobson & Dozois 2004; Fairburn et al 1991; Prato & John 1991; Rofey et 
al 2004; Shafran et al 2007; Waller et al 1995).  The Stroop paradigm in the present study did not 
produce results in line with this.  There was evidence that the clinical group were generally slower 
to process information that was not specifically related to threat (i.e. also neutral words).  This 
combined with the lack of a significant difference within the clinical group between threat and 
neutral stimuli, suggests a lack of support for attentional bias to threat in this study.   
 
By exploring the literature in more detail it is possible to place these findings in context.  It is the 
case that attentional biases have been demonstrated in ED, however this has not been consistently 
so across stimuli type or ED diagnosis.  Inconsistencies in studies have shown that the nature of 
stimuli employed has not always been found to reliably relate to ED samples (Dobson & Dozois 
1994).  For example, failures to detect attentional biases for body shape and weight words have 
been reported for participants with AN (Ben-Tovim et al 1989; Fassino et al 2002; Perpina et al 
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1993) and for those with BN (Black, Wilson, Labouvie & Heffernan 1997).  Biases towards food 
words have also been found inconsistently (Faunce 2002; Lee & Shafran 2004), with variability 
between ED diagnoses.  For example the Stroop effect for food words has been found to be more 
apparent in AN and less so in BN (Ben-Tovim & Walker 1991; Cooper & Todd 1997; Channon, 
Hemsley & de Silva 1988; Perpina et al 1993).  Research exploring attentional biases for self-
referent information beyond that of food, weight and shape is limited yet seems to indicate that 
biases for this type of information are present, at least for individuals with BN psychopathology 
(McManus et al 1996; Meyer et al 2000; Waller et al 1996).  However, this study would seem to 
support those mentioned above that query attentional bias in ED using the Stroop paradigm. 
 
The failure to find an effect between target and neutral stimuli in this and some prior studies quoted 
may refer to the efficacy of the emotional Stroop paradigm as a tool for measuring attentional bias.  
Some research has suggested that there are theoretical difficulties relating to the ability of the 
emotional Stroop to differentiate between attentional bias (i.e. diverting attention towards a 
stimulus) and cognitive avoidance of a stimulus (Lavy & van den Hout 1994; Mogg & Bradley 1999; 
de Ruiter & Broschot 1994).  More recent research has employed different paradigms, such as the 
dot probe task, which propose to be more effective at measuring attentional bias than the Stroop 
task (e.g. Shafran et al 2007; Wells & Matthews 1994).  However the criticisms levelled at the 
Stroop can also be applied to these newer paradigms (Fox, Russo, & Dutton 2002; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986).  Studies using paradigms that differentiate these factors have been used 
in anxiety disorders (Amir, Elias, Klumpp & Przeworski 2003) and depression (Koster, De Raedt, 
Goeleven, Franck & Crombez 2005).  However these paradigms are developing and have yet to be 
used with ED populations to date (Shafran et al 2007).  Within this study, it was felt important to use 
a well established measure of attentional bias (Wells, Mathews & MacLeod 1996) to balance the 
use of the relatively novel measure of cognitive avoidance.   
 
5.2.2 Strengths and limitations of the present study in relation to the attentional bias paradigm 
 
There were many strengths within this study in relation to the Stroop paradigm which mainly 
involved revising the task to rule out a number of confounders.  Attempts were made to improve the 
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stimuli used by matching the number of target stimuli semantic categories with an equal number of 
categories for neutral stimuli and avoiding types of stimuli known to impact on latencies (i.e. 
avoiding colour stimuli).  The presentation and recording of the Stroop stimuli was improved by 
using computerised presentation and recording of response times to minimise the effect of the 
experimenter and improve accuracy.  Stimuli was randomised in terms of content of semantic 
category and the order fixed (i.e. all were presented threat-control).  This was to prevent the 
possibility of an effect of sequence that would occur if the stimuli were generated completely at 
random.  In order to make the study applicable to prior research, Stroop stimulus words were 
chosen from those words previously used wherever possible.   
 
However the lack of statistically significant findings for the Stroop may be related to some 
weaknesses in terms of the stimuli chosen.  Using stimuli from prior research may have meant that 
that the disorder relevant categories were perhaps not adequately delineated (Faunce 2004; Lee & 
Shafran 2004).  For example, the food category consisted of generic food words (i.e. „dinner‟) with 
high calorie words (i.e. „cookie‟) and within the body category words relating to both shape (e.g. 
„thighs‟) and weight (e.g. „heavy‟) were used (see Appendix N).  This may be problematic as it does 
not allow biases for these potentially different stimuli to be revealed, and one type of stimuli may 
have obscured the effects of the other.  However, having twelve stimuli in each category should 
have allowed for this to be adequately controlled for.  
 
The lack of a significant effect for the clinical group in terms of the disorder relevant and self-
esteem categories with the neutral words may be due to the selection of appropriate neutral word 
stimuli.  Prior research lacks specificity in terms of how neutral stimuli are selected and decided 
upon (Lee & Shafran 2002).  Attempts were made to match the format of existing research while 
being mindful of the suggestions for improvements in terms of using stimuli that occur with similar 
frequency (e.g. using animal and household objects).  It would seem that these attempts were 
successful as preliminary analysis (see Appendix U) indicated correlations between all categories 
of words.  This suggested that the Stroop words were well matched in terms of difficulty between 
the categories and participants were generally consistent in their responses.   
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It may be that words in themselves are somewhat inadequate to consistently detect differences in 
attention.  Some research has employed pictorial versions of attentional bias tasks (Shafran et al 
2007; Walker, Ben-Tovim, Paddick & McNamara 1995) as this is suggested to improve the 
ecological validity of the task (Faunce 2002).  However, it should be pointed out that the emotional 
Stroop task represents a cognitive task over and above ED status and the lack of difference 
between the target and neutral words may reflect attentional bias as a cognitive process that exists 
independently of „disorder‟ status.  The general slowing of processing found within the clinical group 
may reflect be reflective of symptoms of ED, for example the consequences of starvation or mood 
state (Rofey et al 2004). 
 
5.2.3 Interpretation of findings related to cognitive avoidance in the context of previous research  
 
The previous research exploring cognitive avoidance in ED, although very limited, indicated 
evidence for cognitive avoidance in self-report studies (Troop & Treasure 1997; Troop, Holbery & 
Treasure 1998) and in those using experimental paradigms employing strategic processing tasks.  
This has been particularly found for those with BN psychopathology (Meyer et al 2000; Waller et al 
1995).  In order to extend and offer further support for this research, the present study employed an 
adaptation of the anagram solution task developed by Waller and colleagues (Meyer et al 2005; 
Waller & Meyer 1997).  This study did find evidence to support the process of cognitive avoidance 
in ED participants for food and self-esteem threat categories, in comparison to neutral anagrams.  
However, these findings were compromised by the lack of a significant effect between the clinical 
and control groups, with post hoc results indicating that the clinical group processed the target 
words more quickly than controls.  These findings will now be interpreted in the light of the existing 
research. 
 
Parallels can be drawn between the findings of existing research and the present study.  In Meyer 
et al‟s study (2005), although BN participants took longer to solve the „ego-threat‟ words (i.e. those 
related to self-esteem), no significant differences were found on the food anagrams.  Post hoc tests 
revealed that the clinical group were quicker to solve the food anagrams than the control group, 
particularly for those participants who were purely restrictive and did not use compensatory purging 
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behaviours (regardless of diagnosis).  The restrictive participants also solved the ego-threat 
anagrams in similar times to the control group (Meyer et al 2005).  Within non-clinical samples 
there is evidence to suggest that those with a lower BMI (i.e. more likely to engage in dieting or 
restrictive behaviour) solved threat anagrams more quickly (Waller & Meyer 1997).  This is clinically 
important for the present study as it may indicate that having a heterogeneous clinical ED group 
may have obscured important effects of type of pathological eating behaviour on cognitive 
avoidance.  This limits the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the differences between BN, 
AN and EDNOS diagnostic groups in terms of cognitive avoidance.  However, the moderating effect 
of ED behaviour was explored in this study and no significant effects were found and effect sizes 
were small.  While this may relate to the small sample size, it seems that in this study ED behaviour 
did not impact on anagram solution times.  A more likely conclusion is that certain features of the 
control group and the experimental context may have had a confounding task specific effect.  This 
will be explored further in due course. 
 
Eating disorder psychopathology may have had an effect on the speed of processing of the 
anagrams.  For example, Meyer et al (2005) found that having poor body image may result in faster 
processing of threat.  In their study the BN group were significantly faster on threat words if they 
had an elevated Body Dissatisfaction (BD) score on the EDI (Garner 1991).  This has also been 
found within non-clinical groups (Meyer et al 2005; Waller & Meyer 1997).  As some of the clinical 
ED sample in the present study had BD scores in the elevated clinical range (see Appendix T), this 
may explain why they processed the threat words more quickly.  Faster processing of disorder 
relevant and threat words on the anagram task might actually be indicative of hyper-attention to 
those cues (as opposed to cognitive avoidance) in those with a negative body image.  This will now 
be discussed.   
 
In a strategic task such as the anagram solution task, it is suggested that more rapid processing 
may be more indicative of a process of attentional bias rather than cognitive avoidance (Meyer et al 
2005).  It has been highlighted that these two processes may be inherently linked and may occur 
interdependently during stages of information processing (deRuiter & Brosschot 1994; Lavy & van 
den Hout 1994).  Although direct relationships between the Stroop and anagram task were not 
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explored within the analysis of the present study, the finding for faster solution times for the clinical 
group may also provide evidence of attentional bias for threat cues in these participants.  It is 
perhaps the case therefore, that attentional biases also operate within a strategic processing task 
(i.e. the anagram solution task).  This would warrant further investigation.   
Faster processing of threat-related words may also indicate a hyperattentiveness towards 
information that relates to the ED individual‟s current concerns (i.e. weight and shape or negative 
self-beliefs).  As these types of stimuli were possibly more relevant to the individual, they may be 
more readily accessible in initial processing and thus the anagrams were more quickly solved.  
Indeed, faster processing may in itself be a form of avoidance in that quicker solution of the 
anagram would more readily remove the threat. 
 
5.2.3 Strengths and limitations of the present study in the context of the cognitive avoidance 
paradigm 
 
This study used a relatively novel strategic processing paradigm thought to access processes of 
cognitive avoidance, based upon prior research (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005).  As this 
paradigm is new, the present study sought to further validate and refine it.  This involved using the 
existing categories of food and self-esteem threat anagrams and also extending this to include 
body anagrams.  This was done in order to bring the paradigm in line with studies using the 
emotional Stroop task that have primarily explored these categories.  This was also done to make 
comparable the stimuli used across the two experimental tasks, particularly given the suggestion of 
the link between attentional bias and cognitive avoidance (de Ruiter & Broschot 1994; Lavy & van 
den Hout 1994).  However, due to the lack of significant findings for this aspect of the study it may 
be worth exploring the anagram paradigm used more closely.  
 
An attempt was made to match the target words chosen for the anagrams wherever possible on 
those used in the prior research (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005).  However, it was the 
case that these words did not appear to be adequately matched for word length or difficulty within 
these studies (e.g. food category words consisted of 4 letters whereas threat words consisted of up 
to 6 letters; Meyer et al 2005).  Therefore, in the present study a decision was made to extend the 
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food words to include those up to a maximum of 6 letters to bring these in line with those for the 
self-esteem threat category (see Appendix P).  This meant that food words were drawn from the 
wider pool of target words used in prior emotional Stroop studies.  Neutral words in the prior 
research were again only 4 letters long so were drawn randomly from the wider pool of target words 
used in the Stroop literature and generated for this study to include both 5 and 6 letter words.  This 
study was unique in its attempt to measure cognitive avoidance of body stimuli.  As this was the 
case, the words were drawn from existing Stroop studies where possible.  Generating the target 
and neutral stimulus words in this way meant that the norms for solution times provided by the prior 
research (Meyer et al 2005; Waller & Mayer 1997) were not compatible. 
 
The logistics of this study meant that only a brief pilot could be undertaken and the primary aim of 
this was to test the ease of use of the computer software, not to obtain norms for the anagrams.  
Therefore it is possible that the words in certain categories were more complex than those in other 
categories.  Preliminary analysis of the correlations between stimuli categories (see Appendix V) 
did not indicate this to be the case.  However, future research would need to take more steps to 
ensure that anagrams used are of equal difficulty.   
 
A further indication that the anagrams may have been too complex is reflected in the rate of error 
on this task.  However, errors were generated largely by the control group.  This may have 
impacted upon the findings for the anagram task, as the nature of the task would have rendered it 
obvious to a participant if they had made an error (i.e. they would be looking at an incorrect word 
solution on the screen).  As the instructions requested that participants avoid error, producing 
incorrect solutions may have made them more attuned to their mistakes, which may have impacted 
on their performance times (i.e. resulted in impaired performance for reasons other than cognitive 
avoidance).  Prior research (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005) has reported no information 
as to error rates.  The rate of error in the present study would appear to be indicative of features of 
the control group that will be discussed in the context of the broader limitations of the study.   
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5.3 General strengths and limitations of the study and suggestions for improvement 
 
This study had certain strengths, including the use of mixed quasi-experimental design to test focal 
hypotheses with planned comparisons and the inclusion of a control group.  Employing a within-
subjects design allowed for the control of participant variables (i.e. keyboard skills and psychomotor 
ability).  Many of the limitations of this study were affected to a certain extent by the time 
constraints and the clinical realities of the research.  The limitations of the study link directly to 
suggestions for improvement and so these will follow on.  The limitations can be described broadly 
in terms of those related to potential non-equivalence of groups, particular problems related to 
recruitment and those characteristics of the experimental tasks and context. 
 
5.3.1 Issues of power and sample size 
 
Due to certain recruitment difficulties, the clinical sample was somewhat underpowered, falling just 
short of the target of twenty seven participants for the clinical ED group (N=23).  However, this did 
not have a deleterious effect since the power to detect a medium effect size (i.e. Cohen‟s d of .50) 
was still sufficient to detect a medium power of 75% at an alpha level of 0.05 (1 tailed).  The study 
was compromised to some degree but the small numbers of participants in the ED behaviour 
groups.  This limited the comparisons that could be made between the groups and therefore limited 
the potential conclusions which could be drawn regarding attentional bias and cognitive avoidance 
for those that binge-eat and those that restrict their eating.  Future research could include larger 
samples to address this and to reduce the chance of type II errors.   
 
As discussed above it is possible that threat stimuli may not have been powerful enough to detect 
differences for the clinical ED group to statistical significance, particularly for the anagram task 
where there was some indication of cognitive avoidance.  Future studies may chose to utilise threat 
stimuli that may be more powerful and is more ecologically valid, such as picture stimuli (e.g. 
Cochrane, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart & Luciano 2006; Shafran et al 2007) and 
visual stimuli that requires a strategic engagement for the cognitive avoidance task (e.g. film; Sloan 
2004). 
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5.3.2 Features of the sample 
 
Clinical Group: 
There were strengths in relation to the recruitment of the clinical sample, such as negotiating with 
services regarding ways to maximise recruitment.  For example, the participants were initially 
informed about the research as part of routine contact with their Team clinician and this may have 
increased participation.  A further benefit is that participants were not excluded from the study on 
the basis of diagnosis.  Given the critique of diagnostic classifications of ED (Fairburn et al 2003; 
2007; Hayes et al 1996), this was felt to be valid and may have enhanced recruitment (i.e. by not 
excluding the category EDNOS for example).  Grouping ED patients by behaviour (i.e. binge-purge 
or restricting) is strongly recommended over diagnostic groups, to tease out important differences 
in cognitive processes that may exist between the groups (Faunce 2004; Lee & Shafran 2004).  
This was attempted in this study to explore the moderating effect of ED behaviour on the cognitive 
processes.  However the small sample size may have impacted on these findings.   
 
There was some attrition from the study at intake (N=7).  Some studies have reported on the 
difficulties in recruiting ED populations and suggest that participation in research may vary across 
ED diagnoses, with more difficulties in recruiting AN participants (Hewell, Rienecke Hoste & Le 
Grange 2006; McDermott et al 2003).  Detailed information concerning participants who declined to 
take part in this study was not recorded.  However, given that the study was in part measuring an 
avoidant process it is interesting to comment that ED patients predisposed to avoidant coping 
styles (Eifert & Heffner, 2003), may have actually been unwilling to participate in the research.   
 
As mentioned above there were some features specifically related to the clinical sample that due to 
service related issues and the logistics of the study it was not possible to adequately control for.  
The amount of demographic information that could be obtained was limited, for example details 
relating to stage of therapeutic intervention and medication.  As a result the effects of these 
variables on attentional bias and cognitive avoidance cannot be ruled out.  This is frequently 
overlooked in the prior literature and attempts were made to collect this data in this study.  
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However, due to working practices, logistical and service related issues (e.g. the accurate recording 
of type of therapeutic intervention) access to this information was limited and could only be 
commented upon in a descriptive way. 
 
Control Group:  
 
Some features of the control group (i.e. the rate of error generated on the anagram task) does raise 
concerns with regard to the equivalence of the groups.  There was some variation between the 
groups that may go some way to explaining the task specific differences in error.  For example, 
there was a significant difference in the participant‟s age which was not expected.  This may be 
important as there has been some indication that age may affect the degree of attentional bias 
(Seddon & Waller 2000).  However, there are often considerable weaknesses in how age is 
classified in the literature and there have been no age effects found for cognitive avoidance.  
Although there were no significant differences between the groups, level of English grammar and 
comprehension may also have had an effect, as there were more participants with English as a 
second language in the control group.  This may have inflated the error rate and had an impact on 
anagram solution time.  Educational ability may also have impacted on the error and anagram 
solution time.  Future research should be mindful of these factors.  
 
On the question of demand characteristics, it is possible that participants interpreted the task 
instructions differently.  The control group, perhaps due to being psychology students and having 
some experience of experimental research, may have interpreted the goals of the task in relation to 
speed and may have prioritised this over accuracy.  They may have had somewhat less motivation, 
having participated in the research in order to obtain course credit.  There were variations in the 
experimental setting that also may have impacted upon the equivalence of the groups.  These are 
discussed below. 
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5.3.3 Issues relating to the experimental context 
 
Unfortunately due to the certain logistical constraints in recruiting the clinical sample, the 
experimental setting was unavoidably different between the clinical and control group.  This would 
go against the high degree of standardisation that was hoped for by introducing within group 
variation.  For example, all participants in the control group were tested in experimental laboratories 
at the university.  This allowed the participant to complete the tasks without involvement from the 
experimenter, as stated in the methodology.  However, it was not always possible to test 
participants from the clinical group in this manner.  Some participants were seen in their own 
homes which meant that the experimenter was sometimes present in the room.  In terms of 
demand characteristics, this may have meant that the ED group felt more pressure to perform well 
under the perceived scrutiny of the experimenter.  This may be particularly so when accounting for 
the high level of perfectionism and need for achievement characteristic of the disorders (Shafran et 
al 2002).  This may have introduced extra variation into the experimental setting which could have 
confounded the group comparison between the control and clinical ED group.   
 
5.4 Clinical relevance and theoretical implications 
 
As the hypotheses relating to the emotional Stroop task were largely negative, this study cannot 
provide conclusive evidence of the presence of attentional bias in a clinical ED group.  The impact 
of the study limitations on the findings have been discussed and outlined.  The existing research 
has demonstrated the relevance of this process to ED.   However, the findings of this study offer 
more support to those studies querying attentional bias and the use of the emotional Stroop task.  
Considering this, the research may be at a somewhat early stage to begin to strongly recommend 
therapies to address attentional biases in ED.   However, given the theoretical underpinnings, 
biases in attention are likely to operate in ED and are worth considering in terms of what this may 
add to the clinical picture. 
 
This study found some evidence for the presence of cognitive avoidance in female ED patients.  
Taken together with the previous research findings, it is reasonable to draw conclusions about the 
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likely presence of cognitive avoidance in ED patients.  However, as a result of the limitations of this 
study this was only partially borne out.  The clinical and theoretical implications for these findings 
will now be outlined. 
 
5.4.1 Theoretical implications of attentional biases and cognitive avoidance for eating disorders 
 
The theoretical overview presented in this study gave an insight into the role of cognitive processes 
in the maintenance of ED.  Cognitive avoidance and processes of attentional bias fit within a 
transtheoretical model (see Figure 2) that attempts to explain the cognitive and behavioural 
features commonly associated with eating pathology.  Figure 3 outlined the hypothesised 
mechanism between attentional bias and cognitive avoidance in ED, in that the information 
selected for processing is likely to be in line with the individual‟s current concerns (Harvey et al 
2004; Klinger 1996).  In ED these concerns might be related to eating, shape and weight (Fairburn 
1997).  They may also be related to information that is in line with the individual‟s schemas or self-
beliefs (Cooper 2003; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Wells & Matthews 1994; Wells 1997; 2000) 
and are more likely to be of negative emotional valence (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & 
Vohs 2001; Taylor 1991).  Due to the increase in negative affect that attentional biases of this 
nature may give rise to, an individual may seek to escape (Heatherton & Baumeister 1991; 
Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice 2001), or block this out in some way (Lavey 1986; Root & Fallon 
1989).   
 
The „escape‟ and „blocking‟ models suggest that disordered eating behaviours (i.e. binge-eating) 
may function to enable the individual to reduce their negative self-focus, at least in the short term.  
Cognitive processes of avoidance, such as dissociation (Vanderlinden, Vandereycken, van Dyke & 
Vertomnen 1993), ruminative worry processes (Wells & Davies 1994; Wells 2000; Borkovec, 1994; 
2002; Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004) and thought suppression (Johnston, Bulik & Anstiss 1999; 
Oliver & Huon 2001; O‟Connell, Larkin & Mizes 2005) may also serve this purpose and reduce the 
negative emotional state in the short term. 
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Within the ACT model, Hayes and colleagues (1996; 1999) point out that these efforts to regulate 
emotion by attempting to avoid, control and suppress experience may exacerbate and perpetuate 
distress (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) and there is good evidence that this is the case 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White 1987; Wegner & Zanakos 1994; John & Gross 2004; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner 2000; Purdon, 1999).  It was interesting to note that within this study, experiential 
avoidance as measured by the AAQ was not an explanatory variable for cognitive avoidance or 
attentional bias.  This is contrary to expectation, as it is likely that the construct of experiential 
avoidance as defined by Hayes et al (1996; 1999) would encompass both attentional and avoidant 
processes.  This is the first study to attempt to link experiential avoidance with discrete cognitive 
processes and the lack of an association may be a reflection of the way that experiential avoidance 
is constructed within the AAQ and a result of the limitations of this study.  The AAQ questionnaire 
requires further validation, yet in this study there were clear indications that experiential avoidance 
was likely to be a key feature of ED.  The weight of the existing theoretical and clinical evidence 
would suggest that experiential avoidance plays an important role in the development and 
maintenance of ED (Heffner & Eifert 2004; Heffner et al 2002). 
 
 
5.4.2 Clinical implications of attentional biases and cognitive avoidance for eating disorders 
 
The presence of attentional bias and to some extent cognitive avoidance, have been established in 
ED for disorder relevant and schema related information.  There is now scope within the research 
to attempt to establish the causal structure of these processes in the aetiology and maintenance of 
ED.  It is difficult to establish this within cross-sectional designs.  Longitudinal studies or studies 
which experimentally manipulate the processes to test out the effects on attitudes and beliefs would 
help to provide some evidence for a causal or maintaining function within the disorder.   
 
It is important to understand differences in presentation between ED groups (i.e. individuals who 
use binge-purge or restrictive behaviours) in relation to cognitive processes.  There is some 
indication that while diagnosis might not be of relevance to treatment (Fairburn et al 2003), type of 
eating-disordered behaviour might be.  If individuals with restricting or binge-purge behaviours 
218 
show variation in the nature of stimuli they attend to (Ben-Tovim et al 1989; Fassino et al 2002; 
Perpina et al 1993) this may indicate differences in relation to the cognitive content of those 
individuals experiencing AN or BN disorders.  If patients with AN and BN behaviours display 
differences in relation to the stimuli that they avoid (McManus et al 1996; Meyer et al 2005; Waller 
et al 1996; Waller & Meyer, 1997) this may indicate that the function of avoidance may differ by 
eating-disordered behaviour.  Variation within the behavioural sub-groupings of ED may indicate 
that the therapeutic focus may need to be altered depending on the type and severity of ED 
behaviour.  This is somewhat at odds with the proposal of a transdiagnostic approach (Fairburn et 
al 2003) and would warrant further exploration experimentally and therapeutically. 
 
Attentional biases in ED are suggested to have a role in confirming an individual‟s negative beliefs 
and therefore may perpetuate these beliefs (Fairburn et al 1999; Fairburn et al 2003).  Cognitive 
avoidance of the thoughts and affect associated with these beliefs may further strengthen the 
belief, strengthen the association between the affect and stimulus and therefore increase affective 
arousal over the longer term (Wenzlaff & Wegner 2000).  If as theoretically proposed, attentional 
biases and cognitive avoidance do serve to maintain ED in this way, then particular clinical 
techniques that address them may be warranted.   
This study was not able to explore the effects of therapeutic intervention on the cognitive 
processes.  However, there is some evidence that attentional biases are ameliorated following CBT 
(Cooper & Fairburn 1993; Shafran 2006).  If this is the case then it is possible that attentional 
processes do not warrant a specific intervention.  They may normalise with the use of enhanced 
CBT for ED that focuses on aspects such as body checking which may tap into attentional 
processes (Fairburn et al 2003).  However, specific cognitive techniques such as attentional 
training (Wells 2000; Papageourgio & Wells 2003) may also help to address attentional biases.   
 
It may be that avoidant processes may be usefully addressed by using clinical approaches such as 
ACT (Hayes et al 1996; 1999) that highlight the long term effects of experiential avoidance in 
maintaining psychopathology and within treatment, emphasise the acceptance of previously 
avoided negative thoughts and emotions as a route to recovery.  Clinically, the Trainee has 
experienced that therapeutic work focused on the identification of and exposure to avoided 
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cognitions and affect enables the learned value of avoidance to be diminished for patients.  Using 
transtheoretical conceptualisations that highlight these processes (i.e. as in Figure 2) may assist 
clinicians in focusing therapeutically on processes of attention and avoidance. 
 
5.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
In carrying out this piece of research and reviewing the existing experimental evidence for 
attentional bias and cognitive avoidance, a number of improvements for future studies have come 
to light.  Some of these have been briefly mentioned within the main body of the discussion but will 
be expanded upon here.  
 
It would seem that differences in cognitive processes between ED diagnostic groups, or by type of 
eating-disordered behaviour would warrant further investigation.  This is in light of variations in 
cognitive processing found within the literature between those displaying AN and BN 
psychopathology.  This study was limited in its ability to investigate this more comprehensively.  
Since completing this research and becoming immersed in the literature, the Trainee has become 
increasingly aware of processes of attention and avoidance in the maintenance of ED and has 
incorporated this into formulations and interventions with patients.  Anecdotally, the Trainee has 
observed that those who use binge eating are often keenly aware of their experience (both external 
and internal events).  As a result they frequently engage in frantic attempts to avoid these 
experiences.  It may be that those who do not use binge eating to regulate their affect may be more 
disconnected with their initial experience through other processes (i.e. dissociation).   
 
The research would suggest that those displaying BN psychopathology primarily demonstrate 
cognitive avoidance.  This would seem to indicate that those who don‟t purge may manage 
threatening information in a different way.  Further exploration of this is crucial as it may suggest 
that the transdiagnostic conceptualisation of ED may obscure important differences in the more 
subtle cognitive processes.  Future research would benefit from a focus on ED behaviour in 
combination with exploring the effects of particular therapeutic interventions on these cognitive 
processes. 
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In terms of the experimental tasks themselves, the critique of the emotional Stroop task has been 
commented upon.  Future research may benefit from a focus on alternative paradigms to tap 
attentional processes (Shafran et al 2007).  This may include the use of more ecologically valid 
stimuli such as visual stimuli in attentional tasks (i.e. pictures or film) or strategic tasks such 
embedded figures tasks as measures of cognitive avoidance.  Tasks that tease out the 
mechanisms involved in cognitive bias (i.e. vigilance towards or away from threat) are necessary.  
Some recent research has attempted this, which has not yet been applied to ED (Amir et al 2003; 
Koster et al 2005; Shafran et al 2007).  Recently, within Relational-Frame Theory, the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al 2006) has been developed.  
Although not specifically a measure of attentional bias or cognitive avoidance, this newly developed 
computer-based task is proposed to measure verbal relational networks or beliefs.  This 
corresponds well to the ACT model.  Future research could make use of the IRAP to explore the 
weight/shape and self-esteem related beliefs and current concerns of ED participants. 
 
Within this study, efforts were made to improve upon the limitations of the stimuli used and their 
presentation.  However, there are further potential ways of improving the validity of the target 
stimuli used.  For example, carrying out pilot work in which ED participant‟s rate a pool of target 
words in terms of the degree of threat, may improve the relevance to the current concerns of ED 
individuals.  These may or may not be disorder-specific.  To overcome any indications that words 
may differ in complexity, future studies using the anagram paradigm should employ piloting 
measures to ascertain norms for anagram words.  This would allow significant differences for 
clinical groups to be more reliably demonstrated. 
 
A strength of this study was the use of a control group of participants.  However, future studies 
employing these paradigms should make efforts to minimise the non-equivalence of clinical and 
control groups.  For example, this could be done by matching by age, socio-economic status, 
educational level and level of competency with written English.  Controlling for variation between 
the experimental settings was a shortcoming of this research.  Future studies should attempt to 
minimise the effects of context.  This study did not employ a mood measure (other than measures 
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of anxiety) in the design.  Future research would benefit from this as there has been some 
indication that mood impacts upon processes of selective attention (Rofey et al 2004).  This may 
feasibly be the case for processes of cognitive avoidance also.  Investigations into the effect of 
mood on specific cognitive processes is limited and further investigation employing mood measures 
pre and post experimental tasks may help to clarify the effect.  
 
Finally, there is scope for conducting longitudinal studies which experimentally explore whether key 
cognitive processes have a maintaining role in ED.  There is evidence from this study and existing 
research that to some extent these are normal cognitive processes which are likely to occur within 
the general population along a continuum.  Therefore the potential role and impact of cognitive 
processes of attention and avoidance in the development and maintenance of the disorders 
requires some clarification. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
 
This study provided some support for the presence of attentional biases and cognitive avoidance of 
disorder relevant and self-esteem threat information.  The study had much strength in attempting to 
address some of the methodological shortcomings of previous research and in extending the 
paradigms used to encompass non-disorder-specific stimuli that may be of relevance to ED.  
However, some of the hypotheses for this study were unsupported.  This was surprising, as 
anecdotally the clinical experience of the Trainee would suggest that some individuals with ED 
appear very connected to their initial experience (i.e. may be vigilant on automatic processing), 
then appear to engage in attempts to avoid the negative internal states that may arise.  However, 
this may only be the case in those individuals who use binge-eating to regulate their affect.  Future 
research would need to explore and address the differences in cognitive processing between ED 
behaviours or diagnostic groups.   
 
There were a number of limitations to this study which may have had a bearing on the outcome.  
These would need to be addressed in future research.  The use of the emotional Stroop task as a 
measure of attentional bias has been questioned and it is possible that other paradigms may tap 
into this process more effectively.  The current study may call into question the utility of an anagram 
solution task as a measure of cognitive avoidance, indeed there is some suggestion that it too may 
measure attentional bias.  Previous commentators have highlighted that these processes are not 
independent of one another.  There is a great deal of scope for future research to attempt to tease 
out these mechanisms and explore their role in eating disorder psychopathology.  This would help 
to contribute to the theoretical conceptualisations of the disorders and ultimately, may help to 
improve interventions for patients. 
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U H
 
Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield 
Hertfordshire 
AL10 9AB 
Dear .................... (Clinician inserts first name) 
 
Re: Perceptual ability and reaction time in people with eating disorders 
 
I am writing to you to invite you to take part in a research study that I am currently 
carrying out as part of a university qualification.  The study aims to look at the perceptual 
abilities and reaction times in people who have eating disorders. 
 
An information sheet about the study is attached.  It provides an explanation about what 
the study involves.  You are under no obligation to take part.  Please read the information 
sheet carefully. 
 
If you would like further information about the study or would like to be involved and are 
happy for me to contact you, please complete the tear off slip below and send it to: 
Diana Carmen, Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course, University of 
Hertfordshire, College Lane, Hatfield, AL10 9AB or email Diana.carmen@HPT.nhs.uk.  
Please note that this does not obligate you to being involved in the study.  Alternatively, 
you are welcome to speak to me by ringing 01707 286 322. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Diana Carmen 
Chief Investigator for the research 
             
         Please tick 
I would like more information       
 
I would like to participate in the study      
 
I give permission for Diana Carmen to contact me about the study   
 
I prefer to be contacted by: telephone  or email  
 
Telephone number/email address:         
 
Name:      Signature:       
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study: Project investigating perceptual ability and reaction time in people with an 
eating disorder 
 
My name is Diana Carmen. I am a trainee clinical psychologist. You are being invited to 
take part in a research study looking at perceptual ability and reaction time in people with 
an eating disorder.  Before you decide to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information and discuss it with others if you wish.  Take time to decide whether 
or not you would like to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Some researchers think that people with eating disorders may perceive and react to things 
in a different way to people without eating disorders.  The aim of this project is to explore 
perceptual abilities and reaction time in people with eating disorders.  I am carrying out 
this research as part of a doctoral qualification. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you have been referred to a specialist eating disorder 
service and have problems with your eating.  People without an eating disorder are also 
being asked to take part in the study.  The study aims recruit sixty four people. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you decide to take part, but 
later change your mind you are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  A 
decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the 
treatment or standard of care you receive from the Eating Disorders Service. 
 
If you are happy to be contacted about the project, you can send your contact details to 
me (either an email address or a telephone number) and I will get in touch with you to 
discuss the project further and answer any questions you may have. 
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, I will arrange a time to visit you to complete some computer 
based tasks which look at perceptual skills and reaction time.  I will also arrange for you 
to complete four questionnaires which ask about eating behaviours, thoughts, worries and 
attitudes.  You will also be asked for some information about yourself, such as your age, 
height and weight.   
The whole of the assessment will take around an hour.  If you cannot complete this in one 
session, then arrangements can be made for you to fill out the questionnaires before 
completing the computer tasks.  I can arrange to meet you to carry out the assessment at 
the most convenient place for you, this could be at your home or at the eating disorders 
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clinic.  If you would like some feedback about the assessment, I would be happy to 
provide this for you. 
If you consent to take part in the study, I will look at your medical records so I can find 
out some information about your eating disorder and the treatment you receive. 
 
Will my taking part be confidential? 
Yes.  All the information I collect about you will be kept strictly confidential.  This means 
that the questionnaires will not have your name or contact details on them.  Instead each 
questionnaire is given a number before it is given out to participants.  Completed 
questionnaires will be kept at a secure location which will only be accessible by the 
researcher.  Consent forms with your signature on will be kept separately from the actual 
questionnaires.   
If you agree, I will put a copy of the information sheet in your medical folder and write to 
your GP to let the people who work with you know that you have taken part in the 
project.  If you do not want this to happen, you can let me know on the Consent Form and 
it will in no way affect the treatment you receive. 
If I become concerned during the research visit that you may harm yourself or someone 
else, then I will need to contact your doctor or the people in your team to let them know.  
I will try to discuss this with you first. 
 
What will happen to the results of the project? 
Once all the assessments have been completed, I will write a report to be published as a 
doctoral thesis for the qualification of Doctor of Clinical Psychology at University of 
Hertfordshire.  I also intend to publish the findings of the project in an academic 
publication so that it can be useful to other professionals working with people with an 
eating disorder.  If you would like a copy of the report, I can make this available to you 
from July 2007.  You will not be personally identifiable in any publication or report. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
It is hoped that this research will help develop psychological understanding of people 
who have eating disorders. 
What if something goes wrong? 
In the unlikely event that participating in this research has caused you distress in some 
way, please do not hesitate to raise your concerns with the researcher who will be able to 
advise you on where you may be able to access further help.  If you wish to make a 
complaint, you can contact the Complaints Manager, Trust Head Office, 99 Waverley 
Road, St Albans, Hertfordshire AL3 5TL; telephone 01727 897225 or email 
Complaints@hpt.nhs.uk.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by Hertfordshire Research Ethics Committee. 
Thank you for taking time to read this  
Contact details of the researcher: Diana Carmen, Email address: 
Diana.Carmen@HPT.nhs.uk, Telephone number: 01707 286 322.  Postal address: Diana 
Carmen, Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, 
Herts. AL10 9AB 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study: Project investigating perceptual ability and reaction time  
 
My name is Diana Carmen. I am a trainee clinical psychologist. You are being invited to 
take part in a research study looking at perceptual ability and reaction time in people.  
Before you decide to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information and 
discuss it with others if you wish.  Take time to decide whether or not you would like to 
take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Some researchers think that people with eating disorders may perceive and react to things 
in a different way to people without eating disorders.  The aim of this project is to explore 
perceptual abilities and reaction time in people who have an eating disorder compared to 
those who do not.  I am carrying out this research as part of a Doctoral qualification. 
 
Who is taking part in the study? 
This research involves two groups of people. One group will contain people that are 
experiencing an eating disorder, the other group will contain people who are not 
experiencing an eating disorder. This study aims to recruit around sixty four people in 
total.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. If you do not want to take part, or you change your mind at any time during your 
participation in this study, you do not need to give a reason. Participation is entirely 
voluntary and you can withdraw at any time.  
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, I will arrange a time for you to complete some computer based 
tasks which look at perceptual skills and reaction time.  I will also arrange for you to 
complete four questionnaires which ask about thoughts, worries and attitudes, including 
eating behaviours.  You will also be asked for some information about yourself, such as 
your age, height and weight.   
 
The whole of the assessment will take no more than an hour and will take place at the 
University of Hertfordshire.  If you would like some feedback about the assessment, I 
would be happy to provide this for you. 
 
Will my taking part be confidential? 
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Yes.  All the information I collect about you will be kept strictly confidential.  This means 
that the questionnaires will not have your name or details on it.  Instead each 
questionnaire is given a number before it is given out to participants.  Completed 
questionnaires will be kept at a secure location which will only be accessible by the 
researcher.  Consent forms with your signature on will be kept separately from the actual 
questionnaires.   
 
What will happen to the results of the project? 
Once all the assessments have been completed, I will write a report to be published as a 
doctoral thesis for the qualification of Doctor of Clinical Psychology at University of 
Hertfordshire.  I also intend to publish the findings of the project in an academic 
publication so that it can be useful to other professionals working with people with an 
eating disorder.  If you would like a copy of the report, I can make this available to you 
from July 2007.  You will not be personally identifiable in any publication or report. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
It is hoped that this research will help develop psychological understanding of people 
who have eating disorders. 
 
What if I have questions or concerns? 
If you have any further questions about the research, please feel free to contact the 
researcher via email, telephone or post, details of which are below.  In the unlikely event 
that participating in this research has caused you distress in some way, please do not 
hesitate to contact the researcher who will be able to advise you on where you may be 
able to access further help through the University of Hertfordshire‟s support systems. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by Hertfordshire Research Ethics Committee and the 
University of Hertfordshire Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this  
 
Contact details of the researcher: Diana Carmen, Email address: 
Diana.Carmen@HPT.nhs.uk, Telephone number: 01707 286 322.  Postal address: 
Diana Carmen, Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course, University of 
Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Study: Project investigating perceptual abilities and reaction time in people with 
eating disorders  
Please tick the box if you agree 
 
 
I confirm that I have read the information sheet for the 
 above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I am 
 free to withdraw at anytime, without giving any reason,  
without my medical care being affected. 
 
I understand that sections of my medical notes may be looked at  
by the researcher where it is relevant to my taking part in the research.   
I give permission for the researcher to have access to my records. 
 
I give permission for an information sheet to be put into my medical  
notes, or to be sent to my doctor. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above project. 
 
 
 
            
Name of participant   Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of researcher   Date    Signature 
 
1 copy for participant, 1 for researcher, 1 to be kept with medical notes. 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Study: Project investigating perceptual abilities and reaction time in people with 
and without eating disorders  
Please tick the box if you agree 
 
 
I confirm that I have read the information sheet for the 
 above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I am 
 free to withdraw at anytime, without giving any reason. 
 
I understand that my taking part will be confidential and 
I will not be personally identifiable in the research 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above project. 
 
 
 
            
Name of participant   Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of researcher   Date    Signature 
 
1 copy for participant, 1 for researcher. 
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Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield 
Hertfordshire 
AL10 9AB 
 
Te: 01707 286322 
email: diana.carmen@HPT.nhs.uk 
 
Dear Dr.................... 
 
Re (participants name & date of birth) 
 
Study: Cognitive processing of disorder-relevant and self esteem threat information 
in female eating disorder patients: the role of attentional bias and cognitive 
avoidance  
 
The above named patient has consented to take part in a study investigating cognitive 
processes in people with eating disorders.  Please find enclosed a copy of the participant 
information sheet detailing the study for your records. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this research study, or if you would like a 
copy of the report when available, please contact Diana Carmen, Chief Investigator for 
the study, at the address above.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Diana Carmen 
Chief Investigator for the research 
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Debrief Statement (all participants) 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  Sometimes when psychologists do research it is 
not always possible to tell you ahead of time specifically what we are looking at.  This is 
because when we want to test certain thinking abilities that are more automatic, we can‟t 
tell you exactly what they are because that would draw your awareness to them and we 
would no longer be able to test the abilities. 
 
You were told that this study was about perceptual ability and reaction time in eating 
disorders.  The computer tests were specifically looking at how you responded to 
different types of words: food, body and negative self esteem words compared to neutral 
words.   
 
When you were completing the first task on the computer, it was measuring how much 
you were distracted by particular words, not how good you were at naming the colour 
quickly.  The computer recorded how long it took you to respond to each different type of 
word.  Research tells us that people with eating disorders tend to take longer to respond to 
food and body size words and your scores will help to show if that is true or not. 
 
When you were solving the anagrams, the computer was recording how long it too you to 
solve each different type of word.  One of the questions this study is hoping to answer is 
whether people with eating disorders avoid words related to food, body and self esteem 
more than other words.  One of the ways we can test this is by measuring the time it took 
you for each type of word. 
 
Your scores will be put into a group with those of other people with eating disorders 
taking part in the research and will be compared to a group of people without an eating 
disorder. 
 
The other aspects of the study are as stated in the information sheet. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
If you would like individual feedback on your performance, I am happy to provide this 
for you at a later date. 
 
Thank you once again for taking part in this study. 
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*Clinical Group 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following questions are about your eating.  Please circle the answer that applies best to you: 
 Do you ever fast for a whole day?  Yes  No 
 
 If yes, how often is this?  Have once  now and then 
 
once a week 2-3 times a week 
 
every second day every day 
 
 
 Do you ever binge on large amounts of food?  Yes  No 
 
 If you do binge, how often is this?: Hardly ever  once a month 
 
once a week  2-3 times a week 
 
daily  2-3 times a day 
 
Date of Birth: Current Height: Current weight: 
Current Occupation: 
Highest qualification (e.g. GCSE, HND etc) 
What age did you first have problems with your eating? 
Marital Status: 
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Do you do any of the following to help you lose weight? (please tick):  
 
 Never Occasionally 1 per week 2-3 times a 
week 
Daily 2-3 times a 
day 
5 or more 
times per 
day 
Exercise        
Take diet pills        
Take diuretics 
(water pills) 
       
Take laxatives        
Make yourself 
vomit 
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*Control Group 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Birth: Current Height: Current weight: 
Current Occupation: 
Highest qualification (e.g. GCSE, HND etc) 
When were you last on a diet (if ever)? 
Marital Status: 
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EDI 3 
 
Please circle your answer on the scale below.  The items ask about your attitudes, feelings and behaviours to food or eating. 
 
For each item, decide if the item is true about you ALWAYS (A), USUALLY (U), OFTEN (O), SOMETIMES (S), RARELY (R) or 
NEVER (N).  Circle the letter that corresponds to your rating on the scale below. For example, if your rating for an item is OFTEN, you 
would circle the “O” for that item. 
 
Respond to all of the items, making sure that you circle the letter for the rating that is true about you.  If you need to change an answer, 
mark an „X through the incorrect letter, and then circle the correct one. 
 
A = ALWAYS U = USUALLY  O = OFTEN   S = SOMETIMES  R = RARELY   N = NEVER 
                  
 
I eat sweets and carbohydrates without feeling nervous     A U O S R N 
I think that my stomach is too big.       A U O S R N 
I eat when I am upset         A U O S R N 
I stuff myself with food         A U O S R N 
I think about dieting.         A U O S R N 
I think that my thighs are too large.       A U O S R N 
I feel extremely guilty after overeating.       A U O S R N 
I think that my stomach is just the right size.      A U O S R N 
I am terrified of gaining weight        A U O S R N 
I feel satisfied with the shape of my body.      A U O S R N 
I exaggerate or magnify the importance of weight     A U O S R N 
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A = ALWAYS U = USUALLY  O = OFTEN   S = SOMETIMES  R = RARELY   N = NEVER 
                  
I have gone on eating binges where I felt that I could not stop.    A U O S R N 
I like the shape of my buttocks.        A U O S R N 
I am preoccupied with a desire to be thinner      A U O S R N 
I think about bingeing (overeating)       A U O S R N 
I think my hips are too big.        A U O S R N  
I eat moderately in front of others and stuff myself when they are gone.   A U O S R N 
I feel bloated after eating a normal meal.       A U O S R N 
If I gain a pound, I worry that I will keep on gaining     A U O S R N 
I have the thought of trying to vomit in order to lose weight.    A U O S R N 
I think that my thighs are just the right size.      A U O S R N 
I think that my buttocks are too large.       A U O S R N 
I eat or drink in secrecy         A U O S R N 
I think that my hips are just the right size.      A U O S R N 
When I am upset, I worry that I will start eating      A U O S R N 
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Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) 
 
Most people experience unpleasant and/or unwanted thoughts (in verbal and/or picture form), which can be difficult to control. We are interested in the 
techniques that you generally use to control such thoughts. Below are a number of things that people do to control these thoughts. Please read each 
statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by circling the appropriate number. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time thinking about each one. 
 
When I experience an unpleasant / unwanted thought: 
NEVER  SOMETIMES  OFTEN  ALMOST ALWAYS 
1. I call to mind positive images instead  1   2  3   4 
 
2. I tell myself not to be so stupid   1   2  3   4 
 
3. I focus on the thought    1    2   3    4 
 
4. I replace the thought with a more   1   2  3   4 
    trivial bad thought 
 
5. I don‟t talk about the thought to anyone  1   2  3   4 
 
6. I punish myself for thinking the thought  1   2  3   4 
 
7. I dwell on other worries    1   2  3   4 
 
8. I keep the thought to myself   1   2  3   4 
 
9. I occupy myself with work instead   1   2  3   4 
 
10. I challenge the thought‟s validity  1   2  3   4 
 
11. I get angry at myself for having the thought 1   2  3   4 
 
12. I avoid discussing the thought   1   2   3  4 
 
13. I shout at myself for having the thought  1   2   3  4 
 
14. I analyse the thought rationally   1   2   3  4 
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NEVER  SOMETIMES  OFTEN  ALMOST ALWAYS 
15. I slap or pinch myself to stop   1   2   3  4 
      the thought 
 
16. I think pleasant thoughts instead  1   2   3  4 
 
17. I find out how my friends deal    1   2   3  4 
      with these thoughts 
 
18. I worry about more minor things instead   1   2   3  4 
 
19. I do something that I enjoy   1   2   3  4 
 
20. I try to reinterpret the thought   1   2   3  4 
 
21. I think about something else   1   2   3  4 
 
22. I think more about the more   1   2   3  4 
      minor problems I have 
 
23. I try a different way of thinking about it   1   2   3  4 
 
24. I think about past worries instead  1   2   3  4 
 
25. I ask my friends if they have similar thoughts 1   2   3  4 
 
26. I focus on different negative thoughts  1   2   3  4 
 
27. I question the reasons for having the thought 1   2   3  4 
 
28. I tell myself that something bad will   1   2   3  4 
      happen if I think the thought 
 
29. I talk to a friend about the thought  1   2   3  4 
 
30. I keep myself busy    1   2   3   4 
Please check that you have answered all of the questions in the questionnaire pack. Thank you. 
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Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI) (Wells, 1994) 
 
Instructions: A number of statements which people have used to describe their thoughts and worries are given below.  Read each statement and 
put a circle around the most appropriate number to indicate how often you have these thoughts and worries. 
 
Do not spend too much time on each statement. There are no right or wrong answers and the first response to each item is often the most 
accurate. 
ALMOST  SOMETIMES  OFTEN   ALMOST 
 NEVER         ALWAYS 
 
1. I worry about my appearance  1   2   3   4 
 
2. I think I am a failure   1   2   3   4 
 
3. When looking to my future I give 1   2   3   4 
more thought to the negative things than  
the positive things that might  happen to me 
 
4. If I experience unexpected physical 1   2   3   4 
symptoms I have a tendency to think the worst possible thing is wrong with me 
 
5. I have thoughts about becoming  1   2   3   4 
seriously ill 
 
6. I have difficulty clearing my mind 1   2   3   4 
of repetitive thoughts. 
 
7. I worry about having a heart attack. 1   2   3   4 
or cancer. 
 
8. I worry about saying or doing the 1   2   3   4 
wrong things when among strangers. 
 
9. I worry about my abilities not living 1   2   3   4 
up to other people‟s expectations. 
10. I worry about my physical health. 1   2   3   4 
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ALMOST  SOMETIMES  OFTEN  ALMOST 
NEVER        ALWAYS 
11. I worry that I cannot control my 1   2   3   4 
thoughts as well as I would like to. 
 
12. I worry that people don‟t like me. 1   2   3   4 
 
13. I take disappointments so keenly 1   2   3   4 
that I can‟t put them out of my mind. 
 
14. I get embarrassed easily.  1   2   3   4 
 
15. When I suffer from minor illnesses 1   2   3   4 
such as a rash I think it is more serious than it really is. 
 
16. Unpleasant thoughts enter my head  1   2   3   4 
against my will. 
 
17. I worry about my failures and my 1   2   3   4 
weaknesses. 
 
18. I worry about not being able to cope  1   2   3   4 
in life as adequately as others seem to. 
 
19. I worry about death.   1   2   3   4 
 
20. I worry about making a fool of myself. 1   2   3   4 
 
21. I think I am missing out on things in  1   2   3   4 
life because I worry too much. 
 
22. I have repetitive thoughts such as  1   2   3   4 
counting or repeating phrases. 
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The Acceptance & Action Questionnaire (AAQ) (Hayes et al. 2004) 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how much each statement applies to you.  
Use the following scale to make your choice. 
Never  
true 
very seldom  
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always  
true 
always  
true 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
1. I‟m able to take action on a problem, even when I fear I may get it wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. When I feel depressed or anxious, I‟m unable to take care of   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
my responsibilities 
 
3. I try to suppress thoughts and feelings I don‟t like     1  2  3  4 5 6 7 
by just not thinking about them. 
 
4. I rarely worry about getting my anxieties, worries and feelings   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
under control. 
 
5. In order for me to do something important, I have to     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have all my doubts worked out. 
 
6. I‟m not afraid of my feelings.       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. If I could magically remove all painful experiences I‟ve had.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 in my life, I would do so. 
 
8. It‟s OK to feel depressed or anxious      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. It is unnecessary for me to learn to control my feelings   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 in order to handle my life well. 
 
10. I try hard to avoid feeling depressed or anxious.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11. I take action on a problem, even when I fear I may get it wrong.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
12. I am in control of my life.       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
13. When I compare myself to other people, it seems that most of them  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 are handling their live better than I do. 
 
14. A person who is really “together” should not struggle with things  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 the way I do. 
 
15. There are not many activities that I stop doing when I am depressed  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 or anxious. 
 
16. Anxiety is bad.        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Never  
true 
very seldom  
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always  
true 
always  
true 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
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On screen Instructions for Stroop:  
 
You will be asked to complete 3 tasks. 
The first perceptual task is a colour naming experiment.  When the task starts, some 
everyday words will appear on the screen in different colours.  Your task is to identify the 
colour of the word as quickly as you can. 
You are to press the key on the keyboard the matches the colour that the word on the 
screen is written in. 
Do not make any mistakes.  
You will be timed for the task. 
 
Stroop Stimuli 
 
Food  Food ctrl Body  Body ctrl Threat   Threat ctrl 
 
butter  button  waist  wheel  failure  filing 
pastry  penny  large  lemur  worthless wrapping 
diet  draw  stomach survey  helpless heron 
crisps  crane  hips  hare  deprived design 
cookie  cushion  figure  feather  jeered  jackdaw 
meal  mail  massive money  isolated  industry 
dinner  donkey  thin  tilt  rejected  reindeer 
chips  chain  huge  hawk  mocked  modem 
chocolate committee fat  far  horrible  hornet 
potato  piano  round  rabbit  lonely  ladder 
toast  toad  thighs  tools  inferior  iguana 
snack  socks  monstrous mongoose bad  bike 
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On screen Instructions for Digits Forward: 
 
The next task involves repeating some numbers. 
In a moment some numbers will appear briefly on the screen.   
When the numbers disappear you are to type in the numbers you have seen in the exact 
order in which they were presented onscreen.   
Try not to make any mistakes. 
You will be timed for this task.  
 
1 – 7 
6 – 3 
5 – 8 – 2 
6 – 9 – 4 
6 – 4 – 3 – 9 
7 – 2 – 8 – 6 
4 – 2 – 7 – 3 – 1 
7 – 5 – 8 – 3 – 6 
6 – 1 – 9 – 4 – 7 – 3 
5 – 9 – 2 – 6 – 1 - 7 
 
On screen Instructions for Digits Backward: 
 
In a moment some more numbers will appear briefly on the screen.   
This time, when the numbers disappear you are to type in the numbers you have seen in 
the reverse order in which they were presented onscreen.  i.e type them backwards 
Try not to make any mistakes. 
You will be timed for this task.  
 
2 – 4 
5 – 7 
6 – 2 – 9 
4 – 1 – 5 
3 – 2 – 7 – 9 
4 – 9 – 6 – 8 
1 – 5 – 2 – 8 – 6 
6 – 1 – 8 – 4 – 3 
5 – 3 – 9 – 4 – 1 – 8 
7 – 2 – 4 – 8 – 5 – 6 
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On screen Instructions - Anagram Task 
 
Your next task is to solve some anagrams.  Anagrams are jumbled up letters that make a 
word.  
Work as quickly as you can to solve the anagrams.  Do not make any mistakes.  Type 
your answer below the jumbled letters.   
When have solved the anagram, press the return key and the next anagram will appear. 
 
Anagram Stimuli 
 
FOOD   BODY    THREAT   CNTRL 
 
NUTS (TUSN) HEAVY (AHYEV)  FAIL (LFIA)  CALF (LACF) 
 
BREAD (ABDER) BIG (BGI)   INSULT (TULSNI) HIRE (REIH) 
 
CREAM (RMEAC) WEIGHT (ETWIGH)  DRAB(RADB)   WATCH(TWCAH) 
 
CAKE (EAKC) CURVY (RVCYU)  DULL(LUDL)     HEDGE (EHEGD) 
 
CHEESE (ESEHCE) HUGE (GUEH)  UGLY (GLUY)  PENCIL (CENPLI) 
 
SUGAR (GARUS) SHAPE (PASEH)  ALONE (NELOA) BIT (ITB) 
 
PICNIC (NCPICI) BULKY (KLYUB)  DUMB(BUDM)     DATA(TADA) 
 
MILK (KMIL) BODY (DBYO)  EMPTY(TEMYP) EAGLE 
(LEEGA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix P 
270 
 
271 
 
272 
 
273 
 
274 
 
275 
 
276 
Distributions of scores on the clinical measures between groups. 
 
Eating Disorders Inventory-3 
 
Box plots displaying the mean raw scores for the three eating disorder pathology subscales: DT, B and BD 
for the control & clinical ED groups. 
 
Body DissatisfactionBulimiaDrive for thinness
40
20
0
18
28
19
3
Eating Disorder Inventory 3 raw scores for Control group
EDI 3 Subscale
 
 
 
EDI_BDBulimiaDrive for thinness
40
20
0
Eating Disorder Inventory 3 raw scores for Clinical ED group
EDI 3 Subscale
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Thought Control Questionnaire: TCQ 
 
Box plot displaying the mean scores for TCQ total, Distraction, Punishment, Re-appraisal, Worry & Social 
Control Subscales for both groups 
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Anxious Thoughts Inventory: AnTI 
 
Box plot displaying the mean scores for AnTI total, Social Worry, Health Worry & Meta Worry subscales for 
both groups 
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Acceptance & Action Questionnaire: AAQ 
 
Box plot displaying the mean scores for the AAQ total score for both groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical GroupControl Group
GROUP
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
T
o
ta
l 
A
A
Q
 s
c
o
re
 
280 
Preparatory analysis in relation to the modified Stroop task. 
 
If a participant named the wrong colour by key stroke, miss hit a key, or made no response an error 
was recorded.  The frequency of participants making one or more error responses on the Stroop 
task accounted for 47.4% of the data.  As this appeared to be a moderate percentage of error 
overall, it was important to understand the effect of the error rate on the task data.   
Analysis of the error responses was then performed to determine: 
 
1) the error rate per individual Stroop stimulus 
2) the error rate per participant 
 
1) Frequency of errors per Stroop stimulus 
The error rate data was examined to detect any individual Stroop stimuli with an unusually high 
error rate.  The number of errors for each variable were initially examined. The bar charts below 
graphically illustrate the percentage of errors per variable that participants made in the clinical and 
control groups.   
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Bar graphs to show % error per Stroop Stimulus for each group 
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The percentage of error per Stroop stimulus was checked in the control group and no Stroop item 
exceeded 6% error.  For the clinical group no Stroop item exceeded an error rate of 14%.  The next 
step in the analysis or error on the Stroop was to check whether making an error on an item had a 
negative impact on the response times (i.e. resulted in longer latencies).  The error bar below 
clearly indicates that, contrary to expectation, within 95% confidence limits participants who made 
errors were somewhat quicker in their response times.  However, a t-test comparing the mean 
latencies for Stroop items where an error occurred with those items where no error occurred 
indicated that participants making errors were not significantly faster on Stroop item responses than 
those not making errors (t=1.45, df = 53, p = .15). 
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This exploration of the data indicated that no one Stroop item exceeded an error rate of 15% and 
that an error response on a Stroop item did not result in a slower reaction time.  For this reason, 
there appeared to be no reason to exclude any Stroop item on the basis of error in subsequent 
analyses.   
 
2) Frequency of errors per participant. 
 
The frequency data for the number of errors per participant is shown in the table below.  This 
indicates that 52.9% of cases made no errors in the control group and 52.2% of the clinical ED 
cases made no errors.  A bar chart indicating the casewise error response rate for the control and 
clinical ED groups is also shown below.  It would appear from this bar chart that the control group 
made less number of errors than the clinical ED group on individual Stroop items.  The clinical ED 
group appeared to make more percentage of errors on particular Stroop items (i.e. variable 159; 
see box plots).  However a chi square analysis performed on the two groups revealed no significant 
differences between the clinical ED group and the control group in terms of error on the Stroop (χ² 
Fishers Exact Test (df = 1, n=57) = 2.7, NS). 
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Table to show frequency data for error responses on the Stroop task for participants in the control 
and clinical ED group 
 
GROUP 
 Number of 
errors per 
participant Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Control Valid .00 18 52.9 52.9 52.9 
1.00 7 20.6 20.6 73.5 
2.00 5 14.7 14.7 88.2 
3.00 3 8.8 8.8 97.1 
4.00 1 2.9 2.9 100.0 
ED Valid .00 12 52.2 52.2 52.2 
1.00 7 30.4 30.4 82.6 
2.00 1 4.3 4.3 87.0 
3.00 3 13.0 13.0 100.0 
4.003.002.001.00.00
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Bar chart displaying the % error for the Stroop responses for participants in the control and clinical ED 
group. 
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Analysis showing correlations between categories of Stroop stimuli 
 
GROUP   Body Mean Food Mean 
Self 
Esteem 
Mean 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Self Esteem 
Neutral Mean 
Control 
Group 
 
(N=33) 
Body Mean Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .872 .844 .887 .846 .840 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Food Mean Pearson 
Correlation 
.872 1 .862 .894 .908 .859 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000   .000 .000 .000 .000 
Self Esteem 
Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.844 .862 1 .797 .889 .838 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.887 .894 .797 1 .855 .797 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000   .000 .000 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.846 .908 .889 .855 1 .837 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000   .000 
Self Esteem 
Neutral Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.840 .859 .838 .797 .837 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
Clinical 
Group 
 
(N=22) 
Body Mean Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .827 .907 .865 .890 .805 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Food Mean Pearson 
Correlation 
.827 1 .782 .838 .912 .910 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000   .000 .000 .000 .000 
SE Mean Pearson 
Correlation 
.907 .782 1 .844 .864 .825 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.865 .838 .844 1 .886 .846 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000   .000 .000 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.890 .912 .864 .886 1 .844 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000   .000 
Self Esteem  
Neutral Mean 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.805 .910 .825 .846 .844 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
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Preparatory analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the correlations between the 
threat and neutral categories of words.  This was carried out to investigate both the strength of the 
relationship between the categories and also as a check on the equivalent degree of difficulty 
between the stimuli categories.  The results are shown in the table above and indicate the all 
categories of Stroop stimuli were significantly correlated. 
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Preparatory analysis in relation to the anagram solution task. 
 
If a participant produced a miss-spelt word, produced an incorrect word, made no response or 
produced one of the few alternative solutions to some of the anagrams, an error was recorded.   
 
Analysis of the error responses on the anagram solution task was then performed to determine: 
 
1) the error rate per individual anagram word 
2) the anagram error rate per participant 
 
3) Frequency of errors per anagram word 
 
The error rate data was examined to detect any individual anagram word with an unusually high 
error rate.  The number of errors for each anagram were initially examined.  These figures indicated 
that the clinical group made less errors overall (34.8% made no error) than the control group (5.9% 
made no error) on individual anagram items.   
The bar charts displayed below graphically illustrate the percentage of errors per anagram that 
participants made in the clinical ED and control groups.  It was clear from these charts that one 
anagram (v 120 „insult‟) produced a high degree of error in both groups (67.6% control group and 
52.4% clinical ED group).  This anagram was subsequently discarded and excluded from the 
analysis.  It also appeared that the control group made a greater degree of errors than the clinical 
group and made them across a greater number of anagrams.   
 
The percentage of error per anagram exceeded 30% for some words in the control group, however 
no individual anagram exceeded 30% in the clinical group.  For this reason it was not feasible to 
exclude any anagram where the error was over 30% as the differences between the two groups 
was marked (i.e. on variable 209 see bar charts).   
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Bar graphs to show % error per anagram stimulus for each group 
 
 
 
288 
 
Frequencies of anagram solution error per participant 
 
A bar chart indicating the casewise error response rate on the anagram task for the control and 
clinical ED groups is shown below.  Higher error rates appeared to have been generated 
exclusively by controls. 
 
Bar chart displaying the overall error (%) for the anagram task for the comparison and clinical ED 
group. 
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There was no indication to remove any case on the basis of an unreasonably high error rate.  The 
previous research using the anagram solution task as a measure of cognitive avoidance gave no 
indication of how to manage error with the anagram data (Waller & Meyer 1997; Meyer et al 2005).  
Therefore it was decided to exclude all individual anagram errors case wise.  Additionally any 
solution times in excess of 50 seconds or greater than 3 SDs from the 75th percentile were 
excluded (see box plots below).  
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Box plots showing individual anagram solution times for each group 
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Non-parametric correlational analysis was performed to determine whether there were associations 
between making an error and anagram solution times, depending on the semantic category of word 
(i.e. food, body, self-esteem threat and neutral anagrams) between the control and clinical ED 
groups.  The findings are displayed in the table below and show that within the control group, there 
was a significant association between the amount of error and the food anagram solution times. 
 
GROUP   BODY_MED FOOD_MED SE_MED NEUT_MED 
Control 
(N=34) 
Spearman's 
rho 
error for 
anagram 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.070 .459(**) .283 .176 
Sig. (2-tailed) .696 .006 .105 .319 
ED 
(N=23) 
Spearman's 
rho 
error for 
anagram 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.187 .275 .260 .367 
Sig. (2-tailed) .393 .204 .230 .085 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Analysis was performed to determine whether there were differences in the amount of error, 
depending on the semantic category of word (i.e. food, body, self-esteem and control) between the 
comparison and clinical ED groups.  This indicated a significant difference between the number of 
errors and the semantic category of the word for the comparison group (χ² (3, n=34) = 30.5, 
p=.>001) and the clinical group (χ² (3, n=23) = 29.7, p=.>001).  The bar chart displayed below 
illustrates the differences in the percentage error count on each semantic category of anagram for 
the ED clinical group and the comparison group.  Generally, self esteem anagrams produced 
greater error. 
EDControl
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Following removal of each individual respondent‟s error on an anagram, box plots were re-
produced to check the distribution of anagram solution times for those anagrams correctly solved 
(see below).  These box plots clearly indicate abnormalities in the distribution of the data and thus a 
more robust measure of central tendency, the median was decided upon to compute subsequent 
analyses for the anagram tasks.  Non-parametric tests would be used due to abnormalities in the 
distribution of the data. 
 
Box plots displaying the distribution of anagram solution times for those stimuli correctly solved in 
the control and clinical groups 
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Analysis showing correlations between categories of anagram stimuli 
 
Preliminary analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the correlations between the threat 
and neutral anagram categories.  This enabled inferences to be made with regard to the degree of 
difficulty between the anagram categories.  The results, indicating significant correlations between 
each category are shown in the table below. 
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GROUP  Body Mean Food Mean 
Self 
esteem 
Mean 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Self 
esteem 
Neutral 
Control 
 
(N=33) 
Spearman's rho Body Mean Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .874(**) .818(**) .904(**) .861(**) .800(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Food Mean Correlation Coefficient .874(**) 1.000 .834(**) .864(**) .860(**) .837(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 
Self Esteem 
Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .818(**) .834(**) 1.000 .762(**) .859(**) .830(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .904(**) .864(**) .762(**) 1.000 .857(**) .766(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .861(**) .860(**) .859(**) .857(**) 1.000 .828(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 
Self Esteem 
Neutral Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .800(**) .837(**) .830(**) .766(**) .828(**) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
ED 
 
(N=22) 
Spearman's rho Body Mean Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .779(**) .938(**) .836(**) .818(**) .774(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Food Mean Correlation Coefficient .779(**) 1.000 .694(**) .802(**) .892(**) .841(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 
SE Mean Correlation Coefficient .938(**) .694(**) 1.000 .817(**) .768(**) .783(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
Body Neutral 
Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .836(**) .802(**) .817(**) 1.000 .869(**) .775(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
Food Neutral 
Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .818(**) .892(**) .768(**) .869(**) 1.000 .728(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 
Self Esteem 
Neutral Mean 
Correlation Coefficient .774(**) .841(**) .783(**) .775(**) .728(**) 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective:  To examine the relationship between eating disorders and cognitive avoidance 
using a strategic processing task. 
 
Method:  23 women with eating disorders and 34 controls completed a strategic processing 
anagram solution task of disorder relevant, threat and neutral anagrams.  All participants completed 
measures of eating disorder pathology and cognitive coping style.   
 
Results:  There was some indication that women with eating disorders showed cognitive 
avoidance of food and self esteem related threats relative to neutral anagrams.  Differences 
between the clinical and control groups were inconclusive.   
 
Conclusion:  The findings are discussed in the context of the previous research.  It is proposed 
that future research should use paradigms which differentiate between attentional bias and 
cognitive avoidance. 
 
Keywords: eating disorders, cognitive avoidance, disorder relevant, self esteem threats, 
cognitive processing. 
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Introduction 
 
Research has suggested that people demonstrating eating pathology process disorder relevant 
information in two key ways.  First, there is an automatic process involving attentional bias to the 
information (i.e. stimuli relating to body shape, food and weight).  This has been found relatively 
consistently in eating disorder patients (1-6).  Secondly, there is some evidence that patients with 
eating disorders might also attempt to divert their attention away from this information, particularly if 
it is construed as threatening (i.e. a threat to self esteem such as „failure‟; 7-9).  This is framed as a 
defensive process of cognitive avoidance, as patients are unable to sustain their attention on the 
threat due to the negative thoughts and affect that may arise (10-13). However, there is very little 
evidence demonstrating the presence of cognitive avoidance in eating disordered patients.   
 
Theoretical models such as the “escape from self awareness” conceptualisation of binge eating 
(14-15) and the “blocking” model (16-17) offer accounts of eating disorder psychopathology as an 
avoidant mechanism.  Both models suggest that eating behaviours are motivated attempts to 
reduce short term awareness of difficult emotions and cognitions that the individual finds 
intolerable.  In those with binge eating, through seeking to escape a negative self focus the 
individual may narrow the focus of their attention to very present and immediate behaviour such as 
eating (14-15).  Forms of avoidant coping might also serve to suppress experience such as thought 
suppression (18-20), dissociation (21), and processes such as worry and rumination (22-26).  
Processes of cognitive avoidance could be reasonably encompassed by the ACT concept of 
experiential avoidance (27-28) which comprises forms of avoidance such as attempts to escape 
stressful experiences (i.e. avoidant coping), attempts to become separate from aversive events and 
accompanying emotions (e.g. detached coping), or to inhibit the expression of emotions (e.g. 
emotional suppression).  Experiential avoidance, together with ineffective cognitive-behavioural 
emotional control strategies (e.g. dietary restriction in ED) have been implicated in the aetiology 
and maintenance of eating pathology (29-30).  
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The research evidence exploring cognitive avoidance to date has used various cognitive 
processing paradigms with non-clinical populations displaying some eating pathology (1; 9-10).  
These studies have found evidence of cognitive avoidance in women with bulimic attitudes.  A key 
study employed an anagram solution task to measure cognitive avoidance within a clinical eating 
disordered population (11).  As a strategic processing task, this involved active engagement with 
threatening stimulus words (e.g. single-word anagrams for food such as „cake‟), self esteem threat 
(e.g. „fail‟) and neutral words which the participant was required to solve under timed conditions.  
Longer solution times for threat words in comparison to neutral words were indicative of the 
individual seeking to avoid engagement with the threat word.   
 
The study by Meyer et al (11) found evidence that bulimic individuals took longer to process the self 
esteem threat anagrams than controls.  There were no differences in anagram solution time 
observed for the food related words.  This study lends some support to a proposition within the 
“escape” model 14 that for bulimic individuals, ego or self esteem threats might be more relevant in 
the development of eating psychopathology than the more disorder specific threats related to 
symptoms.  To date, no conclusive evidence has been found in relation to cognitive avoidance in a 
restrictive anorexic group.  One might expect this to function differently, as those with restrictive 
eating do not use binge-eating to shift the focus of their attention. 
 
It is clear that there is little empirical evidence available investigating cognitive avoidance with a 
clinical eating disorder sample.  In general, the evidence base for the presence of cognitive 
avoidance in eating disorders is at an early stage.  There is scope for refinement and development 
of the paradigms.  The process of cognitive avoidance should be explored within eating disorders 
other than bulimia to examine if it is a process which can be found across eating pathology.  There 
are some limitations to anagram paradigm as it has been used, such as matching anagram words 
appropriately for difficulty, for length of word and for emotional valence.  The previous research has 
also been limited in the stimuli it has focused upon, employing only two semantic classes of stimuli 
(e.g. food and threat). 
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The overall goal of the present research was to establish whether patients with eating disorders 
show cognitive avoidance for eating, shape/weight and self esteem threat stimuli and if so whether 
this process is specific to patients with eating disorders.  This study attempted to explore the role of 
cognitive avoidance in eating disordered behaviour by targeting a clinical population across eating 
disorder diagnoses.  By using a computerised modification of the anagram solution task used in 
previous research, the current study aimed to provide support for but also advance this paradigm 
by addressing some of the limitations.  This study also attempted to explore experiential avoidance 
in eating disorders, as this has close links with cognitive avoidance.  The study was approved by 
the local research ethics committee.  It was hypothesised that: 
 
1) cognitive avoidance for food, body and self esteem threat stimuli will (a) be present in 
patients with and eating disorder and (b) be stronger in patients with eating disorders than 
controls 
2) that eating disordered behaviour (i.e. bulimic or anorexic behaviour) will have a moderating 
effect on cognitive avoidance 
3) that there will be a relationship between experiential avoidance and cognitive avoidance in 
eating disorder patients. 
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Method 
 
Participants: The clinical participant group were recruited from a community eating disorders 
service (n=23).  They were all female, aged over 16 and had a body mass index (BMI) of not less 
than 13 and not greater than 27.  To test hypothesis 2, the clinical group were split by diagnosis 
together with their scores on the Eating Disorders Inventory-3 (EDI-3).  This resulted in two groups 
of patients; those who used binge-purge behaviours (n=15) and those who were restrictive (n=8).   
The control group were recruited from a university sample.  All were female, aged over 16, were 
within a normal weight range (BMI 20-25), were not currently dieting or displaying problematic 
eating behaviour outside of normal limits (as measured by 3 subscales of the EDI-3).  All 
participants were required to have computer keyboard and mouse skills.  Those participants with 
dyslexia were excluded from the study. 
 
Materials:  
Stimuli: Threat stimuli were drawn from a pool of those previously reported in the cognitive 
avoidance research and from words used in prior studies of attentional bias.  Neutral anagrams 
were generated for this study from 3 semantic categories (i.e. animals, household and office 
objects).  Criteria were employed to match words for length and frequency of use in the English 
language, consistent with previous research.  Participants were asked to complete 32 single-word 
anagrams consisting of words up to a maximum of 6 letters.  Anagrams consisted of food, body, 
self esteem threat and neutral words, with 8 words in each category.  Anagrams were randomised 
across the semantic categories and presented to all participants in the same order.   
 
Apparatus: The stimuli were presented on a 15” Sony Vaio FX101 laptop.  A software programme 
designed for the study presented the stimuli and recorded response latencies.  Participants 
received task instructions on the screen prior to beginning the task.  These were also written out for 
them. They were instructed to work as quickly as possible, to try not to make any mistakes and that 
they would be timed for the task.  Participants completed a short practise trial prior to beginning the 
task.   
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Measures: All participants completed all measures. 
The Eating Disorder Inventory 3 RF (EDI-3; Garner, 2004 31):  The EDI-3 is a widely utilised self-
report measure of eating disorder symptoms.  The three primary subscales of the EDI-3 were used; 
the Drive for Thinness (DT), Bulimia (B) and Body Dissatisfaction (BD) scales.  This consists of 25 
items scored on a 0-4 scale.  The EDI-3 has been shown to have good internal consistency (r=.90-
.97), content and criterion-based and construct validity (α=.80) with good test-retest reliability 
(r=.98).  It has norms available for anorexia (Restricting and Binge-Eating/Purging type), bulimia 
and eating disorder NOS individuals.  Mean raw scores are available for non-clinical samples.   
 
Acceptance & Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al, 2004 32): The AAQ is a measure of 
experiential avoidance.  The 16 item version was used, which is undergoing validation.  The 
psychometric properties of this scale have been established in clinical and non-clinical samples.  
The AAQ has reasonable internal consistency; Cronbach‟s α of .70 and on comparison with the 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (a measure of avoidant coping 33) showed convergent validity of 
r =0.44−0.50.  Each item is scored from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true) with half of the items 
reversed scored.  For the purposes of this study, higher scores indicated greater experiential 
avoidance.   
 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994 34): The TCQ is a well utilised and 
researched measure of thought control strategies believed to have a link to psychopathology.  It 
consists of 30 items that can be summed to give a total score and comprises 5 subscales of 
Distraction, Punishment, Re-appraisal, Social control and Worry.  The subscales have been shown 
to have moderate to strong internal consistency (Chronbach α of .64 - .79 for the subscales) and 
have good test re-test reliability (r=.68-.83).  The subscales of interest were Punishment and Worry 
as it has been indicated that a tendency to use these strategies to control unwanted thoughts has 
significant associations with emotional disorder and psychological disturbance 35.   
 
Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994 36): The AnTI has been widely used in clinical 
research and is a measure of the content and process of anxious thoughts.  It comprises 22 items 
which can be summed to give a total score that comprises 3 subscales; Social worry, Health worry 
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and Meta-worry.  The subscales have good internal consistency (Chronbach α of 0.84, 0.81 and 
0.75 respectively).  This measure is particularly useful in assessing the content of pathological 
worry and difficulties in the regulation of thought.   
 
Statistical analyses: 
Data analysis was based on anagram solution time (in seconds) for correct responses.  One 
anagram produced a high degree of error in both groups (67.6% for controls and 52.4% for the 
clinical group) and was automatically excluded from the analysis.  There was a significant 
difference between the amount of error for the control group (5.9% made no error) and the clinical 
ED group (34.8% made no error) on individual anagram items (z=3.51, p = .001).  Due to the 
variation in the percentage of error per anagram between the groups, it was not appropriate to 
exclude any individual anagram on the basis of a percentage error rate.  As it was unclear how to 
manage error within the anagram data based on previous research 10-11, all individual anagram 
errors were excluded case wise.  Additionally any solution times in excess of 50 seconds or greater 
than 3 standard deviations from the 75th percentile were excluded.  Due to abnormalities in the 
distribution of the data, the median statistic was used in the analysis of the anagram task. 
 
To answer the key experimental hypotheses relating to cognitive avoidance, a series of planned 
comparisons within and between groups were conducted and planned to be tested 1-tailed.  To 
investigate the hypothesis relating to experiential avoidance and cognitive avoidance, correlational 
analyses were used.   
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Results 
 
Demographic and group characteristics: 
The demographic and group characteristics are shown in Table 1.  As expected there were 
significant group differences between BMI, the EDI-3, AnTI, TCQ and AAQ.   
 
Table 1: Age, BMI, eating disorder psychopathology, anxious thoughts, thought control 
strategies and experiential avoidance scores (and SD) by group 
 
 Clinical ED Group 
 
N=23 
Control group 
 
N=34 
Group differences 
Mean age 28.60 (8.60) 22.15 (4.73) t=3.65 (53) p = .001 
Mean BMI 18.00 (2.70) 21.66 (2.44) t=5.44 (53), p = .001 
EDI-3 DT 24.00 (5.60) 4.60 (5.03) z=13.60 (53), p=.001 
EDI-3 B 13.40 (10.50) 2.30 (3.33) z=5.70, (53), p=.001 
EDI-3 BD 33.60 (7.73) 12.40 (8.70) z=9.40 (53), p=.001 
TCQ Punishment 13.52 (4.03) 9.90 (2.50) z=3.60 (53), p=.001 
TCQ Worry 13.00 (3.10) 9.80 (3.04) z=4.00 (53), p=.001 
AnTI Total 56.00 (12.00) 40.5 (11.30) z=4.30 (53), p=.001 
AAQ Total 67.1 (12.0) 51.2 (9.4) z=5.90 (53), p=.001 
 
Hypothesis 1: cognitive avoidance for food, body and self esteem threat stimuli will (a) be present in 
patients with and eating disorder in comparison to neutral stimuli and (b) be stronger in patients 
with eating disorders than controls.  Due to abnormalities in the distribution of the data, non-
parametric Mann Whitney U tests were used in the analysis.  The descriptive statistics for the 
anagram solution task are shown in Table 2. 
 
304 
Within the eating disorder group there was a significant difference between participants mean 
anagram solution times on food anagrams (z=2.20, p=.01; Cohen‟s d=.40) and self esteem threat 
anagrams (z=2.70, p=.01; Cohen‟s d=.40) in comparison with the neutral anagrams.  There were 
no significant differences for solution times between body anagrams and neutral anagrams (z=1.20, 
p=.10; Cohen‟s d=.16).  Therefore, experimental hypothesis 1 could only be partially accepted 
because the effect size for the body anagram comparison was very small.  It was concluded that 
eating disorder participants demonstrated cognitive avoidance for food and self esteem threat 
anagrams in comparison to neutral anagrams.   
 
Table 2: Anagram solution times (and SDs) in seconds for eating disorder and control 
groups 
 
 Clinical ED 
Group 
 
N=22 
Binge-purge 
subgroup 
 
N=14 
Restricting 
subgroup 
 
N=8 
Control 
group 
 
N=34 
Body anagram 8.30 (5.1) 8.15 (5.00) 8.50 (5.40) 9.30 (5.00) 
Food anagram 8.80 (4.2) 9.06 (4.00) 8.26 (5.00) 9.80 (6.00) 
Self esteem 
anagram 
9.00 (4.3) 8.47 (4.00) 9.86 (5.20) 11.60 (5.00) 
Neutral anagram 7.40 (5.1) 6.53 (3.00) 9.36 (7.60) 6.50 (3.40) 
 
On inspection of the mean anagram solution times, it appeared contrary to prediction that the 
control group produced longer solution times than the clinical group.  This had the potential to 
obscure the findings between the groups and so was further explored in a post hoc investigation, to 
be discussed.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: Given the above, to further investigate if the control group were significantly 
different from the clinical group the Mann Whitney U comparisons were performed 2 tailed.  There 
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were no significant differences on anagram solution time between the groups for the body 
anagrams (z=-1.10, p=.30; Cohen‟s d=-.40) or food anagrams (z=-3.00, p=.80; Cohen‟s d=-.11).  
Negative effect sizes denote that the control group performed more slowly on these anagrams, 
contrary to prediction.  Indeed this result was significant for the self esteem threat anagrams (z=-
2.20, p=.01; Cohen‟s d=-.50), against the hypothesis.  For this reason the experimental hypothesis 
that cognitive avoidance would be stronger in the clinical group than the control group was rejected. 
 
The effect of eating disordered behaviour on cognitive avoidance: 
The clinical group was split into two by eating disordered behaviour, i.e. those using binge-purge 
behaviours (n=14) and those who restrict (n=8).  This was based upon their diagnosis and their 
scores on the EDI-3 subscales. 
Hypothesis 2: eating disordered behaviour (i.e. bulimic or anorexic behaviour) will have a 
moderating effect on cognitive avoidance.   
A Mann Whitney U test revealed no significant difference between the eating disordered behaviour 
groups for anagram solution times for body (z=-.13, p=.90; Cohen‟s d=-.06), food (z=81, p=.40; 
Cohen‟s d=17).or self esteem threats (z=-53, p=.60; Cohen‟s d=-.36).  Negative effect sizes denote 
that the restricting group processed these anagrams more slowly.  The effect sizes were small and 
so the hypothesis that type of eating disordered behaviour would have a moderating effect of 
anagram solution time was rejected. 
 
Experiential avoidance: 
Hypothesis 3: theoretically experiential avoidance appears to subsume cognitive avoidance, 
therefore it was expected that there would be a relationship between the participants scores on the 
AAQ and performance on the anagram task.   
Unexpectedly, correlational analysis did not reveal any relationships between scores on the AAQ 
and solution times for the threat anagrams.  The findings are displayed in Table 3.  No relationships 
were found for either group.   
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Table 3: Correlations between anagram solution times and experiential avoidance for eating 
disorder and control groups 
 
 Clinical ED Group 
(N=22) 
                    Control Group  
                    (N=33) 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p 
value 
Spearman‟s rho 
Correlation 
p 
value 
AAQ with Body Anagram 
Median 
.24 .30 .10 .60 
AAQ with Food Anagram 
Median 
.05 .80 -.23 .20 
AAQ with Self Esteem 
Anagram Median 
.27 .23 -.05 .80 
 
Post hoc analysis relating to the control group 
 
Post hoc investigations of the control group were performed as it emerged that they appeared to 
produce longer anagram solution times than the clinical group (i.e. indicating greater cognitive 
avoidance).  Within subjects post hoc comparisons indicated that participants in the control group 
produced significantly longer anagram solution times for food words (z=4.10, p=.001, 2-tailed), 
body words (z=4.10, p=.001, 2-tailed) and self esteem threat anagrams (z=6.50, p=.001, 2-tailed) 
than neutral anagrams.  These effects were much greater than for the clinical group (Cohen‟s d of 
.72, .70 and 1.22 respectively).  Prior investigations indicated that the control group produced 
significantly more errors than the clinical group therefore this suggests there may have been factors 
specific to the control group that may have obscured the findings on the anagram solution task.  
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Conclusions 
 
Support was found for the presence of cognitive avoidance within the eating disorder group for food 
and self esteem threats.  However, these findings were compromised by the lack of a significant 
effect between the clinical and comparison groups.  Post hoc tests indicated that cognitive 
avoidance was not specific to the eating disorder group, as the control group displayed longer 
anagram solution times for the threat anagrams than the clinical group.  This was unexpected and 
contradicts the previous findings (11).  However, parallels can be drawn between the findings of 
existing research and the present study.  In Meyer et al‟s study (11), although bulimic participants 
took longer to solve the „ego-threat‟ words (i.e. those related to self esteem), no differences were 
found for the food anagrams.  Post hoc tests revealed that the clinical group solved food anagrams 
faster than the control group, particularly the restrictive participants.  Restrictive participants also 
solved the ego-threat anagrams in similar times to the control group (11).  Within non-clinical 
samples there is evidence to suggest that those with a lower BMI solve threat anagrams more 
quickly (10).  These prior findings are significant for the present study as having a mixed clinical 
group for the main hypotheses may have obscured the important effects of eating disordered 
behaviour.  Further research is warranted with larger samples to determine the effect of disorder 
specific behaviour on cognitive avoidance.  
 
Within the previous research, faster anagram solution times have been suggested to represent 
processes of attentional bias in operation within the task (11).  It has been highlighted that 
attentional bias and cognitive avoidance do not occur independently of each other during 
information processing (37-38).  Therefore it is possible that attentional biases to the disorder 
relevant and self esteem threat stimuli may account for the faster solution times in the clinical 
group.   
 
It is possible that the control group did display greater degrees of cognitive avoidance than the 
clinical group.  This would indicate that cognitive avoidance is a generic process, not specific to 
psychopathology.  This is a reasonable suggestion which would benefit from further exploration in 
the research.  However, the amount of error generated by the control group may help to explain 
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these findings.  It is possible that the control group found the anagrams more complex than the 
clinical group, thus they made more errors and took longer to solve them.  There was some 
variation between the groups that may go some way to explaining the task specific differences in 
error.  For example the control group were younger than the clinical group.  This may be important 
as there has been some indication that age may affect cognitive biases (39).  Although there were 
no significant differences between the groups, level of English grammar and comprehension may 
also have had an effect, as there was a trend towards more participants with English as a second 
language in the control group.  This may have inflated the error rate and had an impact on anagram 
solution time.  Future research should be mindful of these factors.   
 
Despite indications that experiential avoidance was likely to be a key feature of the eating disorder 
group in this study, it was of note that this did not appear to be an explanatory variable for cognitive 
avoidance.  This is contrary to expectation, as it is likely that the construct of experiential avoidance 
(27-28) would encompass avoidant cognitive processes.  This may be both a feature of the way 
that experiential avoidance is constructed within the AAQ and a result of the limitations of this 
study.  The AAQ questionnaire requires further validation.  However the existing theoretical and 
clinical evidence would suggest that experiential avoidance plays an important role in the 
development and maintenance of ED (29-30). 
 
This study had a number of strengths.  Notably, only one other study has explored cognitive 
avoidance in a clinical eating disorder sample using the anagram solution paradigm.  This study 
attempted to add more weight to the literature in support of the relevance of cognitive avoidance to 
an eating disordered population.  It also attempted to advance the paradigm by attempting to 
improve matching procedures for stimulus words and extending the disorder relevant stimuli to 
include body words.  Presenting the task in a computerised way was also beneficial as it minimised 
demand characteristics and experimenter effects.  It also allowed for more accurate recording of 
response times than via stopwatch.  This study attempted to explore cognitive avoidance by eating 
disordered behaviour, as opposed to diagnosis.  This is in line with a transdiagnostic (40), more 
functional view of eating disorders.  However the numbers in each group may have been too low to 
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detect any differences.  This study is also one of the first to measure experiential avoidance in a 
clinical eating disorder group. 
 
The study had a number of limitations, including the lack of a pilot study to obtain normative 
solution times for the anagram task.  As the target words were different to that used in the prior 
research, direct comparison was not possible.  Therefore establishing norms with which to compare 
clinical samples and ensure anagrams are of equivalent difficulty is crucial for future research.  It is 
possible that the stimuli used were not as relevant to the current concerns of eating disordered 
individuals as hoped.  Ways to improve this would be asking a group of eating disorder participants 
to rate a pool of target words in terms of the degree of threat.  This may improve the ecological 
validity of the target words used.  Finally, the anagram solution task may not adequately distinguish 
between biases towards threat and cognitive avoidance of threat.  Developing paradigms that tease 
out differences between vigilance to threat (i.e. attentional bias) and avoidance of threat would be 
worthwhile, although this is with recognition that the processes may be interdependent. 
 
Given the evidence to support cognitive avoidance within the eating disorder group in this and prior 
research, it is reasonable to conclude that this process may have relevance for individuals with 
eating disorders.  Theoretical accounts conceptualise eating disordered behaviours themselves as 
motivated attempts to regulate affect through the avoidance or “escape” they provide.  There is 
much evidence to suggest that efforts to regulate emotion by attempting to avoid, control and 
suppress experience may ultimately exacerbate and perpetuate distress (27-28; 41-44).  As it 
seems likely that avoidance would perpetuate the symptoms associated with eating disorders, 
particular clinical techniques to address this may be warranted.  These may already be 
encompassed within CBT (i.e. exposure and response prevention) but it may be that avoidant 
processes may be more usefully addressed by using clinical approaches such as ACT (27-28).  
This approach would seem to be beneficial as it highlights the long term effects of experiential 
avoidance in maintaining psychopathology.  Within treatment, ACT emphasises the acceptance of 
previously avoided negative thoughts and emotions as a route to recovery.  This approach has 
been usefully modified for eating disorders (30) and therapeutic outcome studies measuring 
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changes in avoidant style of coping would provide support for the use of this approach.  This is a 
challenge for clinical research. 
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